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INTRODUCTION

The Yearbook of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht (Tilburg University) contains this year six, mostly elaborate studies of a rather different nature, all provided with a summary which the reader can find at the end of each study.

The first contribution is written by Anna Sapir Abulafia, Professor of the Study of the Abrahamic Religions at Oxford University. It deals with regulations concerning Jews in Medieval Canon Law. This contribution was originally given as a lecture on the occasion of the graduation of Syds Wiersma, defending his *Pearls in a Dunghill. The Anti-Jewish Writings of Raymond Martin O.P. (ca. 1220 – ca. 1285)*, May 20th 2015 at Tilburg University. It forms part of an ongoing project on ‘Gratian and the Jews’. For many years now, the Jaarboek has been publishing contributions on the issue of the relations between Jews and Christians in the Middle Ages, and we welcome this study of such an expert scholar.

Anton ten Klooster is a graduate student of the Tilburg School of Catholic Theology and the Thomas Instituut of Utrecht, working under the direction of the undersigned as well as prof. dr. Marcel Sarot. Ten Klooster will shortly finish his project on Aquinas’s commentary on Matthew. In conducting his research, he discovered the importance of the so-called Basel manuscript for the authentic reportation of Aquinas’s commentary, which has quite a complex history. Ten Klooster now presents, for the first time, an edition of the part of this manuscript that contains Aquinas’s commentary on the beatitudes and a critical apparatus that goes with it.

Jörgen Vijgen is at present post-doctoral researcher at the Thomas Instituut, and, together with his colleague Jacco Verburgt, entrusted with the organization of the next international conference of the

Institute (see www.thomasinstituut.org; “Initiation and Mystagogy in Thomas Aquinas”, 13-15 December 2018). Vijgen has studied the ways in which Aquinas in his academic sermons, only recently made available in a text-critical edition, makes use of Aristotle.

Giuseppe Ferrari, attached to the Thomas Instituut as an independent researcher from Modena, Italy, where he teaches classical languages in high school, presents a fruit of his studies on the relevancy of the thought of Thomas Aquinas for present-day environmental ethics. Ferrari in part answers to the call of Pope Francis in his *Laudato si!*

Rudi te Velde, professor in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas at Tilburg School of Catholic Theology, and member of the Thomas Instituut, studies, from an explicit modern perspective, the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas on religious obedience, and especially Aquinas’s interpretation of the story of the binding of Isaac.

The final contribution in this volume is from the hand of Marcel Sarot, dean of the Tilburg School of Catholic Theology and member of the Thomas Instituut. Sarot has written extensively on the problem of evil as well as the (im)passibility of God. His contribution is devoted to a conceptual analysis of ‘evil’.

We are very grateful to be able to publish this 36th collection of studies devoted to the thought of Thomas Aquinas. At present we are working towards making the Jaarboek available in open access. In the mean time, previous volumes can be accessed on www.thomasinstituut.org.

October 5, 2017

Henk J.M. Schoot,
Editor-in-Chief.

GRATIAN AND THE JEWS

Anna Sapir Abulafia

In the process of writing my latest book on medieval Christian-Jewish relations I became increasingly aware of the fruitfulness of getting to grips with Roman law and canon law for gaining a fuller and more accurate overall picture of the place of Jews in Medieval Latin Christendom. The history of the Jews in Visigothic Spain illustrates this well. In tandem with so many scholars I had long thought of the Visigothic persecution of the Jews in the seventh century simply as a blip in the relatively peaceful period of Christian-Jewish relations from about 500 to 1096, the date of the attacks against the Jews of the Rhineland by the *milites Christi* of the so-called popular crusades. It was only when researching the canons concerning Jews of the councils of Toledo that I realised how incredibly important that ‘blip’ had been for Christian-Jewish relations throughout the medieval period.

As is well known, the Jews in Spain were forcibly converted to Catholicism by King Sisibut in 615/6. It seems that Sisibut had made up his own mind to deal with the Jews of his kingdom in this way, even though this would go against accepted ecclesiastical policies concerning the position of Jews in Christian society. One of the many tasks of the Fourth Council of Toledo in 633, which was convened under the aegis of Isidore of Seville, was to deal with the inevitable issues ensuing from the king’s actions. The Council produced nine canons to address the problem of the presence of unwilling Jewish converts. Eight of the nine ended up in Gratian’s *Decretum*, the magisterial collection of ecclesiastical rulings of the mid twelfth century. Four of the nine are among the ten ‘Jewish’ canons which John Gilchrist has identified as the most frequently cited in canon law collections of the tenth, eleventh and twelfth century up to and including the *Decretum*.¹ The most widely

¹ John Gilchrist, ‘The Canonistic treatment of Jews in the Latin West in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries’, *Zeitschrift der Savigny-*

disseminated of the four was Canon 57 (*De Iudeis*).² It stated unequivocally that Jews should not be forced to convert. It was, however, equally unequivocal in stating that the Jews who had been converted by force (as had happened under Sisibut), had to remain Christians. Anything else would be blasphemous with regard to the sacraments of which they had partaken. This canon, protective in one sense, but cruelly repressive in another, was quoted over and over again when canonists discussed the nature of coercion and the nature of its counterpart: voluntary or involuntary acquiescence. In Pope Innocent III's definitive ruling on the matter, in a letter to the archbishop of Arles in 1201, *Majores ecclesie* acquiescence was so broadly defined that in effect, any Jew who had succumbed to baptism to escape death was not permitted to return to Judaism, however unwillingly the process of conversion had been.³

Another of the widely disseminated canons, *Iudeorum filios et filias*, canon 60, addressed the concern that forced converts would be unreliable when it came to bringing up their children as good Christians. Accordingly, it ruled that these girls and boys should be removed from their parents and put into the care of Catholic families or monasteries where they would receive a good Christian upbringing. This canon led to later discussions about the permissibility of depriving Jews, who had not converted, of their offspring in order to baptize them. The third ruling, *Plerique qui ex*

Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte Kanonistische Abteilung 106 (1989), 70-106 and 'The Perception of Jews in the Canon Law in the Period of the First Two Crusades', *Jewish History* 3 (1988), 9-24; D. 45 c. 5, C. 28 q. 1 c. 11, C. 28 q. 1 c. 12, D. 4 de cons. c. 94.

² Amnon Linder (ed. and trans.), *The Jews in the Legal Sources of the Early Middle Ages* (Detroit, 1997), 486-7 (henceforth *JLSEMA*).

³ Solomon Grayzel, *The Church and the Jews in the XIIIth Century. A Study of their relations during the years 1198-1254, based on the papal letters and the conciliar decrees of the period*, revised edn (New York, 1966), no. 12, 100-103, 15; Shlomo Simonsohn (ed.), *The Apostolic See and the Jews. Documents: 492-1404* (Toronto 1988), no. 77, 80-81; see John A. Watt, 'Jews and Christians in the Gregorian Decretals', in *Christianity and Judaism*, ed. Diana Wood, Oxford 1992, 99-100.

Iudeis, canon 59, forbade Jewish converts from practising Judaism; the fourth, canon 62, *Saepe malorum consortia*, prohibited converted Jews from interacting with those who had remained Jews. Another canon which ended up in the *Decretum* was canon 65 (*Praecipiente domino* [also disseminated as *Constituit, Iudei aut hi qui ex Iudeis, Hi qui ex Iudeis*]) which legislated against Jews holding offices through which they would have authority over Christians.⁴ Canon 14 of the Third Toledan Council of 589, *Suggerente concilio id* (also cited as *Nulla officia*), had also done this, as well as stipulating that Jews should not have Christian wives or concubines or own Christian slaves. This canon echoed various Roman laws forbidding Jews to have Christian slaves or preside over members of the Christian faith in fear that they would misuse their position of authority to disadvantage Christians. A chunk of *Nulla officia* also found its way into the *Decretum*.⁵ Innocent III referred to it in canon 70 of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215.⁶

Whatever really happened to Jews under Visigothic rule in the early seventh century - Michael Toch for one has doubted that there were, in fact, any Jews in Visigothic Iberia at the time and interpreted the Toledan 'Jewish' canons as products of over-active ecclesiastical imaginations - ,⁷ Visigothic legislation played a significant role in defining the parameters of Jewish participation in Christian society. It did this because the disseminated canons touched on what I consider to be two fundamental aspects of Christian-Jewish relations: conversion and hierarchy. Throughout the Middle Ages ecclesiastical hopes for Jewish conversion were dampened by anxieties about Jewish recidivism and concerns for the undermining

⁴ *JLSEMA*, 485-91.

⁵ *JLSEMA*, 484-5; D. 54 c. 14.

⁶ Norman P. Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical councils* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1990), 267.

⁷ Michael Toch, 'The Jews in Europe, 500-1050', in Paul Fouracre (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 2005), 550-1; see discussion in Anna Sapir Abulafia, *Christian-Jewish Relations, 1000-1300. Jews in the Service of Medieval Christendom* (Harlow, 2011), 26-30.

of Christian society by insincere converts.⁸ These concerns magnified when conversion was forced on unwilling Jews and must have intensified when rulers such as Henry IV of Germany permitted forced Jewish converts to return to their Jewish faith in 1097. And as the process of inner spiritual Christian conversion was valued ever more highly from around 1050, the prospect of sincere Jewish conversion to Christianity seems to have been regarded less and less likely.⁹ Hierarchy had to do with interlocking and overlapping principles which derived from the teachings of St Paul, the writings of Augustine, decretals of Gregory the Great and rulings of Roman law. Jews were tolerated as long as, *and only as long as*, they **served** Christian aims. Toleration was conditional on Jews being **useful** to Christian society. Jews were expected to recognise that their place in Christian society was contingent on their subservience to Christians. Judaism was deemed to have been superseded by Christianity; Jews were supposed to serve Christians and not Christians Jews. That was the prevailing theory in medieval Christian thinking.¹⁰ The fact that so many canons repeatedly insisted on the importance of upholding these principles demonstrates that theory and practice seldom went together. In everyday social interactions between Christians and Jews, ecclesiastical rules governing Jewish service were constantly broken.

⁸ Kenneth Stow has been particularly interested in ideas concerning Jewish contamination; see for example his *Jewish Dogs. An Image and its Interpreters*, Stanford, CA, 2006.

⁹ See for example my 'Guibert of Nogent and William of Flay and the problem of Jewish conversion at the time of the First Crusade', in *Studies in medieval intellectual and social history. Festschrift in honor of Robert Chazan* ed. David Engel, Lawrence H. Schiffman, Elliot R. Wolfson (Leiden etc., 2012), 9-27.

¹⁰ See Sapir Abulafia, *Christian-Jewish Relations*.

Gratian's collection of canons, the *Decretum*, overtook all previous canonical collections.¹¹ It systematized many thousands of ecclesiastical and theological texts spanning more than 1000 years of Christianity. It rapidly became the medieval textbook of canon law. It was studied, taught and consulted all over Europe. Glosses on the text proliferated and numerous *summae* or overviews of the *Decretum* were produced soon after its appearance. Anders Winroth's research has given us the tools to think more clearly about the evolution of the *Decretum*. Winroth identified a group of manuscripts which contain an early form of the *Decretum*. He called this version the first recension and dubbed it Gratian 1. Winroth reckoned Gratian would have completed the first recension at the earliest in 1139.¹² Within a short period of time an extended version of the *Decretum* had evolved. The exact process by which this fuller version came into existence is still much debated. It is not clear what involvement, if any, Gratian himself had in it. Nor is it clear whether it was the work of one or more canonists. Gratian 2 is the term Winroth used for the extended version, which he called the second recension. He placed its completion by 1158.¹³ In what follows I shall use the term Gratian 1 to refer to the first recension as presented by Winroth and Gratian 2 to the extended much more familiar version of the *Decretum* which is now generally thought to have begun to circulate by about 1150.¹⁴

¹¹ *Corpus Iuris Canonici*. Vol. 1, *Decretum magistri Gratiani*, ed. by Emil Friedberg, Leipzig 1879: <http://geschichte.digital-sammlungen.de/decretum-gratiani/online/angebot>.

¹² Anders Winroth, *The Making of Gratian's Decretum*, Cambridge 2011, 136-140.

¹³ Winroth, 140-44, especially 142.

¹⁴ The appendix to *The Making of Gratian's Decretum* which outlines Gratian I is on pp. 197-227; for Winroth's working edition of Gratian 1 see <http://gratian.org>, accessed on 28 September 2017; for Gratian 1 and 2 see in particular, Winroth, pp. 194-6 and his 'Recent Work on the Making of Gratian's *Decretum*', *Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law* 26 (2004-6), 1-30, especially pp. 4-5; Peter Landau, 'Gratian and the *Decretum Gratiani*', in: Wilfried Hartmann and Kenneth Pennington

The *Decretum* evolved in a period of exciting intellectual advances in theology and philosophy. This period also witnessed important developments in Christian thinking about Jews. I have spent many years in analysing the evolution of the Christian-Jewish debate within the context of twelfth-century scholasticism. Research on the twelfth-century Christian-Jewish debate has shed more light on twelfth-century scholasticism, just as studies on the evolution of twelfth-century thought have done much to deepen our understanding of changes occurring in the Christian-Jewish debate. It makes sense to adopt the same approach to canon law. The *Decretum* contains some 36 canons specifically dealing with some kind of interaction between Christians and Jews.¹⁵ Why were **those texts** included in the *Decretum* and others not? Why were ‘Jewish canons’ placed **where** they were? What was the **reason** for including them and in **what context** were they included? Only six of the 36 ‘Jewish’ canons listed by Gilchrist were present in Gratian 1. **Why** was the majority added by the compiler(s) of Gratian 2?¹⁶ Does that mean that Gratian 2 was more anti-Jewish than Gratian

(eds), *The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical period, 1140-1234: From Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX* (Washington D.C. 2008), 39 note 33 for references to a discussion about the ur-Gratian text [henceforth *HMCLCP*]. For an extensive bibliography on the development on the *Decretum* see <http://legalhistorysources.com/1140a-z.htm> as well as <http://gratian.org>. See also Martin Brett, ‘Editing the Canon-Law Collections between Burchard and Gratian’, in *Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, ed. Uta-Renate Blumenthal, Kenneth Pennington, and Atria A. Larson. Monumenta Iuris Canonici, series C: Subsidia, vol. XIII, Vatican 2008, 98; I am very grateful to Dr Martin Brett for his kind assistance with this complex material.

¹⁵ Gilchrist, ‘The Canonistic treatment of Jews’, 97-100.

¹⁶ Kenneth Pennington asks this question in ‘The Law’s Violence against Medieval and Early Modern Jews’, *Rivista Internazionale di Diritto Comune* 23 (2012), 25.

1?¹⁷ And crucially, **how** were these canons read, how were they commented on in the glosses, the commentaries which proliferated in the margins of the MSS? One only needs to think of the vast numbers of Gratian manuscripts spread over the whole of Europe to appreciate the importance of gaining greater insights into what I have simply phrased ‘Gratian and the Jews’ in the title of my article.

Examining all of the MSS of the *Decretum* in search of answers to these questions would obviously be impossible. That is why I have decided to concentrate on an unique manuscript in the library of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, MS 283/676.¹⁸ This manuscript contains a late twelfth-century *Decretum* together with two layers of glosses. The oldest layer of glosses is the most extensive one; as Charles Duggan has shown, it reflects the teaching of Gratian by Anglo-Norman canonists in Oxford in the 1190s. The most interesting part of the Anglo-Norman Gloss (A-NG) is the signed glosses by John of Tynemouth and Simon of Southwell, both of whom were masters in Oxford at the time. The later layer of glosses, which is much less extensive, is from around 1300.¹⁹ The dates of composition of both layers of glosses

¹⁷ <http://canonlaw.wikispot.org/History> (accessed 2 March 2017) implied that the inclusion of the anti-Jewish canons in Gratian 2 attested to Gratian’s 2 being ‘more traditional and harsh’.

¹⁸ I am very grateful to the Fellow Librarian, the Librarian and the library staff of Gonville and Caius for their assistance in consulting this manuscript and others.

¹⁹ Stephan Kuttner and Eleanor Rathbone, ‘Anglo-Norman Canonists of the Twelfth Century. An Introductory Study’, *Traditio* (7) 1949–51, 317–21; see also the extensive analysis by Charles Duggan, ‘The Reception of Canon Law in England’, in *Canon Law in Medieval England. The Becket Dispute and Decretal Collections*, ed. Charles Duggan, London 1982, 371–7 and more recently Anna Sapir Abulafia, ‘Jews in the Glosses of a late twelfth-century Anglo-Norman Gratian manuscript (Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, MS 283/676)’, in: *Anglo-Norman Studies: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 2015*, ed. Elisabeth van Houts (Woodbridge, 2016), 19–33; Rodney Thomson dated the hand of the second layer of glosses to around 1300 in a private communication. I am very grateful for his help with this MS.

coincided with important moments in the history of the Jews of medieval England. The 1190s marked the period following the succession of Richard I in September 1189. The king's coronation and his immediate departure on Crusade sparked widespread attacks on Jews which lasted into the first few months of 1190. In 1194 Jewish moneylending was meticulously organised by royal ordinance. Henry II's reorganisation of the mints in the late 1150s had given a large number of Jews the opportunity to become involved in moneylending. The Jewish communities of England soon ranked among the most prosperous in the whole of Latin Christendom. At the same time Henry's confiscation of the estate of Aaron of Lincoln in 1186 was an ominous sign of Jewish exposure to the whims of the crown. Last, but not least, by the 1190s a thriving Jewish community was developing in Oxford within easy reach of the royal castle around what is now known as Carfax and St Aldate's in the centre of what was medieval Oxford.²⁰ As for the later layer of glosses, it would have been added to the MS around the time Edward I expelled the Jews from England in 1290.

To make my research project on MS 283/676 manageable I have decided first of all to tackle the twelfth-century layer of glosses. Once I have worked my way through that, I shall compare it to the later gloss. As for the earlier layer of glosses I have decided to tackle one section of the *Decretum* at a time in order to build as full a picture as possible of the role of Jews in the A-NG. Built into my analysis is the comparison between what the A-NG had to say about Jews with what had been said in the sources its compiler(s) seem(s) to have consulted. These sources included, the *Summa* on the *Decretum* by John Faventinus (fl. 1170s/1180s), the so-called

²⁰ For the Jews of medieval England see for example Patricia Skinner (ed.), *Jews in Medieval Britain*, Woodbridge, 2003 and the chapter on England in Sapir Abulafia, *Christian-Jewish Relations*, 88-108; for Oxford in particular see Pam Manix, 'Oxford: mapping the medieval Jewry', in: Christopher Cluse (ed.), *The Jews of Europe in the Middle Ages (tenth to fifteenth)*. *Proceedings of the International Symposium held at Speyer; 20-25 October 2002* (Turnhout, 2004), 405-20.

Summa Lipsiensis which scholars now regard as an Anglo-Norman work compiled in Paris circa 1186, which used John Faventinus, and the widely disseminated *Summa decretorum* by Huguccio (d. 1210), which in turn used the *Summa Lipsiensis*.²¹ My analysis will also comprise a comparison between the views expressed about Jews in the A-NG and the Ordinary gloss on the *Decretum*. The *Glossa ordinaria* became the standard running commentary on the *Decretum* after it was compiled by Johannes Teutonicus around 1214-1216/17 and revised by Bartholomew of Brescia (d. 1258) after the appearance of the Gregorian *Decretals* in 1234.²² So far I have examined *causa* 23 of the second part of the *Decretum* and I have a conducted a full analysis of Distinction 45 of Part I. The focus of the first part of the *Decretum* is on different aspects of ecclesiastical posts and on the requirements for and the duties of those who occupy them. Part II comprises 36 fictitious *causae* or cases. *Causa* 23 is built around the case of bishops waging war against heretics. It contains *Dispar nimirum* (C. 23 q. 8 c. 11), one of the few 'Jewish' canons contained in Gratian 1. *Dispar nimirum* is a fragment of the letter Pope Alexander II wrote in 1063 to the bishops of Spain praising them for preventing French crusaders perpetrating violence against Jews. The fragment incorporated in the *Decretum* says 'The case of Jews and Muslims is without a doubt different. For against the latter, who persecute Christians and drive them out of their own cities and settlements, one fights justly;

²¹ Kuttner and Rathbone, 'Anglo-Norman Canonists of the Twelfth Century', 317-21; Charles Duggan, 'The Reception of Canon Law in England', in: Charles Duggan, *Canon Law in Medieval England. The Becket Dispute and Decretal Collections*, London 1982, no. XI, 371-7; *Summa 'Omnis qui iuste iudicat' sive Lipsiensis*, ed. Rudolf Weigand, Peter Landau, Waltraud Kozur, vol. 1, *Monumenta Iuris Canonici* series A: Corpus Glossatorum, vol. 7 (Rome 2007), ix-xi; Rudolf Weigand, 'Transmontane Decretists', *HMCLCP*, 195-6; Kenneth Pennington, *Medieval and early modern jurists: a bio-bibliographical listing* at <http://legalhistorysources.com/1140a-z.htm>; Sapir Abulafia, 'Jews in the Glosses', 19-20.

²² R. Weigand, 'The Development of the *Glossa Ordinaria* to Gratian's *Decretum*', *HMCLCP*, 82-91.

the former are prepared to serve everywhere'. A short summary of my findings on canon 23 will illustrate well how instructive it is to read 'Jewish' canons such as this one in the full context of its appearance in the *Decretum*.

Dispar nimirum is a canon which on the face of it protects Jews against Christian attack. I cannot have been the only one to have wondered why the *Decretum* incorporated this protective canon rather than the better known '*Sicut Iudeis*' which had found its way into a sizeable number of canonical collections. '*Sicut Iudeis*' is the letter Gregory the Great wrote in 598 to the bishop of Palermo admonishing him that 'Just as the Jews [*Sicut Iudeis*] should not have the freedom to presume anything in their synagogues beyond what is permitted by law, in the same way, they should not suffer any prejudice in those things granted them'.²³ The opening phrase of this Gregorian letter had formed the opening of the standard and oft repeated papal bull of protection of Jews from the 1120s. This bull too was known as *Sicut Iudeis*. One understands much better why Gratian chose *Dispar nimirum* rather than *Sicut Iudeis* if one takes the overall context of the *causa* 23 into account. The *causa* is about waging war and the parameters by which war might be waged justly. By the final stage of his discussion Gratian I was considering whether bishops or clerics were permitted to take up arms and he was looking for a ruling which legitimated violence. He needed a ruling which made the legal distinction between Muslims and Jews clear; he was not just looking for a protective canon for Jews. *Dispar nimirum* suited his purpose to a tee. The glosses on *Dispar nimirum* in the Anglo-Norman gloss and the *Glossa ordinaria* bear this out. They did not discuss protection of Jews. They entered into discussions about the legal differences between the contact Christians might have with Muslims and Jews. The A-NG took pains to refer the reader to *De Iudeis*, the Toledan canon we have discussed which became part of Distinction 45 in the *Decretum* so that it was clear that Jews who were Christian converts had to be forced to remain Christian. These Jews were certainly not protected against Christian violence. The *Glossa Ordinaria* explained that if

²³ Quotation from *JLSEMA*, 434.

Muslims did not attack Christians they should not be attacked either.²⁴ What we learn from all of this is the importance of remembering that the *Decretum* is not about Jews. We need to puzzle out why it included the ‘Jewish’ canons it did and in what manner and why to understand better the role it played in developing Christian-Jewish relations.

Distinction 45 is about bishops and the patience they need to show their flock and the clerics serving under them. As we have just seen it includes *De Iudeis* (D. 45 c. 5). This is in the extended version of Gratian 2. It also contains *Qui sincera* (D. 45 c. 3), a letter by Gregory the Great instructing bishops that they should coax Jews to the font, not repress their services. It too did not feature in the first recension of Gratian 1. Why were these canons added to the extended version of the *Decretum*? It seems to me that the compiler(s) of Gratian 2 felt that Distinction 45 lacked many relevant canons which had important things to say about episcopal conduct. After all, Gratian 2 listed 12 more canons that Gratian 1 for this Distinction. *De Iudeis* and *Qui sincera* were only 2 of these.²⁵

Let us now turn to Distinction 54, the distinction which contains a section of canon 14 of the Third Toledan Council forbidding Jews

²⁴ Important too is to take into account the material Gratian would have had to hand. Looking at the sources for the canons surrounding *Dispar nimirum* one discovers that Gratian was relying heavily on the *Panormia*, a widely disseminated late eleventh or early twelfth-century collection of canons usually ascribed to Ivo of Chartres. The *Panormia* includes *Dispar nimirum*, not *Sicut Iudeis*. Does this mean Gratian did not know *Sicut Iudeis*? Not necessarily, *Sicut Iudeis* was included in another collection he used for this section, the *Polycarpus* of the early twelfth century. See for full analysis, Anna Sapir Abulafia, ‘Engagement with Judaism and Islam in Gratian’s *Causa 23*’, in Philippe Buc, Martha Keil and John Tolan (eds), *Jews and Christians in Medieval Europe: The historiographical legacy of Bernhard Blumenkranz* (Turnhout, 2015), 12-15.

²⁵ For a full analysis see Sapir Abulafia, ‘Jews in the Glosses’.

to hold office over Christians and to own Jewish slaves.²⁶ Let us see what we can gauge from an investigation of what the ‘Jewish’ canons are in this Distinction and how and why they were placed there. Let us also try to learn something about how the ‘Jewish’ canons were commented on in the *Glossa ordinaria* and in the ANG.²⁷

Distinction 54 is concerned with rules governing the ordination of *servi/famuli*, persons of unfree status, slaves or serfs. In what follows I shall refer to *servi/famuli* as applicable to preserve the multivalence of the original terms.²⁸ The basic rule was that only *servi* who had been freed by their master were eligible for clerical orders. The Distinction gathered together canons on the reasons why *servi* had to be freed, on the type of freedom deemed necessary to become a cleric, the nature of a master’s permission, and the onus on bishops to be informed of the personal status of those who presented themselves for holy orders. In Winroth’s working edition of the first recension of the *Decretum*, i.e. Gratian 1, there are 11 canons and seven comments,²⁹ or *dicta* as they are called, in which Gratian set out a position and offered solutions to the contradictions presented by the canonical material he had gathered together on a particular issue. Gratian 2 – remember, we do not know how many canonists are hiding behind this nomenclature – added seven canons, two *dicta* and a sentence to Gratian 1’s closing *dictum* of

²⁶ Friedberg, 206-12.

²⁷ I have found Leena Löfstedt (ed.), *Gratiani Decretum: La traduction en ancien français du Décret de Gratien*. Vol. 1: *Distinctiones*. Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum 95, Helsinki, 1992 very helpful in analysing Distinction 54.

²⁸ In what follows I shall indicate if other terms are used to designate persons of unfree status. The complex issue of what exactly each of these terms meant in any time and place goes beyond the remit of this article.

²⁹ <http://gratian.org>, accessed on 28 September 2017; in Friedberg’s edition canons 1-2, 4, 5, 9, 10-11, 19, 21-23; d.a.c. 1, d.p.c. 4, d.p.c. 8, d.p.c. 21, d.p.c. 22; d.p.c. 23.

the distinction.³⁰ Friedberg's edition of the *Decretum* has an additional six *paleae*.³¹ *Paleae* were added to Gratian 2 after it was completed till 1180.³² Both of the new *dicta* which were added by Gratian 2 to Distinction 54 concern Jews; three of the seven additional canons are 'Jewish' canons; three of the *paleae* deal with Jews. None of Gratian 1's canons or *dicta* mentioned Jews. Why?

Gratian 1's discussion seems straightforward enough. He presented four canons to cover the position with which he had opened, namely that persons of unfree status could not be ordained unless they had obtained legal freedom from their own masters. No bishop might ordain someone else's *servus* unless his master had agreed. 'A man who will have joined divine military service must be completely free so that he cannot be dragged from the Lord's army in which he is enrolled by the bonds of any necessity' (D. 54 c.1). The liberty granted to a *servus* in these circumstances had to be granted before promotion to holy orders by means of a freedom charter publicly displayed on the pulpit (D. 54 c. 2). If *famuli* belonging to the Church were summoned by their bishops to serve in clerical orders, they too must have gained their freedom. If they proved their virtue they could go on to higher offices. And if they misbehaved they were bound into perpetual slavery (D. 54 c. 4). Gratian continued to emphasise the necessity of *servi* who had been freed and had been ordained not to be obligated in any way to their former masters (D.54. d.p.c. 4, c.5). Gratian 1 went on to consider those who had somehow entered clerical orders without obtaining their freedom. Priests would lose the money or property they possessed. Deacons in this position could hand over a substitute in their stead if they had one, if not, they would have to return to their masters (D.54 d.p.c. 8, c. 9). If a bishop had ordained a *servus* a priest knowing that he was unfree, then he had to indemnify the master in question for the double amount. If the bishop had acted on good faith then those who had misled him had to indemnify the lord. It is worth pointing out that a master's right to his property and the sanctity of

³⁰ D. 54 cc 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 24, d.p.c. 12, d.p.c. 14, d.p.c. 23.

³¹ D. 54, cc 3, 6, 8, 16, 17, 18

³² Landau, 'Gratian and the *Decretum Gratiani*', 47.

clerical orders were the legal issues at stake, not the wishes of *servi*. Gratian finally wondered whether *servi* belonging to monasteries could be given their freedom so that they could be ordained. He started by saying this was not possible because abbots and monks had nothing of their own so they could not give anyone something, in this case a *servus* his freedom. And a possession could only be alienated by its owner in temporal law (D. 54 c. 22). But Gratian seemed dissatisfied by this line of thought and went on to state that, actually, monastic *servi* could, after all continue to serve the monastery after they had gained holy orders (D. 54 d.p.c. 22). And he ended with a decretal of Gregory the Great which said that monks who had been ecclesiastical *famuli* could go on to be ordained if they had proven themselves as monks (D. 54 c. 23).

That Gratian 2 might wish to add more proof texts to Gratian 1's exposé is easy enough to imagine. In Gratian 2's first additional canon (D. 54 c. 7) the importance of the unfree person seeking ordination to have led a good life is specified. But what possible bearing could Jews have on the discussion? Why was such a large proportion of the additional material in Gratian 2 about Jews? The answer lies in the first additional *dictum* in Gratian 2 (D. 54 d.a.c. 13) which was inserted after all of Gratian 1's canons about the need for *servi* to be given their liberty if they were to enter holy orders or, as the case may be, remain in clerical orders if some irregularity had occurred along the way. Gratian 2's *dictum* is preceded by an additional canon (D. 54 c. 12) admonishing bishops, priests, deacons and abbots not to retain unfree persons (*servos et originarios*) who have sought to gain entrance to a monastery or ecclesiastical service without written proof of their masters' consent or unless the necessary legal transaction had been enacted. It is at this point that Gratian 2's additional *dictum Hoc tunc* was introduced, saying: 'This should then be observed when a master and a *servus* are of the same faith. But if a Jew will have bought a

Christian slave (*mancipium*), he must be freed by the authority of a judge or a bishop even if the Jew is unwilling.³³

Gratian 2 introduced Jews into the Distinction 54 because he felt it necessary to make plain that the rule that *servi* could not enter holy orders unless their masters had agreed to free them did not apply if the masters in question were Jew.³⁴ One might well wonder whether the compiler(s) of Gratian 2 was/were interested in this question from a purely theoretical point of view or out of practical considerations as well.³⁵ To be sure, there existed a plethora of canons concerning Jewish slaveholding. Amongst these were widely disseminated extracts from letters by Gregory the Great who had responded to actual cases brought to him for resolution.³⁶ On the other hand, it would seem that Jewish possession of house slaves continued to exist in different measure in different parts of Medieval Latin Christendom.³⁷ Apart from that, I would argue that

³³ D. 54 d.a.c. 13, Friedberg, 211: *Hoc tunc observandum est, cum dominus et servus eiusdem professionis inveniuntur. Ceterum si Iudeus Christianum mancipium emerit, iudicis uel episcopi auctoritate, etiam eo inuito, ad libertatem debet perduc.*

³⁴ The *Summa Lipsiensis* commented on the *dictum* which we now know was added by Gratian 2: ‘*Ne autem de servis Iudeorum aliquis intelligat, determinat tunc observari debere, cum uterque et dominus et servus Christiani fuerint; nam de seruis Iudeorum secus est dicendum*’, *Summa Lipsiensis*, ed. Weigand et al., 255.

³⁵ On the issues of Jewish slaveholding in canon law see Francis R. Czerwinski, ‘The Teachings of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Century Canonists about the Jews’ (PhD, Cornell University 1973), 90-140; see also Walter Pakter, *Medieval Canon Law and the Jews* (Ebelsback, 1988), 84-142.

³⁶ Gilchrist, ‘The Canonistic treatment of Jews’, 72, 74; Watt, ‘Jews and Christians in the Gregorian Decretals, 95-6; Sapis Abulafia, *Christian-Jewish Relations*, 20-2).

³⁷ See Michael Toch, ‘Wirtschaft und Verfolgung: Die bedeutung der Ökonomie für die Kreuzzugspogromedes 11. Und 12. Jahrhunderts. Mit einem Anhang zum Sklavenhandel der Juden’, in A. Haverkamp (ed.), *Juden und Christen zur Zeit der Kreuzzüge* (Sigmaringen, 1999), 272- 85, in which he argues that medieval Jews were not heavily

the reason these canons continued to resonate so strongly was that the issue of Jewish slaveholding morphed into the issue of Jewish employment of Christian domestic servants and was interconnected with the issue of Jews holding offices and having jurisdiction over Christians. The fundamental issue at stake was the one we have already touched on. It was the issue of Jewish standing, of the correct hierarchy between Christians and Jews, in other words, of the perceived correct relationship between Jews and Christians. Jews were supposed to be lorded over by Christians; the reverse was seen as a dangerous inversion of what was considered to be the proper hierarchy between Christians and Jews.

By mentioning a Jewish master the compiler(s) of Gratian 2 opened a number of legal questions. (This is presumably why at an even later stage another three canons, the three *paleae* mentioned above, were added.) The first additional canon Gratian 2 introduced was *Mancipia Christiana* (D. 54 c. 13). This is a short extract from the final part of the letter Gregory the Great sent to Praetor Libertinus of Sicily in 593.³⁸ The letter instructed Libertinus to take up the case of a Jew called Nasas who had allegedly bribed Libertinus' predecessor Justinus to allow him among others things to buy Christian slaves and retain them for himself. If the case was proven against Nasas, he should be made an example of by inflicting severe corporal punishment on him. As for the Christian slaves (*mancipia Christiana*) he had bought, 'free them according to the unambiguous precepts of the laws to prevent that, heaven forbid, the Christian religion be polluted by being subjected to Jews' (... *ne, quod absit, religio Christiana Iudeis subiecta polluatur*).³⁹ *Mancipia Christiana* was included in the Pseudo-Ivonian Tripartita

engaged in the slave trade; according to him the slaves mentioned in connection with Jews in medieval sources usually referred to their house slaves.

³⁸ *JLSEMA*, 424-5.

³⁹ Latin as in D. 54 c. 13, Friedberg, 211.

collection which scholars have identified as an important source for the *Decretum* which supplied Gratian 2 with a lot of his material.⁴⁰

The next additional canon in Gratian 2 is the one we have mentioned before. It is *Nulla officia* (D. 54 c. 14) which was the second part of canon 14, *Suggerente concilio*, of the Third Toledan Council of 589. The first part of the canon had legislated against Jews marrying Christians or having Christian concubines or having Christian slaves for their own use. Any children born out of such marriages were to be baptised. The part that was included in Gratian 2 legislated against Jewish office holding. It went on to say that ‘If Christians have been defiled by them by the Jewish rite (*Iudaismo ritu sunt maculati*) or even circumcised, they should return to liberty without a compensatory price being paid, and to the Christian religion’. *Nulla officia* had also been included in the *Tripartita*.⁴¹

The third additional canon comes after Gratian 2’s second *dictum* which introduced the issues of non-Christian slaves owned by Jews wanting to convert to Christianity. The canon is *Fraternitatem vestram oportet*, which was the main chunk of another decretal, *Fraternitati vestrae ante*, by Gregory the Great, sent in 596 to Bishop Fortunatus of Naples. *Fraternitatem vestram oportet* is one of the canons Gilchrist identified as being particularly widely disseminated.⁴² It too had been incorporated in the *Tripartita*,⁴³ and

⁴⁰ Friedberg, 211; *Tripartita* I.55.65, at http://ivo-of-chartres.github.io/tripartita/trip_a_1.pdf 2015-09-23 / 898fb accessed on 19 September 2017. On the *Tripartita* and the *Decretum* see Landau, ‘Gratian and the *Decretum Gratiani*’, 31-2; Winroth, 16.

⁴¹ *JLSEMA*, 484-5; Friedberg, 211; *Tripartita* II.36.7, at http://ivo-of-chartres.github.io/tripartita/trip_a_2.pdf 2015-09-23 / 898fb accessed on 19 September 2017.

⁴² Gilchrist, ‘The Canonistic treatment of Jews’, 74.

⁴³ Friedberg, 211-2; *Tripartita* III.26.9, at http://ivo-of-chartres.github.io/tripartita/trip_b_c.pdf 2015-09-23 / 898fb accessed on 19 September 2017.

it would seem that Gratian 2 would have found all three of his ‘Jewish’ canons for Distinction 54 in this collection.⁴⁴

Fraternitatem vestram oportet dealt with the thorny issue of Jewish possession of slaves who were pagans or Jews and who wished to convert to Christianity. That they must be freed was not in doubt, the issue was whether their Jewish owners had the right to monetary compensation or not. Gregory’s decision took Jewish interests into account by making a distinction between pagan slaves whom Jews had bought for their own use and pagan slaves bought as a commodity to sell on. Pagans or Jews bought for their own use must be freed and not sold. But if one of the pagan slaves bought for resale wished to convert to Christianity within the first three months of being bought by the Jew, then the Jew might seek payment from a Christian buyer. If conversion to Christianity was sought by such a slave after the first three months were up, then the slave must be freed forthwith because if a slave had not been sold in three months it must be assumed that the slave was actually bought for his/her Jewish master’s own use and not, in fact, for resale.

The three *paleae* which follow in Friedberg’s edition of the *Decretum* supplemented issues raised in the previous canons. The first is canon 16, *Si quilibet Iudeorum*, a fragment from a letter from 593 by Pope Gregory I to Januarius, bishop of Cagliari, which shed more light on the issue of *servi* of Jews wishing to convert to Christianity.⁴⁵ Gregory’s decretal stated that if such a slave had

⁴⁴ Research into the sources of Gratian is ongoing, see for example Landau, ‘Gratian and the *Decretum Gratiani*’, 25-35; Winroth, 15-18; as far as the ‘Jewish’ canons are concerned, as far as I can tell on the basis of my research to date, the *Tripartita* seems to be important. From my analysis of the ‘Jewish’ canons added to Distinction 45 by Gratian 2 it would seem that *Qui sincera* (D. 45 c. 3) and *De Iudeis* (D. 45 c. 5) were taken from the *Tripartita* as well, see Sapir Abulafia, ‘Jews in the glosses’. Martin Brett’s preface to his working edition at http://ivo-of-chartres.github.io/tripartita/trip_a_pref.pdf 2015-09-23 / 898fb accessioned on 19 September 2017.

⁴⁵ *JLSEMA*, 426.

taken refuge in a holy place for the sake of faith he should be supported in all ways in obtaining his liberty without any compensatory payment, whether he had already been a Christian or whether he had been baptized at this stage.⁴⁶ This fragment often appeared in canonical collections in the slightly longer version, *Pervenit ad nos*, and, as such, was very widely disseminated, more widely than Gilchrist had supposed.⁴⁷ The next canon, *Et si Iudeorum*, derived from the Twelfth Toledan Council of 681 and simply stated that *servi*, who were owned by Jews and had not been converted, who had taken refuge in the grace of Christ must be freed.⁴⁸ The final *palea*, *Presenti concilio*, is canon 18; it hailed from the Council of Macon (581/583).⁴⁹ It reiterated that no Christian slave (*mancipium*) should serve a Jew. Any Christian might redeem him - the price for a good slave (*mancipium*) would be twelve *solidi* - and either give him his freedom or keep him as his slave (*mancipium*). The same should happen if a slave wanted to become a Christian and his Jewish master did not allow it. 'For it is a violation of divine law for a blasphemer against the Christian religion to hold in chains someone whom Christ, the Lord had redeemed through the shedding of his blood.' If the Jew was unwilling to cooperate then the slave (*mancipium*) was allowed to live with Christians wherever he wanted to as long as the Jew delayed to agree to the arranged price. Again, it is worth noting that these rulings were more concerned with redressing the inversion of

⁴⁶ Literally 'without any damage to the Christian poor'. This must mean that no funds should be deflected from the poor by providing compensatory payment. For in the preceding sentence, not included in this extract, the letter decreed that these runaway slaves were either being restored to their Jewish masters or bought from them.

⁴⁷ Gilchrist, 'The Canonistic treatment of Jews', 104 and 106. If one adds the times *Pervenit ad nos* in pre-Gratian collections of canons to the times *Si quilibet Iudeorum* appears, the text appears as least as popular as the canons named by Gilchrist as the most popular anti-Jewish canons in circulation in the tenth, eleventh and first half of the twelfth centuries.

⁴⁸ *JLSEMA*, 518, 520.

⁴⁹ *JLSEMA*, 475-6; the council text begins with the words *Et licet quid*.

what was deemed to be the proper hierarchy between Christians and Jews than with the slaves in question. None of these *paleae* were included in the *Tripartita*; all three could have been found in Ivo's *Decretum*; canons 17 and 18 were also in Burchard's *Decretum*.⁵⁰

So how did the A-NG read the 'Jewish' canons? What did it think was worthy of comment? First of all, it needs to be said that neither the *Glossa ordinaria* nor the A-NG commented on the three 'Jewish' *paleae*. MS 283/676, in fact, excluded the *paleae* from its text of the *Decretum*. As for the other 'Jewish canons' and Gratian 2's opening *Dictum* (Ad hunc), the A-NG delved into the many different legal permutations of Jewish slaveholding in line with the *Summa Lipsiensis* and Huguccio. The permutations were clearly presented in a diagrammatic format, a format frequently deployed in MS 283/676. Slaves belonging to Jews could either be Christians or not; bought Christian slaves would have to be freed forthwith without compensatory payment. Non-Christian slaves could have been bought by Jews or born in Jewish households. These non-Christian slaves could wish to become Christian or not. If not, there were no legal impediments to Jewish ownership as long as slaves had not been circumcised. Circumcision would free the slave and his Jewish master would face capital punishment as in Roman law (C. J. 1.10.1). Non-Christian slaves who had been born in Jewish households who wished to become Christian were to be freed without compensatory payment (cf. C. J. 1. 3.54.8). The same applied to non-Christian slaves who had been bought to serve Jews. But Jews would receive compensatory payment for non-Christian slaves they had bought for resale who wished to convert to Christianity within three months of being purchased, when they were freed from Jewish ownership. But if the slave in question had not been sold within three months, no compensatory payment was due to the Jewish owner because it was assumed that the slave had, in fact, been bought for his/her Jewish owner's own use and not for

⁵⁰ Friedberg, 212; Ivo, *Decretum* 13.102, 1.280, 282 at http://ivo-of-chartres.github.io/decretum/ivodec_13.pdf and http://ivo-of-chartres.github.io/decretum/ivodec_1.pdf 2015-09-23 / 898fb accessed on 19 September 2017; Burchard 4.86, 4.88, *JLSEMA*, 636.

resale. Compensatory payment for slaves was put at 12 *solidi* as in *Presenti*, which was explicitly referenced to Burchard's *Decretum* (4. [88]), the canon which ended up as one of the 'Jewish' *paleae* in Gratian's *Decretum* (D. 54 c. 18). The comments in the A-NG on *Hoc tunc* closed by saying that the rules concerning Jewish slave owning also applied to the slaves bought by Gentiles (*Gentiles*) and cited the canon *Iudei* of the Third Lateran Council (1179). But it added the proviso that slaves belonging to Gentiles who had become Christians could not be removed from Gentile ownership without some form of compensation.⁵¹

Very interesting is how the A-NG and, indeed, the *Summa Lipsiensis* introduced the *Iudei*, canon 26, of the Third Lateran Council of 1179. This canon emphatically forbade Jews and Saracens from having Christian domestics in their homes. It also said clearly that 'Jews should be subject to Christians'.⁵² To my mind this shows that age-old canons concerning Jews were read in light of contemporary legislation, in this particular case, against Jews keeping domestic servants. This also indicates that 'Gentiles' must signify 'Muslims' in this instance. We can clearly follow the narrowing down of the term *Gentiles* from denoting unbelievers in general to Muslims in particular in the line of argument pursued in the *Summa Lipsiensis* and by Huguccio concerning the fate of slaves belonging to Gentiles who had become Christians. The *Summa Lipsiensis* and Huguccio started by quoting Paul's words to Timothy: 'Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honour; lest the name of the Lord and

⁵¹ Caius MS 283/676, fol. 36r: [*Hoc tunc*] ... *Idem de emptis gentilium* [superscript above *emptis gentilium*: *In Consilio Laterano Iudei*]. *Sed empti gentilium vernaculi etiam Christiani facti non eximuntur a dominorum potestate nisi dato pretio vel [quodam] [MS gives quosdam.]*

⁵² *Iudaei sive Saraceni nec sub alendorum puerorum obtentu nec pro servitio nec alia qualibet causa, christiana mancipia in domibus suis permittantur habere [...] cum eos [Iudaeos] subiacerent Christianis oporteat [...]*: Norman P. Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical councils*, 223-4 (my translation).

his doctrine be blasphemed' (1 Tim. 6:1).⁵³ They then proceeded to declare that although Paul's statement made it plain that Christians might **be** slaves of unbelievers (*infideles*), they must not **become** slaves of infidels. The *Summa Lipsiensis* then immediately went on to say that some people today argued that this only applied to earlier times when there were vast numbers of infidels and only a handful of Christians and that it no longer applied. It clinched the argument by citing Lateran III, *Iudei* which specifically referred to Jewish and Muslim masters.⁵⁴ Huguccio went on to explain that the Church dealt more severely with Jewish masters of Christian slaves than Pagan masters because Jews assailed the Church more treacherously and that it was much more dangerous for Christians to cohabit with Jews than Pagans because Jews were so very skilful in seducing Christians to Judaism. But he then went on to explain that in present times this distinction no longer held because *Pagani* had adopted circumcision and discernment of foods. By *Pagani* Huguccio was clearly signifying Muslims. And as far as he was concerned, neither Jews nor Pagans should therefore be offered compensator payment for a slave who was freed because he had become a Christian.⁵⁵ An important part of my project will, in fact,

⁵³ Translation taken from the Douay Rheims version.

⁵⁴ *Summa Lipsiensis*, ed. Weigand et al, 256: '*Hoc tamen hodie quidam intelligunt locum non habere, set eo tempore tantum, scilicet primitivo, quando pauci erant fideles, multi infideles. Arg. ad idem in conc. Lat. Iudei.*'

⁵⁵ Cambridge, Pembroke College, MS 72, fol. 158vb: *Hoc tunc* [...] *Sed quare in hoc casu aliquid ex servis Iudeorum et alium in servis Paganorum propter perfidiam Iudeorum contra quos sepe severius constituit ecclesia quia ipsi perfidius eam impugnant et plus timetur cohabitatio Iudeorum quam Paganorum quia Iudei peritiores sunt et facilius seducunt Christianos. Hodie tamen non videtur aliud esse dicendum in servis Paganorum quia fere omnes Pagani hodie iudizant circumciduntur discernunt cibos et alios ritus Iudeorum imitantur. Lex enim non facit differentiam inter eos. Lex dicit quod nullo casu est reddendum pretium Iudeo vel Pagano ut C. de episcopis, Deo § his ita [C. J. 1.3.54.8]. Sed in hoc potius standum est canonici; Pakter, 119-120, n. 109; <http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/>, sv. I am grateful to the*

be to investigate when Gratian's glossators interpreted the terms *Pagani* or *Gentiles* specifically to refer to Muslims.

It is striking that neither the A-NG nor the Ordinary Gloss, which both had used Huguccio, followed him in including such a negative appraisal of Jews in their treatment of Gratian 2's first *dictum*, *Hoc tunc*. The *Glossa ordinaria* simply concluded its gloss by stating that Pagans could be a master of a Christian slave but not become one.⁵⁶ But in commenting on canon 13, *Mancipia* the Ordinary gloss wondered whether a Christian could have a Jewish slave and concluded that he could as long as Christian master and Jewish slave did not live in close proximity of each other, citing two canons from *causa* 28 (q. 1 cc. 12-13), *Sepe malorum* and *Nullus* which respectively forbade Jewish converts from consorting with their former co-religionists and Christians from partaking of Jewish unleavened bread, living with Jews, or consulting Jewish physicians. As we have already noted, *Sepe malorum* hailed from the Fourth Council of Toledo; *Nullus* derived from the Council 'In Trullo' of 691.⁵⁷ Huguccio had explained more fully that a Christian could buy a Jewish slave to have him guard over his garden, fields, vineyards or cattle if he had him living apart from his Christian household. What was forbidden was close proximity

staff in the Manuscript Room of the University Library in Cambridge for their assistance in consulting this manuscript.

⁵⁶ Gonville and Caius College MS 6/6, fol. 45va; the Roman edition of the *Decretum* which includes later additions to the Ordinary gloss does give this negative material: *Corpus juris canonici emendatum et notis illustratum*, Gregorii XIII. Pont. Max. iussu editum, Romae: In aedibus Populi Romani, 1582, Part I, in 2 volumes: *Decretum Gratiani electronic edition*: University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) Digital Library Program. *Corpus juris canonici (1582)*, fol. 374, available at <http://digital.library.ucla.edu/canonlaw/>.

⁵⁷ Caius MS 6/6, fol. 45va: *mancipia] Sed nunquid Christianus potest emere Iudeum mancipium? Sic non tamen cum illo moretur ut xxviii. q. 1. Sepe et c. nullus [C. 28 q. 1 cc. 12-3]; JLSEMA, 459-60.*

with Jews.⁵⁸ This mirrored the observation made in the Ordinary gloss that Jews could be masters over so-called *coloni*, that is to say Christians tied in some way to the land but not living in proximity with their Jewish landlords.⁵⁹ Gregory the Great had made this concession in his letter of 594 known as *Multorum ad nos relatione* or *Hortamur*. It was widely disseminated and ended up in the Gregorian Decretals.⁶⁰

The A-NG was much less expansive in its treatment of *Mancipia* than Huguccio had been or the Ordinary gloss would be. The first thing it did was to expand the ruling to apply to Pagans as well through citing the Justinian code (C. J. 1.3.54.9). It then highlighted that the freedom granted to the Christian slave was in respect of his Jewish owner; he could, however, either be given to a Christian or he could be given his freedom. As for leading these Christian slaves into freedom, the A-NG again cited *Iudei* in Lateran III. It ended by referring to its comments on the canon *Iudas* in C. 17 q. 4 c. 34 to find the solution to the seeming contradiction between that canon and *Mancipia*.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Pembroke MS 72, fol. 158vb: *Mancipia*] [...] *Sed numquid econtra licet Christiano Iudeum mancipium emere? Non ut remaneat Iudeus et cohabitaret Christiano arg. 28 q. 1 Nullus, Sepe, Omnes. Aliter licet immo si remaneat Iudeus dummodo non cohabitaret Christiano potest Christianus eum emere. Puta faciet eum custodire ortum vel agros vel vineas vel peccora vel faciat eum habitare vel conversari seorsum ab aliis. Sola enim familiaris conversatione prohibita est cum Iudeo [...];* Pakter, 133, 133 n. 174.

⁵⁹ Caius MS 6/6, 45va: *Producit [sic] id est perductos ostendite quia statim liber est Extra de Iudeis c. ii [X. 5.6.2] tamen coloni possunt esse Iudeorum ut ibi dicitur; Czerwinski, 124 n. 65.*

⁶⁰ *JLSEMA*, 426-7; Gilchrist, 'The Canonistic treatment of Jews', 74, 102; X.5.6.2; Watt, 'Jews and Christians in the Gregorian Decretals, 95-6.

⁶¹ Caius 283/676, fol. 36va: *Iudeum] vel etiam paganum C. De Episcopis et clericis l. ultima [C. J. 1.3.54.9 (in Krueger edition at <http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/>)]]; libertatem] quantum ad Iudeum quia ab eo liberatur sive Christiano tamen datur sive liber*

Judas qui Judaice (C. 17 q. 4 c. 34), was a letter by Pope Gelasius of the early 490s about a legal case concerning a Jewish slave owner and a slave who had taken refuge in a church claiming that he was a Christian and had been circumcised. The Pope asked the local bishop to find out the truth of the matter and then decide if the slave should be freed or returned to his owner ‘so that the sanctity of religion should not seem *defiled*, nor a slave try to free himself from his lord’s legal ownership by way of a lie’.⁶² The canon was added by Gratian 2 to *Causa* 17. The A-NG argued that it did not clash with *Mancipia* because if the slave would have lied in either one of his assertions, he would be qualified for freedom because either he would have proved that he had been bought as a Christian by a Jew or that he had been circumcised against his will and thus would be freed. The possibility that the slave might have lied on both counts appears not to have been considered by the A-NG.⁶³ The Ordinary gloss, following in the footsteps of Huguccio solved the seeming contradiction between *Mancipia* and *Judas* by explaining that in *Mancipia* it was clear that the slave was a Christian. In *Judas* the issue concerned a slave lying about his Christianity in order to escape the yoke of slavery.⁶⁴

efficiatur; perducite] In consilio Laterano Iudei; infra 17 q. iiiii Judas contra solution ibi.

⁶² *JLSEMA*, 416.

⁶³ *Caius* 283/676, fol. 141vb: *competentis] Supra 54 Mancipia contra. Solutio: Si mentitus fuerit servus in utroque, sufficeret enim ad libertatem, Quod vel probaret se Christianum emptum a Iudeo vel invitum ab eo circumcicum, quoniam tunc ad libertatem perduceretur, vide ibi.*

⁶⁴ *Caius* 6/6, fol. 45va: *Ad libertatem] infra xxviii [sic] q. iiiii Judas qui [C. 17 q. 4 c. 34] contra sed hic de eo <agitur quem constat esse Christianum, ibi de eo [Caius MS 34/67, fol. 20vb]> qui mentitur se Christianum ut evadat iugum servitututis; Czerwinski, 124, 124 n. 65; Huguccio, Pembroke MS 72, 158vb: [...] et xvii q. iiiii Judas contra. Ibi dicitur de quodam Christiano servo Iudei qui non debet evadere iura domini nisi eum volentem [?] dominus circumciderit sed hic de eo agitur quem constat esse Christianum, ibi de illo qui afferebat se esse Christianum sed hic revocabitur in dubium.*

We have seen that *Mancipia* ended with the injunction that the Christian religion should not be polluted; *Nulla* legislated that Christian slave who had been defiled by Judaism or circumcised had to be set free with compensatory payment to their Jewish masters. The *Summa Lipsiensis* had interpreted *maculati* (defiled) in *Nulla* to refer to Christian slaves being compelled to eat meat during the days of abstinence. Huguccio said the same in his comments on *Mancipia* and *Nulla* adding to the latter that Christians would have been compelled to discern between foods.⁶⁵ Neither the A-NG nor the *Ordinaria* gloss carried these comments. What they did do in common with Huguccio and the *Summa Lipsiensis* was to cross refer *Nulla* to *Constituit* (C. 17 q. 4 c. 31), which, as we have seen, derived from the Fourth Toledan Council. It forbade Jews from holding public office and declared it a *sacrilege* for Christians to allow Jews to have this kind of power over Christians.⁶⁶ In passing it is worth noting that the reason Gratian 2 would have chosen to add *Constituit* and *Judas* to *Causa* 17 and not *Distinction* 54 was probably because they referred to defilement and sacrilege and that was precisely the topic at stake in this section of *Causa* 17.

The A-NG had a lot more to say about *Constituit* in *Causa* 17 than it did about *Nulla* in *Distinction* 54. First of all, it commented very fully on the phrase in *Constituit* which stated that neither Jews nor *hii qui ex Iudeis* were allowed to hold public office lest they misuse their authority to harm Christians. The phrase *aut hii qui ex Iudeis sunt* had been omitted from the text of *Constituit* and was added to the margin where the A-NG explained that this referred, for example, to the family of those who had been Jews, who were still Jews or to proselytes and even to Christians who had formerly been

⁶⁵ *Summa Lipsiensis*, ed. Weigand et al., 256-7: *Vel 'maculati' quia diebus abstinentie comederunt carnes compulsi*; Huguccio, Pembroke MS 72, fol. 158vb: *Polluatur] vel suscipiendo circumcisionem et comedendo carnes in xl, diebus Veneris coacte vel voluntarie; In iudaismo maculati] alio ritu Iudeorum foede compulsi ut comederent carnes quando non deberent vel ut discernerent cibos vel huiusmodi.*

⁶⁶ *JLSEMA*, 490-91.

Jews with a reference to *Plerique* (D. 4 de cons. c. 94), the Toledan IV canon which had legislated against the backsliding it expected Jewish converts to be guilty of.⁶⁷ *Proselytus* would normally mean a convert to Judaism or a non-Jew living with Jews, but I wonder whether in this context it might mean a Jew who had just converted to Christianity or was in the process of doing so.⁶⁸ The Ordinary gloss mentioned the family members of Jews and ‘Jews who had recently converted to Christianity’.⁶⁹ The A-NG, and not the Ordinary gloss, linked the prohibition of Jews holding office to the prohibition of Jews having Christian *mancipia* as legislated in Lateran III. Fascinating is how it then linked this with the statement that Christians must not do homage (*homagia*) to Jews, referring to a bull from Alexander III to Archbishop Richard of Canterbury dated between 1174-9 (*Non sine*) in which the Pope had ordered that the faithful must not ‘pay homage or fealty to Jews’ (*ne quis Judeis hominia vel fidelitates*).⁷⁰ The kind of homage envisaged in

⁶⁷ Caius MS 283/676, fol. 141va: *aut hii qui ex Iudeis sunt] Puta de familia eorum dum tamen Iudei sunt vel et proseliti vel etiam Christiani olim Iudei de con. 4 Plerique [D. 4 de cons. c. 94].*

⁶⁸ See *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources* at <http://clt.brepolis.net/dmlbs/pages/QuickSearch.aspx> s.v., where one of the possible fourteenth-century meanings given is ‘postulant’.

⁶⁹ Caius MS 6/6, fol. 151r: *Qui ex Iudeis] id est de familia ipsorum vel loquitur de Iudeis de novo ad fidem conversis.*

⁷⁰ As highlighted by Czerwinski, 108-9, 108 n. 37; Caius MS 283/676, fol. 141va [in margin]: *nec debent Iudeis Christiana mancipia servire, in Consilio Laterano, Iudei* [top margin additional comment] *Sed nec debent Christiani homagia Iudeis facere In Extra de Iudeis, Non sine - inferatis*; Duggan has shown that the A-NG did not yet have access to the *Compilatio prima* and that it used instead a collection very similar to the so-called Tanner Collection, a Anglo-Norman decretal collection compiled around 1187-91 (see Duggan, ‘The Reception of Canon Law in England’, 372, 376-7 and also my references to Tanner in Sapir Abulafia, ‘Jews in the Glosses’, 21, 25-7, 30). *Non sine – inferatis* is found in Tanner VI.5.3 (*proferatis* instead of *inferatis*), ed. Walther Holtzmann, ‘Die Dekretalensammlungen des 12. Jahrhunderts: 1. Die Sammlung Tanner’, in *Festschrift zur Feier des Zweihundertjährigen Bestehens der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, II:

this bull is that of Christians to Jews who had acquired *parochias ecclesiarum* through ‘purchase or contract or even in pledge’. Charles Duggan translated *parochias ecclesiarum* as ‘parish churches’ and argued that the bull was the result of matters brought to the Pope’s attention by Richard who sought to address a number of problems in his province. The bull also urged Richard to request King Henry to compel the Jews to give up any such properties they held. And if they continued to hold them, they must pay any tithes owing to the Church.⁷¹ Paul Brand has suggested that the stipulations of the bull make more sense if *parochia* is understood to mean ‘the (tithe-paying) lands within the boundaries of individual (parish) churches’. Christians living on these tithable lands might then well have been put into a position of owing fealty to Jews who had acquired the property.⁷² Whatever the case may be, this is yet another indication how old canonical material was connected to fresh legal material and how questions of Jewish slave holding continued to intersect with the issue of Jewish authority in any shape or form over Christians.

As for the third canon added by Gratian 2 to Distinction 54, *Fraternitatem*, it threw up all kinds of legal concerns for the commentators. These included the exact specification of the time frame in which a slave had to be sold to count as a slave genuinely bought by Jews for resale rather than for their own use, the grounds

Philologisch-Historische Klasse, (Berlin etc. 1951), 135; Simonsohn, no. 54, p. 57.

⁷¹ Charles Duggan, ‘St Thomas of Canterbury and Aspects of the Becket Dispute in the Decretal Collections’, in: C.E. Viola (ed.), *Mediaevalia Christiana XIe-XIIIe siècles. Hommage à Rayminde Foreville* (Paris, 1989) no. 44, 129-30 (quotations from 130); Charles Duggan, ‘Richard [Richard of Dover]’ in *Dictionary of National Biography s.v.* at

<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23514?docPos=25> (accessed 7/2/2017).

⁷² Quotation from email correspondence with Prof. Paul Brand on the decretal in May to June 2017. I am very grateful for Prof. Brand’s help with the decretal and for his feedback on my paper.

for presuming that a slave had not been bought for resale and the legal definitions of presumption. The legal signification of presumption was presented in the A-NG in the same kind of diagrammatic form as the discussion on the different kinds of Jewish slave holding had been. For our purposes the most interesting comment in the A-NG is the one on the end of the canon which said that if a slave belonging to a Jew had not been sold on within three months and if he wished to become a Christian he could no longer be sold and had to be freed. The A-NG explained that the Jew was being disadvantaged in favour of the freedom of another on account of the hatred for his condition. The *Summa Lipsiensis* had said much the same.⁷³

Let us return to the questions we asked at the start of our investigation about the reasons for the presence of the ‘Jewish’ canons in the *Decretum*. It seems to me that our investigation has shown that the ‘Jewish’ canons were not necessarily included for their own sake in the *Decretum*. To me their inclusion does not seem to be particularly indicative of sentiments towards Jews on the part of those responsible, be it Gratian 1 or the compiler(s) of Gratian 2. As far as I can tell at this stage of my research, the ‘Jewish’ canons were introduced for the most part by the compiler(s) of Gratian 2 in service of a more comprehensive treatment of the legal issues Gratian 1 had set out to cover. The canons themselves touched on the broad issues of conversion and the correct legal status vis-à-vis Christians. As such they

⁷³ Caius MS 283/676, fol. 141va: *perducatur] hic privatur Iudeus favor libertatis alterius odio sue conditionis et maxime quia in eum casum devenit servus qui vendi non debet; Summa Lipsiensis*, ed. Weigand et al., 258: *Hinc habetur quod absque delicto suo priuatur quis iure suo. Hoc autem contigit ob fauorem libertatis et religionis et odium alterius ut Iudei, ut hic, quandoque ob fauorem alterius tantum alter priuatur iure suo* See Czerwinski, 91-103 for a discussion about *Fraternitatem* among different canonists in which he points out how Huguccio made provision for the possibility that the Jew might not have been able to find a buyer within the stipulated three months for a slave he had genuinely bought for resale.

underpinned and, indeed, reinforced the overall understanding that Jews were to be tolerated in Christian society on account of their usefulness, their service. The process governing the inclusion of the 'Jewish' canons by Gratian 1 and especially by the compiler(s) of Gratian 2 was in itself an aspect of Jewish service. Having said that, the fact is that many of these canons cast Jewish service in pejorative terms. Whatever the reason might have been to include them, their very inclusion turned them into an important conduit for the dissemination of negative views concerning Jews. We must remember how much Gratian's *Decretum* was read, how frequently it was glossed and to what extent it was taught throughout medieval Europe and beyond. We have also seen how glossators discussing a 'Jewish' canon in Distinction 54 cross-referred to a whole array of other 'Jewish' canons scattered about in the *Decretum*. And because 'Jewish' canons appeared in the *Decretum* in contexts which had nothing to do with Jews, users of the *Decretum* would have come across canons concerning Christian-Jewish relations whether or not they had been specifically looking for rulings concerning Jews. The importance of Gratian's *Decretum* for the dissemination of anti-Jewish texts has, I believe, been underestimated. It is essential to grasp both the process by which 'Jewish' canons entered the *Decretum* and the effect of their inclusion to understand the complex developments of the intricate and paradoxical relationship between Christians and Jews in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ I am very grateful to Prof. Anders Winroth for reading this paper and for his very helpful comments. Any errors are my sole responsibility.

SUMMARY

Gratian's collection of canons and its development into what became known as the *Decretum* contained some thirty-six canons which specifically dealt with some kind of interaction between Christians and Jews. This article wonders why those particular canons concerning Jews were included in the *Decretum* and not others, and why they were placed where they were in the collection. It attempts to ascertain what the reason might have been to include them and in what context that might have occurred. These questions are particularly pertinent because the vast majority of the so-called 'Jewish' canons were added to what Anders Winroth has established as the first recension of the *Decretum*. This article makes a start to answering these questions through an in-depth analysis of Distinction 54, a section of the *Decretum* which explores rules governing the ordination of persons of unfree status to which a number of canons were added concerning Jewish slaveholding and Jewish office holding. The article investigates the position of the 'Jewish' canons in Distinction 54 and attempts to ascertain why they were added. It tries to find out how they were read by examining the comments on the canons in the *Glossa ordinaria* to the *Decretum* as well as glosses in a unique late twelfth-century manuscript (Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, MS 283/676) which reflect how the *Decretum* was taught in Oxford in the 1190s. The article hopes to show that an investigation into the process by which 'Jewish' canons entered the *Decretum* and the effect of their inclusion can add a great deal to our understanding of the intricate and paradoxical relationships between Christians and Jews in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE BEATITUDES: Edition of the Basel Manuscript*

Anton ten Klooster

The beatitudes (Mt. 5,1-11) play an important role in the moral theology of Thomas Aquinas. Although only a single question is devoted to them in the *prima secundae*, there is a case to be made that this discussion of the beatitudes is Aquinas' answer to the perennial question: what is happiness, and how do we attain it?¹ Further support for this thesis is found in the fact that the beatitudes and the gifts of the Holy Spirit are woven into the structure of the *secunda secundae*.² This prominence of the evangelical beatitudes directs our attention to Aquinas' commentary on the gospel of Matthew. Written in the same period as the *secunda pars* of the *Summa*, it gives us an insight into Aquinas' theological reading of the Biblical text.³ However, as is the case with many of the Biblical commentaries, no critical edition exists to date. Some texts are available in a critical or annotated version, but not so for the beatitudes. Of the available texts, none make use of the best

* The present article and text edition are a result of the fruitful discussions with profs. Henk Schoot and Marcel Sarot, at Tilburg University. They legitimately questioned my faith in the present editions, and encouraged me to travel to Basel University library. I am also indebted to dr. Harm Goris, for his feedback on an earlier draft of this article, and to Fr. Timothy Bellamah OP for his helpful remarks on the Basel manuscript.

¹ *STh* I-II, q. 69; S. Pinckaers, 'Beatitude and the Beatitudes in Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*', in: J. Berkman, C.S. Titus (eds.), *The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology*, Washington D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 2005, 115-129.

² D. Mongillo, T. Sabuzi, 'Le Beatitudini: Rilettura di Matteo 5', in: D. Lorenz, S. Serafini (ed.), *Studi 1995*, Roma, Pontificia Università S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 1995, 132-160.

³ J.-P. Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin: Sa Personne et Son Oeuvre*, Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 3rd edition, 2015, 88-92.

manuscript available, which is that of the Basel university library. Considering the wide interest in Aquinas' interpretation of the beatitudes, there is an urgency to at least disclose this part of the manuscript. After a brief description of the *status quaestionis*, we will present an edition of Aquinas' commentary on Mt. 5,1-10. Through the apparatus, the reader can observe where this manuscript shows significant deviations with the three later manuscripts. Furthermore, it gives references to the many Biblical, patristic, and philosophical sources used by Aquinas.

Available Manuscripts and Present Editions

The Leonine edition of the works of Aquinas is still far from complete. For most of Aquinas' works, this is not a problem since the present editions form an acceptable basis for scholarship. The Marietti edition from the 1940s and 1950s is a particularly valuable tool. With the commentary on Matthew, there is a problem though.⁴ The issue was outlined by H.-V. Shooner, in an article on behalf of the Leonine commission.⁵ In short: an early Italian editor of the commentary used a model which had lacunae in chapters five and six. He solved this problem by inserting parts of a commentary by the Dominican commentator Peter of Scala. These interpolations were later forgotten, and came to be considered as part of the authentic commentary of Aquinas. It was R. Guindon who identified this problem in 1955.⁶ In a happy coincidence, the Leonine commission found another witness to Aquinas' lectures on Matthew in that same year. A manuscript in the Basel university library, with shelf mark B.V.12, which had long gone unnoticed was found to contain a copy of the *reportatio* of the lectures from Mt. 1,22 to the end of chapter twelve. This discovery is important

⁴ R. Cai (ed.), Thomas Aquinas, *Super Evangelium S. Matthaei Lectura*, editio V revisa, Torino, Marietti, 1951.

⁵ H.-V. Shooner, 'La Lectura in Matthaicum de S. Thomas (Deux fragments inédits et la Reportatio de Pierre d'Andria)', in: *Angelicum* 33 (1956), 121-142.

⁶ R. Guindon, 'La 'Lectura Super Matthaicum incompleta' de Saint Thomas', in: *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 25 (1955), 213*-219*.

for two reasons. First, it gives us a witness to the text which is much closer to the original *reportatio*.⁷ The Basel manuscript is a late thirteenth or early fourteenth century manuscript from Paris.⁸ It is a copy of a copy of the original *reportatio* done by Aquinas' secretary Peter of Andria. There are indications that it was corrected on the basis of a direct copy of the *reportatio*. By contrast, the three other manuscripts are of a later date, from the mid-sixteenth century.⁹ These three manuscripts, based on further copies of the manuscript were all copied in the *scriptorium* of Vespasiano da Bisticci in Florence.¹⁰ Second, Gałuszka argued that the importance of the Basel manuscript lies in the fact that its text is of an overall higher quality than that of the other manuscripts.¹¹ This manuscript presents the text of Peter of Andria, whereas the editions present the text of the Parisian secular scholar Leodegar of Besançon from chapter 6 on. A comparison of these two texts has shown that Peter's scribal work is of a higher quality.¹² Since its discovery, parts of the Basel manuscript have appeared in print. Most noteworthy among these is the edition of T. Gałuszka,

⁷ T. Gałuszka, *Tomasza z Akwinu - Lectura super Matheum cap. I-II: Studium historyczno-krytyczne i edycja tekstu*, Kraków, Wydawnictwo Esprit SC, 2011, 146. The study is written in Polish, but has a French summary, 299-305.

⁸ For a detailed description of the manuscript: J.P. RENARD, 'La Lectura super Matthaicum V, 20-48 de Thomas d'Aquin', in: *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 50 (1983), 149-151.

⁹ MS Firenze Biblioteca Laurenziana, Fiesolona 98; MS Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Santa Croce Plut. XXVIII dext. 7; MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica, Vat. Urb. Lat. 25.

¹⁰ T. Gałuszka, *Tomasza z Akwinu - Lectura super Matheum*, 21-25. For the two manuscripts of the Biblioteca Laurenziana in Florence, see: H.F. Dondaine, H.-V. Shooner, *Codices Manuscripti Operum Thomae de Aquino*, vol. I: Autographa et Bibliothecae A-F, Roma, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1967, vol. I, 312, 330.

¹¹ T. Gałuszka, *Tomasza z Akwinu - Lectura super Matheum cap. I-II*, 300.

¹² A.M. ten Klooster, 'The Two Hands of Thomas Aquinas: The Reportations of the Commentary on Matthew', in: *Angelicum* 91-4 (2014), 855-880.

which offers a fully edited and annotated text of the first two chapters of the gospel of Matthew.¹³ Renard's edition of Mt. 5,20-48 is also very valuable, but it does not refer back to the Italian manuscripts.¹⁴ The other publications consist of partial transcriptions of the Basel manuscript, which together present this text from Mt. 5,10b to Mt. 6,34.¹⁵ Yet, the first ten verses of Mt. 5 were never edited. All of the material edited to date has been incorporated in a recent Latin-English publication of Aquinas' commentary on the gospel of Matthew.¹⁶ For the first time in centuries, we now have publications of the commentary that consist exclusively of texts by Aquinas, without lacunae.

Presentation of the Edition

The following pages present an edition of the manuscript B.V.12 from f. 25rb line 23 to f. 31rb line 24. This offers a commentary on Mt. 5,1-10, which corresponds with #396-445 of the Marrietti edition. Aquinas' own *divisio textus* for the sermon on the mount forms the basis for this selection. According to his interpretation, the seven beatitudes describe the beatitude of those who are observers of the doctrine of Christ. The eighth beatitude, "blessed

¹³ T. Gałuszka (ed.), *Tomasza z Akwinu - Lectura super Matheum cap. I-II*, 150-249.

¹⁴ J.P. Renard, 'La Lectura super Matthaëum V, 20-48 de Thomas d'Aquin', 153-190.

¹⁵ R. Busa (ed.), *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, Stuttgart, 1980, vol. 6, Friedrich Frommann Verlag Günther Holzboog KG, 360-365; C. Dozois, 'Le "Pater" chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Essai d'Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale', dissertation, Ottawa, Université d'Ottawa, 1960, 186-212; P.M. Kimball, H. Kraml (eds.), Transcription of Basel Manuscript B.V.12, in: P.M. Kimball (translation), *Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew: From the original Latin by St. Thomas Aquinas*, Camillus, Dolorosa Press, 2012, 971-980; H.-V. Shoener, 'La Lectura in Matthaëum de S. Thomas.

¹⁶ J. Holmes, B. Mortensen (translation), *Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew: Chapters 1-12*, Lander, The Aquinas Institute, 2013.

are they who suffer persecution”, is taken as the perfection of the first seven. It is this unit of the *divisio textus* which is found in the following text. From there, Aquinas moves on to the beatitude of those who are the ministers of the doctrine of Christ. This latter part of the text is available as *Leonina inedita* in the Busa edition of Aquinas’ *opera omnia*. But since it is an *inedita*, it has neither a critical apparatus nor references.

The scribe of the Basel manuscript makes abundant use of abbreviations and symbols. These have been written out in full, in order to present the text as the first scribe put it down, and as it was then edited by at least one other scribe.¹⁷ The text was edited by making use of the three other known manuscripts of the commentary on Matthew.¹⁸ In principle, the edition follows the text of the Basel manuscript. The reader should take note that it is written in what Dozois called the “kitchen Latin” of the *reportator*.¹⁹ In a few cases, the Basel text is corrected on the basis of one of the Italian manuscripts. This is done only when this renders a variant reading that is of greater clarity, and that is consistent with the rest of the commentary or Aquinas’ source material. The apparatus presents these variations to the reader, and does not mark other interventions on the manuscripts, such as marginal annotations. One of the reasons to refrain from incorporating these interventions in the apparatus, is that the annotations of B.V.12 often concur with the text of the Italian manuscripts.

Although we closely follow the text of the manuscripts, a number of interventions were made, using principles similar to those of Renard.²⁰ This means that interpunction and capitalization was added, and that the spelling was standardized. Furthermore, the scribe of the Basel manuscript alternatively uses Roman and Arabic

¹⁷ T. Gałuszka, *Tomasza z Akwinu - Lectura super Matheum cap. I–II*, 300.

¹⁸ The *sigla codicum* used is Gałuszka’s.

¹⁹ C. Dozois, ‘Le “Pater” chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Essai d’Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale’, appendix 2, 185.

²⁰ J.P. Renard, ‘La Lectura super Matthaëum V, 20-48 de Thomas d’Aquin’, 150.

numerals. All references have been standardized to Roman numerals. As a courtesy to the reader, Scriptural quotations are given in italics. References to the text commented upon are in italicised bold text.

The footnotes give references to the different authorities quoted in the text, as well as references to authorities which are not quoted but which likely formed the basis for a certain formulation or insight. In the case of Biblical quotations, the full Vulgate text is given in the footnote.²¹ Although this text differs from Aquinas' Parisian Bible, the reader will note great similarities between the phrase quoted in the commentary and the Vulgate.²² Furthermore, similar passages in other works of Aquinas are indicated. These do not include references to the beatitudes in *Scriptum* III dist. XXXIV and *STh* I-II, qq. 68-69, since the considerable overlap between these questions and the commentary would overflow the apparatus.

The Commentary on the Beatitudes in the Basel Manuscript

For most of the text, the Basel manuscript concurs with the present editions. In fact, mistakes that are found in the editions can also be found in the manuscript. For example: when commenting on the beatitude of those who hunger and thirst for justice, the text announces a *tripliciter* division of justice.²³ The correct indication would have been *dupliciter*. This is clear not only from what follows, but also from other sections of the commentary, and other works of Aquinas. But a study of the Basel manuscript does offer the reader a few surprises. Those familiar with the present editions will notice that some discussions are more extensive, albeit in a very modest manner. When commenting on the beatitude of the pure of heart the manuscript further elaborates on how God can be seen in this life by referring to Paul's description of "being caught

²¹ *Biblicorum Sacrorum Iuxta Vulgatam Clementinam, Nova Editio*, Roma, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1929.

²² The Vulgate text is "the most faithful reflection of the *textus receptus* of the thirteenth century": A.M. ten Klooster, 'The Two Hands of Thomas Aquinas', 870 n. 59.

²³ *Sup. Mt.* #427.

up to the third heaven".²⁴ Another, more striking difference is that where both the Marietti edition and the Italian manuscripts describe how *full* beatitude is *included* at the beginning of the sermon on the mount, the manuscript states that *false* beatitude is *excluded*. The Basel text is plausible in light of what follows. Some minor errors from the edition can be corrected on the basis of the manuscript, for example by reading *mites* instead of *miseriordes*.²⁵ At some points, the Marietti edition quotes different Scriptural authorities, on other grounds than a disagreement or omission in the manuscript tradition. The most relevant of these cases is the reference to Isaiah 11,2.²⁶ The Marietti quotes Isaiah 66,2, thus missing a reference to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Other deviations present new challenges to the interpretation of the text. In commenting on common and heroic virtue, the present editions state that these virtues are called *divinae*.²⁷ In the same place, the Basel manuscript reads *dona*. Such details in a *reportatio* should not lead to wild theological speculation, but the differences between the texts urge the reader to reconsider his reading of them and question what Aquinas may be trying to explain in this particular part of his lecture. Especially because up until now there was only one known instance of the expression "vocantur dona" in all of Aquinas' works. And it is probably no coincidence that it is found in the discussion of the beatitudes in the *Summa Theologiae*.²⁸

The present text bears the title *postilla* rather than *lectura*.²⁹ Although none of the previous editions has this title, *postilla* is the oldest indication for the commentary. This is the term written on the first page of the Basel manuscript by one of its first owners. The present version of the *postilla* is a working edition, and not a definitive edition of this part of Aquinas' commentary on Matthew. We happily defer to the experts of the Leonine commission for the formidable task of preparing a full edition. A scholar, or scholars,

²⁴ *Sup. Mt.* #434; 1 Cor. 12,2.

²⁵ *Sup. Mt.* #414.

²⁶ *Sup. Mt.* #415.

²⁷ *Sup. Mt.* #410.

²⁸ *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 1 resp.

²⁹ This choice of title was suggested to me by Fr. T. Bellamah OP.

tasked with such an edition would be able to identify the different hands on the respective manuscripts, and the place of the early editions in the process of transmission and correction of the *reportatio*. The aim of the present text is to offer an edition of Mt. 5,1-10 that may be provisional, but will allow for further study of Aquinas' interpretation of the beatitudes, with access to variant readings, and references to his sources. These references offer a solid foundation for the oft-repeated claim that Aquinas made heavy use of Augustine's *De Sermone Domini in Monte*. Not only is this the most quoted book, with 27 references, Augustine's connection of the beatitudes with the gifts of the Holy Spirit plays an important role in the commentary, as it also does in the *Summa*.³⁰ Further study could also include a comparison of the commentary with contemporaneous works, such as the *secunda pars* of the *Summa* and Aquinas' commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. The interrelatedness of these texts shows on a number of occasions. One very clear example is the commentary's discussion of what makes a person happy (*beatus*). The development and wording of the commentary closely follows that of the Ethics commentary.³¹ These examples are of course but a few suggestions for further research, and we can only hope that more avenues of research can and will be pursued on the basis of this newly available text. For my own part, I hope to contribute to our understanding of Aquinas' interpretation of the beatitudes by studying the commentary from a theological angle. The connection of the beatitudes with the gifts of the Holy Spirit plays an important role in this project, since it helps us to understand how Aquinas perceives of the interaction of human and divine agency on the way toward happiness.³²

³⁰ S. Pinckaers, *The Sources of Christian Ethics*, Washington D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 3rd edition, 1995, 151-155.

³¹ *Sup. Mt.* #408; *SLE* lib. X cap. 6, 101-116.

³² A.M. TEN KLOOSTER, 'The Beatitudes as Acts of the Virtues in Aquinas' *Lectura* on Matthew', in: Thomas Instituut Utrecht, *Jaarboek 2016*, Utrecht, 2016, 75-91.

SUMMARY

There is a renewed interest in Thomas Aquinas' interpretation of the beatitudes. An important source for the study of the beatitudes is Aquinas' commentary on the gospel of Matthew. However, the available editions of this commentary present a text that ignores the oldest manuscript, and has omissions and deviations with regard to this Basel manuscript. In this article, we offer an edition of that part of the manuscript which contains the commentary on Matthew 5:1-10. The critical apparatus has a double function: it records variant readings, and it provides references to the Biblical, patristic, and philosophical sources employed by Aquinas. While we await the Leonine edition of the commentary on Matthew, the present text can serve as a basis for studying Aquinas' interpretation of the beatitudes.

Sigla codicum

- B MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, V.12
 F¹ MS Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Santa Croce Plut. XXVIII dext. 7
 F MS Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Fiesolano 98
 V MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica, Vat. Urb. Lat. 25
 β¹ Consensus codicum F¹ et F

References to works of Aquinas

- [404] Corresponding text in the Marietti edition
II Ad. Cor. R. CAI (ed.), Thomas Aquinas, *Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura*, editio VIII revisa, vol. 1, Torino, Marietti, 1953
SLE Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia Libri Ethicorum*, Editio Leonina, tomus XLVII, vol. II, Roma, Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969
S.Th Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Editio Leonina, tomus IV-X, Roma, Ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. De Propaganda Fide, 1888-1899
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- Confessiones* Augustine, *Confessionum Libri XIII*, CSSL 27
Contra Adimantum Augustine, *Contra Adimantum*, CSEL 25.1
Comm. Hyl. Hilary of Poitiers, *In Evangelium Matthaei Commentarius*, PL 9
Comm. Ier. Jerome, *Commentariorum in Matheum Libri IV*, CCSL 77
Comm. Rab. Rabanus Maurus, *Commentariorum in Matthaicum Libri Octo*, PL 107

<i>De Ciuitate Dei</i>	Augustine, <i>De Ciuitate Dei</i> , CSSL 47-48
<i>De Consensu</i>	Augustine, <i>De Consensu Euangelistarum</i> , CSEL 43
<i>De Genesi</i>	Augustine, <i>De Genesi ad Litteram Libri Duodecim</i> , CSEL 28.1
<i>Enarrationes</i>	Anselm of Laon, <i>Enarrationes in Evangelium Matthaei</i> , PL 162
<i>Ethica G.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i> , Grosseteste translation AL 26.2
<i>Ethica M.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i> , Moerbeke translation AL 26.3
<i>Expositio</i>	Ambrose, <i>Expositio Euangelii secundum Lucam</i> , CSSL 14
<i>Expositio Wal.</i>	Walafrid Strabo, <i>Expositio in Quatuor Evangelia</i> , PL 114
<i>Glossa in Ex.</i>	<i>Glossa Ordinaria - Liber Exodus</i> , PL 113
<i>Glossa in Mt.</i>	<i>Glossa Ordinaria – Evangelium secundum Matthaem</i> , PL 114
<i>Homil.</i>	Chrysostom, <i>Homiliae in Matthaem</i> , PG 57
<i>Magna Moralia</i>	(Ps.) Aristotle, <i>Magna Moralia</i> , Messina translation, AL 27
<i>Moralia</i>	Gregory the Great, <i>Moralia in Iob</i> , CCSL 143A
<i>Opus Imp.</i>	Ps. Chrysostom, <i>Opus Imperfectum in Matthaem</i> , PG 56
<i>Retractationes</i>	Augustine, <i>Retractationum Libri II</i> , CCSL 57
<i>De Sermone</i>	Augustine, <i>De Sermone Domini in Monte</i> , CCSL 35

Thomae de Aquino

POSTILLA SVPER MATHEVM

Reportatio Petri de Andria

- [396] *Videns autem* etc. Hic Dominus suam doctrinam proponit et diuiditur in partes tres.
 In prima ponitur doctrina Christi.
 In secunda ostenditur uirtus doctrine.
 5 In tertia finis ad quem perducit.
 Secundum in caput XIII, tertium in XVII.
 Prima diuiditur in tres.
 In prima proponitur doctrinam Christi.
 In secunda instruuntur ministri.
 10 In tertia confutantur aduersarii.
 Secunda in caput X, tertia in XI.
 Prima diuiditur in duas.
 In prima proponitur doctrina Christi.
 In secunda confirmatur per miracula, in VIII cap.
 15 Prima in duas.
 In prima premititur quasi quidam titulus ad doctrinam.
 In secunda explicatur ipsa doctrina, ibi *beati pauperes*.
 Circa primum tria facit.
 Primo describit locum ubi doctrina fuit proposita,
 20 secundo auditores doctrine,
 tertio ponit modum docendi.
 Secundum ibi *et cum sedisset* tertium ibi *et aperies*.

4 ostenditur] ponitur $\beta^1 V$ 7 prima] primo B 9 ministri] doctrine *add.* $\beta^1 V$
 10 confutantur] confunduntur $F^1 V$ | confundantur F 14 in secunda] *om.* F 15
 prima] diuiditur *add.* F^1 17 explicatur] explicantur V 17 ipsa doctrina] ipsam
 doctrinam $F^1 V$

[397] Dicit ergo ita dixi *quod secuti sunt* etc.¹

Videns autem etc. Ista littera duplicem intellectum habere potest. Primo sic: *ascendit* ad docendum turbas scilicet non fugiens.

5 Vnde Crisostomus dicit quod sicut artifex quando uidet preparatam materiam delectat operari, ita sacerdos delectatur predicare quando uidet populum congregatum et ideo ascendit, Ps. *confitebor tibi in ecclesia*.²

Vel aliter: *ascendit* fugiens scilicet turbas ut securius discipulos doceret. Eccl. IX: *uerba sapientium audiuntur*.³

10

[398] Et notandum quod legitur quod Christus habebat tria refugia.⁴ Quandoque enim fugit ad montem sicut dicitur hic et Io. VIII: *Iesus autem etc.*⁵ Aliter ad nauem Luc. V: *quod cum turbe*.⁶ Tertium desertum, Mc. VI: *uenite*.⁷

15

Sed idest locum et satis conuenienter.

1 secuti] seducti *B* | persecuti *F* 11 habebat] habuit *B* 13 aliter] aliquando *β¹V*
14 uenite] eamus seorsum in desertum *add. β¹V* 15 Sed idest locum] *om. β¹V*

¹ Mt. 4,25: “Et secutae sunt eum turbae multae de Galileae et Decapoli et de Ierosolymis et de Iudaea et de trans Iordanem”.

² Ps. 34,18: “Confitebor tibi in ecclesia magna, in populo gravi laudabo te”; *Opus Imp.* cap. V hom. IX, 679.

³ Eccl. 9,17: “Verba sapientium audiuntur in silentio, plus quam clamor principis inter stultos”.

⁴ *Expositio Wal.* 872b.

⁵ Io. 8,1: “Iesus autem perrexit in montem Oliveti”.

⁶ Lc. 5,1: “Factum est autem, cum turbae irruerunt in eum ut audirent verbum Dei, et ipsa stabat secus stagnum Genesareth”.

⁷ Mc. 6,31: “Venite seorsum in desertum locum et requiescite pusillum”

In tribus enim homo potest habere refugium ad Deum. In protectione diuine altitudinis que per montem significatur, Ps. *qui confidunt in Domino sicut*.⁸ In societate ecclesiastica, que per nauem, Ps. *Ierusalem que edificatur*.⁹ Sap. XIV: *transeuntes mare per ratem*.¹⁰ In solitudine religionis uel contemptu temporalium, Osee II: *ducam eam*.¹¹ Ps. *ecce elongaui*.¹²

[399] Ascendit autem in montem propter quinque rationes. Prima ad ostensionem sue excellentie. Ipse enim est mons de quo Ps. *mons dei mons pinguis*.¹³ Secunda ad ostendendum quod doctor huius doctrine debet in eminentia uite conscendere, Ys. *super montem excelsum*.¹⁴ Crisostomus: nemo potest in ualle consistere et de celo loqui etc.¹⁵ Tertio ad ostendendum altitudinem ecclesie cui doctrina proponitur, Ys. II: *erit mons domus*.¹⁶

1 Deum] eium *V* 2 significatur] signatur *β¹V* 4-5 Sap. XIV...ratem] Sap. XXIV: multitudo ad nauem *β¹V* 8 montem] monte *B* 9 ostensionem] congruebitur *B* 10 secunda] secundo *B* 11 eminentia] eminentiam *B* 13 ostendendum] *om. B* 13 altitudinem] multitudinem *β¹V* 14 proponitur] ponitur *F* 14 mons] in monte mons *B*

⁸ Ps. 124,1: "Qui confidunt in Domino, sicut mons Sion".

⁹ Ps. 121,4: "Ierusalem, quae aedificatur ut civitas".

¹⁰ Sap. 14,5: "Sed, ut non essent vacua sapientiae tuae opera, propter hoc etiam et exiguo ligno credunt homines animas suas, et transeuntes mare per ratem liberati sunt".

¹¹ Os. 2,14: "Propter hoc ecce ego lactabo eam et ducam eam in sollicitudinem et loquar ad cor eius".

¹² Ps. 54,8: "Ecce elongaui fugiens et mansi in solitudine".

¹³ Ps. 67,16: "Mons Dei mons pinguis, mons coagulatus, mons pinguis".

¹⁴ Is. 40,9: "Super montem excelsum ascende, tu qui evangelizas Sion".

¹⁵ *Opus Imp.* cap. V hom. IX, 679.

¹⁶ Is. 2,2: "Et erit in novissimis diebus preparatus mons domus Domini in vertice montium et elevabitur super colles, et fluent ad eum omnes gentes".

Quarto ad ostendendum perfectionem huius doctrine quia perfectissima. Ps. *iustitia tua sicut montes*.¹⁷ Quinto ad ostendendum congruentiam, ut congrueret doctrina ista ueteris legislationi que data fuit in monte, Ex. XIX et XXIV.

5

[400] Consequenter ponuntur auditores *et cum sedisset*. Duo possunt notari in sessione eius. Humiliatio, in Ps. *tu cognouisti sessionem*.¹⁸ Quando enim erat in altitudine diuine maiestatis non poterat capi doctrina eius. Sed tunc ceperunt homines capere quando se humiliavit.¹⁹ Vel hoc pertinet ad dignitatem magisterii, infra XXIII: *super cathedram Moysi sederunt scribi et pharisei etc.*²⁰ Ad studium enim sapientie requiritur quies.

10

Accesserunt discipuli non tantum corpore sed animo, Ps. *accedite ad eum*.²¹ Deut. XXIV: *qui appropinquant*.²²

15

Et nota quod quando Deus predicauit turbis stetit, Luc. VI: *descendens Iesus etc.*, sed hic quando discipulis sedit, et ex hoc inoleuit consuetudo quod turbis predicatur stando religionis sedendo.²³

2 quinto] quinta B 2-3 ad ostendendum congruentiam] om. β¹V 3 congrueret] congruet F¹ | congruat V 3 doctrina] om. β¹V 3 ueteris] legis u. B 7 possunt] potest V 7 sessione] consessione FV | consensione F¹ 9 doctrina eius] eius doctrina F¹V 12 enim] om. B 15 Deus] Dominus β¹V

¹⁷ Ps. 35,7: "Iustitia tua sicut montes Dei, iudica tua abyssus multa".

¹⁸ Ps. 138,2: "Tu cognouisti sessionem meam et resurrectionem meam".

¹⁹ *Comm. Rab.* lib. II cap. V.I.c.

²⁰ Mt. 23,2: "Super cathedram Moysi sederunt scribae et pharisei"; *De Sermone* lib. I.1.2.

²¹ Ps. 6,6: "Accedite ad eum et illuminamini"; *Comm. Rab.* lib. II cap. V.I.d.

²² Dt. 33,3: "qui appropinquant pedibus eius, accipient de doctrina illius".

²³ Lc. 6,17: "Et descendens cum illis stetit in loco campestri".

[401] Et *aperiens*. Hic ponitur modus doctrine. In hoc quod dicit *aperiens* signatur quod diu ante tacuerat et demonstrat quod magnum et longum facturus erat sermonem, sicut dicit Augustinus.²⁴

5 Vel quod magna et profunda dicturus erat. Sic enim consueuerunt facere homines, Iob III: *post hoc Iob*.²⁵ Et dicit *suum*. Prius enim aperuit ora prophetarum.²⁶ Sap. X, *aperuit os*.²⁷ Ipse enim est sapientia Patris.

10 [402] Sed hic est questio: hic enim sermo ponitur quantum ad multa, Luc. VI. Sed uidetur hic et ibi contrarietas sicut patet in textu. Et ponit Augustinus duas solutiones.²⁸ Vna est quod iste sit

15 sermo ab illo distinctus: ipse enim primo ascendit in montem, et fecit hunc sermonem discipulis, et postea descendens inuenit turbam congregatam predicauit et multa recapitulauit, et de hoc dicitur Luc. VI. Vel aliter dicendum, quod unus mons erat et

habebat planitiem in latere et super illam planitiem eleuabat monticulus aliquis. Vnde Dominus ascendit in montem, idest in

20 planitiem illam montis, et primo ascendit superius et conuocauit discipulos et ibi elegit duodecim sicut patet in Luca.

2 signatur] significatur B 2 quod diu] quam diu V 5 dicturus] daturus V
7 ipse] iste B 12-13 iste sit sermo ab illos distincto] est alius sermo ab illo F¹V
13 ipse] Dominus enim dicit ipse add. β¹V 13 enim] om. F¹ 16 dicitur] dicit B
17 et super] om. F¹V 20 discipulos et] om. B

²⁴ De Sermone lib. I.1.2.

²⁵ Iob 3,1: "Post haec aperuit Iob os suum et maledixit diei suo".

²⁶ De Sermone lib. I.1.2; *Moralia* lib. XIV cap. XLIII.51.

²⁷ Sap. 10,21: "sapientia aperuit os mutuorum et linguas infantium fecit disertas".

²⁸ De Consensu lib. II cap. XIX.43-47.

Et postea descendens inuenit turbam congregatam et uenientibus discipulis sedit et habuit sermonem istum ad turbas et discipulos. Et hoc uidetur uerius, quia Matheus dicit in fine sermonis, infra VII, quod *mirabantur etc.*²⁹ Tamen quodcumque accipiatur non est contrarietas.³⁰

[403] *Beati pauperes.* Posuit supra euangelista quasi breuem titulum doctrine Christi, nunc ponit ipsam doctrinam, et effectum eius, scilicet admirationem turbarum. Considerandum autem quod secundum Augustinum in isto sermone Domini tota perfectio uite nostre continetur.³¹ Et probat per id quod Dominus subiungit in fine: *omnis qui audit etc.*³² In quantum enim secta et doctrina cum quod ille qui proponit doctrinam, proponit finem ad quem ducit, scilicet repromissionem aliquam. Id autem quod maxime homo desiderat est beatitudo.

Vnde Dominus tria facit. Primo promittit premium quod consequitur istos qui istam doctrinam accipiunt. Secundo ponit precepta, ibi *nolite putare.*³³ Tertio quomodo aliquis potest peruenire ad ea obseruandum. Secundum ibi *nolite putare*, tertium ibi *petite etc.*³⁴

2 habuit] abiit B 4 quod] om. V 4 accipiatur] accipietur B | accipitur FV 9 eius] secundo add. B 9 admirationem] admiratio B 9 considerandum] aliquid add. B 12-13 omnis...finem] om. β¹V 18 istos] illos B 19 potest] possuit B 20 ea] om. B 20 secundum] om. V 20 tertium] om. V

²⁹ Mt. 7,28: “Et factum est cum consummasset Iesus uerba haec, admirabantur turbae super doctrina eius”.

³⁰ De Consensu lib. II cap. XIX.47.

³¹ De Sermone lib. I.1.1; STh I-II, q. 108 a. 3 resp.

³² Mt. 7,24: “Omnis ergo qui audit uerba mea haec et facit ea adsimilabitur viro sapienti, qui aedificauit domum suam supra petrum”.

³³ Mt. 5,17: “Nolite putare quoniam ueni soluere legem aut prophetas”.

³⁴ Mt. 7,7: “Petite et dabitur uobis, quaerite et inuenietis, pulsate, et aperietur uobis”.

Circa primum duo facit, quia huius doctrine aliqui sunt observatores, aliqui ministri. Primo ergo describit beatitudinem observantium, secundo ministrantium, ibi *beati estis cum maledixerint*.³⁵

5

[404] Notandum autem quod hic ponuntur multa de beatitudinibus, sed numquam aliquis in uerbis Domini posset ita subtiliter loqui, quod pertingeret ad propositum Domini.

10 Sciendum tamen quod in istis uerbis excluditur omnis falsa beatitudo. Omnes enim homines appetunt beatitudinem, sed differunt in iudicando de beatitudine. Et ideo quidam istud, quidam illud appetunt.³⁶

15 Inuenimus autem quadruplicem opinionem de beatitudine.³⁷ Quidam enim credunt, quod in exterioribus tantum consistat, scilicet in affluentia istorum temporalium, Ps. *beatum dixerunt*.³⁸

20 Alii <dicunt> quod beatitudo consistit in hoc quod homo satisfaciat uoluntati sue, unde aliqui dicunt beatus qui uiuit ut uult, Eccle. III: *cognoui quod non melius esset*.³⁹ Alii <dicunt> quod perfecta beatitudo consistit in uirtutibus actiue uite. Alii quod in uirtutibus contemplatiue uite scilicet diuinorum et intelligibilium sicut Aristoteles.⁴⁰ Omnes autem iste opiniones false sunt, quamuis non eodem modo. Vnde Dominus omnes reprobat.

2 observatores] tantum *add. β¹V 6* multa] plura *β¹V 9* excluditur] includitur *β¹V 9* falsa] plena *β¹V 14* quidam] aliqui *B 16* beatitudo] perfecta b. *β¹V 17* aliqui dicunt] dicimus *β¹V 17-18* Eccl. III...esset] Ecc. iudicaui me melius esse *β¹V 19-20* alii...uite] *om. F*

³⁵ Mt. 5,11: “Beati estis, cum maledixerint vobis et persecuti vos fuerint”.

³⁶ Cf. *De Ciuitate Dei* lib. XIX.1; *STh* I-II, q. 5 a. 8.

³⁷ Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 2.

³⁸ Ps. 143,15: “Beatum dixerunt populum cui haec sunt”; *De Sermone* lib. 1.1.3.

³⁹ Eccl. 3,12: “Et cognoui quod non esset melius nisi laetari, et facere bene in vita sua”.

⁴⁰ *Ethica M.* lib. X cap. 8, 1178b.

[405] Opinionem illorum qui dixerunt quod consistit in affluentia exteriorum reprobatur cum dicit *beati pauperes spiritu*, quasi non beati affluentes.

- 5 [406] Opinionem eorum qui ponebant beatitudinem in satisfactione appetitus, reprobatur cum dicit *beati mites* etc. Sed sciendum quod triplex est appetitus in homine: irascibilis, qui querit uindictam de inimicis, et hoc reprobatur cum dicit *beati mites*. Concupiscibilis, cuius bonum est gaudere et delectari, hoc reprobatur cum dicit *beati*
 10 *qui lugent*. Voluntatis, qui est duplex secundum quod duo querit. Primo quod uoluntas nulla superiori lege coarctetur. Secundo quod possunt constringere alios ut subditos. Vnde desiderant preesse et non subesse. Dominus autem contrarium ostendit. Quantum ad primum dicit *beati qui esuriunt*, quantum ad secundum dicit *beati*
 15 *miseri cordes*. Ergo et illi qui ponunt beatitudinem in exteriori affluentia et qui in satisfactione appetitus errant.

- [407] Illi autem qui ponunt beatitudinem in actibus actiue uite, scilicet moralibus uirtutibus, errant, sed minus, quia illud est uia ad beatitudinem. Vnde Dominus non reprobatur tamquam malum sed ostendit ordinatum ad beatitudinem, quia uel ordinantur ad seipsum sicut temperantia et huiusmodi et finis eorum est enim munditia cordis, quia faciunt uincere passiones.⁴¹ Vel ordinantur ad alterum et sic finis eorum est pax, *opus enim iustitie pax*.⁴²

2 cum] tum *BF 2 spiritu*] *om. F 2* quasi] scilicet q. *β¹V 5* opinionem] *om. B 5* ponebant beatitudinem] *om. B 10* secundum] secundo *V 11* coarctetur] arcetur *V 12* possunt] possint *F¹V 12* constringere] restringere *β¹V 15* et] *om. F.*

15 illi qui] illius *V 19* uirtutibus] *om. β¹V 23* et (finis)] *om. β¹V 23* eorum] *om. V. 23* enim] *om. β¹V 24* est] *om. BF¹ 24* pax] et huiusmodi *add. β¹V*

⁴¹ Cf. *STh* II-II, q. 29, a. 4 s.c.

⁴² Is. 32,17: "Et erit opus iustitie pax, et cultus iustitie silentium et securitas usque in sempiternum".

Et ideo iste uirtutes sunt uia in beatitudinem et non ipsa beatitudo, et hoc est **beati mundo corde quoniam ipsi Deum uidebunt**. Non dicit uident quia hoc esset ipsa beatitudo. Et iterum **beati pacifici**. Non quia pacifici sed quia in aliud tendunt, unde **quoniam filii Dei uocabuntur**.

[408] Illorum autem opinio qui dicunt quod beatitudo consistit in contemplatione diuinorum reprobatur Dominus quantum ad tempus, quia alias uera est, quia ultima felicitas consistit in uisione optimi intelligibilis, scilicet Dei, unde dicit **uidebunt**.⁴³

Et notandum quod secundum philosophum ad hoc quod actus contemplatiui faciant beatum duo requiruntur.⁴⁴ Vnum substantialiter, scilicet quod sit actus altissimi intelligibilis, quod est Deus. Aliud formaliter, scilicet amor et delectatio. Delectatio enim perficit felicitatem sicut pulcritudo iuuentutem. Et ideo Dominus duo ponit: **Deum uidebunt** et **filii Dei uocabuntur**. Hoc enim pertinet ad unionem amoris, I Io. III: *uidete qualem caritatem*.⁴⁵

[409] Item notandum quod in istis beatitudinibus quedam ponuntur ut merita, quedam ut premia. Et hoc in singulis. Vnde **beati pauperes**, ecce meritum, **quoniam ipsorum**, ecce premium, et sic in aliis.

1 beatitudinem] beatitudine B 2 corde] om. β¹ 2 ipsi om. β¹V 3 dicit] diceret F 4 non quia pacifici] om. F¹V 4 unde] om. β¹V 9 optimi] om. B 12 faciant] faciunt β¹V 20 item] iterum V 21 unde] om. β¹V

⁴³ *STh* I-II, q. 3, a. 5.

⁴⁴ *Ethica M.* lib. X cap. 4, 1174b; *SLE* lib. X cap. 6, 101-116.

⁴⁵ I Io. 3,1: “Videte qualem caritatem dedit nobis Pater, ut filii Dei nominemur et simus”

[410] Notandum est etiam aliquid circa meritum in communi et aliquid circa premium in communi. Circa meritum sciendum quod philosophus distinguit duplex genus uirtutis. Vnum communis que perficit hominem humano modo. Aliud specialis quam uocat eroycam que perficit supra humanum modum.⁴⁶ Quando enim fortis timet ubi est timendum, istud est uirtus. Sed si non timeret esset uitium. Si autem in nullo timeret confisus Dei auxilio, ista uirtus esset supra humanum modum et iste uirtutes uocantur dona. Isti ergo actus sunt perfecti et uirtus etiam secundum philosophum est operatio perfecta.⁴⁷ Ergo ista merita uel sunt actus donorum, uel actus uirtutum secundum quod perficiuntur a donis.

[411] Item nota quod actus uirtutum sunt illi de quibus lex precipit. Merita autem beatitudinis sunt actus uirtutum, et ideo omnia que precipiuntur infra et continentur referuntur ad istas beatitudines. Vnde sicut Moyses primo proposuit precepta et post multa dixit que omnia referebantur ad precepta proposita, ita Christus in doctrina sua primo premisit istas beatitudines ad quas omnia alia reducuntur.⁴⁸

1 notandum] et n. $\beta^1 V 1$ circa] super *F 1-2* et...communi] *om. F^1 V 4* quam] quia *F^1 V 5* eroycam] eroicam $\beta^1 V 8$ dona] diuine $\beta^1 V 9$ et uirtus] in uirtute *F^1 V 9* etiam] et *F^1 V 13* illi] illa *B 16* proposuit] posuit *F 17-18* Christus in doctrina sua] in doctrina sua *C. F^1 V*

⁴⁶ *Ethica G.* lib. VII cap. 1, 1145a; *Magna Moralia* lib. II cap. 5, 1200b.

⁴⁷ *Ethica M.* lib. I cap. XI, 1101a, cf. 1102a.

⁴⁸ *Enarrationes*, cap. V, 1284a.

[412] Circa primum autem notandum quod Deus est premium eorum qui ei seruiunt, Tren. III: *pars mea etc.*⁴⁹ Ps. *Dominus pars hereditatis.*⁵⁰ Gen. XV: *ego Dominus qui.*⁵¹ Et sicut Augustinus dicit in secundo Confessionum: anima cum recedit a te, ea querit extra te que non inuenit nisi in te.⁵² Homines autem diuersa querunt sed quicquid inueniri potest in qualibet uita totum inuenitur in isto premio quod est Deus. Et ideo quicquid desideratur in quacumque uita totum Dominus repromisit in Deo.⁵³ Aliqui enim ponunt summum bonum affluentiam diuitiarum per quam possunt peruenire ad maximas dignitates, Dominus promittit regnum quod complectitur utrumque. Sed ad hoc regnum dicit perueniri per uiam paupertatis non diuitiarum, unde **beati pauperes**. Alii perueniunt ad istos honores per bella, Dominus autem dicit **beati mites**. Alii consolationes querunt per uoluptates, Dominus autem dicit **beati qui lugent**. Aliqui nolunt subdi, Dominus autem dicit **beati qui esuriunt**. Aliqui uolunt uitare malum comprimendo subditos, Dominus dicit **beati misericordes**. Aliqui ponunt uisionem Dei in contemplatione ueritatis in uia, Dominus autem promittit in patria, unde **beati mundo etc.**

5 que...te] om. $\beta^1 V$ 7 et ideo] Christus *add. B 10* Dominus] ideo *B 13* mites] qui lugent *F 13-15* alii...lugent] om. *F 15* autem] om. *F^1 V 17* comprimendo] exprimendo $\beta^1 V 17$ dicit] dixit *F 18* ueritatis] ueritas *F 19* etc.] corde *V*

⁴⁹ Lm.3,24: "Pars mea Dominus, dixit anima mea; propterea exspectabo eum".

⁵⁰ Ps. 15,5: "Dominus pars hereditatis meae et calicis mei, tu es qui restitues hereditatem meam mihi".

⁵¹ Gen. 15,5: "Ego Dominus, qui eduxi te de Ur Chaldeorum, ut darem tibi terram istam, et possideres eam".

⁵² *Confessiones* lib. II.6.14: "Ita fornicatur anima, cum auertitur abs te et quaerit extra te ea quae pura et liquida non inuenit, nisi cum redit ad te".

⁵³ *STh* I, q. 26, a. 4 resp.

[413] Et notandum quod ista premia que Dominus hic tangit possunt dupliciter haberi: scilicet perfecte et consummate et sic in patria, secundum inchoationem et imperfecte et sic in uia, unde sancti habent quedam inchoationem illius beatitudinis.⁵⁴ Et quia in hac uita non possunt explicari illa sicut erunt in patria, ideo Augustinus exponit secundum quod sunt in hac uita.⁵⁵ **Beati ergo pauperes** scilicet non spe tantum sed etiam re. Ideo non est regnum Dei infra, regnum Dei intra uos.⁵⁶

10 Vnde istis premissis, accedamus ad litteram.

[414] In istis beatitudinibus duo facit euangelista. Primo ponit ipse beatitudines, secundo manifestatio beatitudinum, ibi **beati qui persecutionem patiuntur propter iustitiam**. Hoc est enim declaratiuum omnium beatitudinum.

15 Virtus autem tria facit, quia remouet duo mala, facit operari bonum, et disponit ad optimum. Primo ergo determinat de primo, ibi **beati pauperes**. Secundo ibi **beati qui esuriunt**, determinat de secundo. Tertio ibi **beati mundo**, determinat de tertio. Remouet autem uirtus a tribus malis: cupiditatis, crudelitatis siue inquietudinis, et uoluptatis noxie. Primum notatur ibi **beati pauperes**, secundum ibi **beati mites**, tertium ibi **beati qui lugent**.

3 patria] tantum *add.* $\beta^1 V 3$ et sic] sic $\beta^1 V 7$ etiam] *om.* $F^1 V 7$ ideo] *om.* F | sed i. $F^1 7-8$ ideo...uos] Lu. XVII *add.* F | Ro. V non est regnum Dei intro nos β^1 | Ro. V non est regnum Dei inter uos $V 14$ patiuntur...iustitiam] *om.* $\beta^1 V 14$ est enim] enim est $\beta^1 V 16$ duo mala] a malo β^1 | mala opera et $V 16$ facit operari] operatur et facit $\beta^1 17-18$ ibi beati pauperes] *om.* $B 18$ secundo ibi] *om.* $F^1 V$ | ibi $F 18$ determinat *om.* $F^1 18$ determinat de secundo] de secundo determinat $V 19$ ibi] *om.* $F^1 V$ | de tertio i. $F 19$ determinat] *om.* $V 19$ remouet] remoueat $V 19$ autem] *om.* $V 20$ crudelitatis] credelitatis $F^1 21$ noxie] noctie F

⁵⁴ *STh* I-II, q. 3, a. 5 resp.; q. 4, a. 5 resp.

⁵⁵ *De Sermone* lib. I.4.12; *Retractiones* lib. I c. XIX.2; *STh* I-II, q. 69, a. 2 resp.

⁵⁶ Lc. 17,20-21: “Non venit regnum Dei cum observatione, neque dicent: Ecce hic, aut ecce illic. Ecce enim regnum Dei intra uos est”.

[415] Dicit ergo *beati pauperes*, dupliciter legitur. Primo sic: *beati pauperes spiritu*, idest humiles. Illi enim sunt uere humiles qui se pauperes estimant non solum in exterioribus sed etiam in interioribus, Ps. *ego autem mendicus sum*, contra illud Apoc. III: *dicis quia diues sum etc.*⁵⁷ Et tunc hoc quod dicit spiritu potest tripliciter legi. Spiritus enim aliquando dicitur superbia hominis, Ys. II: *quiescite ab homine*, et XXV: *spiritum robustorum*.⁵⁸ Et dicitur superbia spiritus quia sicut per flatum inflantur utres, ita per superbiam homines, Col. II: *inflatu sensu carnis suae*.⁵⁹ Ergo *beati pauperes*, scilicet qui parum habent de spiritu superbie.⁶⁰ Vel accipitur *spiritus* pro uoluntate hominis. Quidam enim sunt necessitate humiles et isti non sunt beati, sed qui humilitatem affectant.⁶¹ Tertio accipitur pro Spiritu Sancto, unde *beati pauperes spiritu*, scilicet qui humiles sunt per Spiritum Sanctum.

2 illi...humiles] *om.* $\beta^1 V$ 3 etiam in] etiam *F* 4 contra] sed c. *B* 7 Ys. II] Ysa. III *F* 8 flatum] et *add.* *B* 9 inflatus sensu] inflatus secatur $\beta^1 V$ 11 enim] autem *B* 13 affectant] afferant $\beta^1 V$

⁵⁷ Ps. 39,18: “Ego autem mendicus sum et pauper”; Apoc. 3,17: “Quia dicis: quod dives sum et locupletatus et nullius egeo, et nescis quia tu es miser et miserabilis et pauper et caecus et nudus”.

⁵⁸ Is. 2,22: “Quiescite ergo ab homine, cuius spiritus in naribus eius est, quia excelsus reputatus est ipse”; Is. 25,4: “spiritus enim robustorum quasi turbo impellens parietem”.

⁵⁹ Col. 2,18: “Nemo vos seducat volens in humilitate et religione angelorum, quae non vidit, ambulans, frustra inflatus sensu carnis suae”.

⁶⁰ *De Sermone* lib. I.1.3.

⁶¹ *Homil.* XV.1, 224.

Et iste due quasi ad idem redeunt. Et dicit *pauperes spiritu* quia humilitas dat Spiritum Sanctum, Ys. *super quem requiescet etc.*⁶² Istis pauperibus repromittitur regnum in quo intelligitur summa excellentia. Et licet istud retribuatur cuilibet uirtuti, specialiter
 5 tamen datur humilitati quia *omnis qui se humiliat exaltabitur*, infra XIV, et Prou. XXIX: *humilem spiritum suscipite.*⁶³

[416] Vel aliter secundum Ieronimum.⁶⁴ *Pauperes* scilicet ad litteram pauperes in abdicatione rerum temporalium. Et dicit spiritu
 10 quia quidam pauperes necessitate sunt. Sed non debetur illis beatitudo, sed illis qui uoluntate. Et isti dicuntur dupliciter quia etsi aliqui diuitias habent, tamen non habent in corde, Ps. *diuitie si affluant.*⁶⁵ Alii qui nec habent nec affectant, et istud securius est quia mens trahitur a spiritualibus ex diuitiis. Et isti proprie dicuntur
 15 *pauperes spiritu*, quia actus donorum, qui sunt supra humanum modum, sunt hominis beati. Et quod omnes diuitias abiiciat infra ut nec etiam aliquo modo appetat, hoc supra humanum modum.

4 retriubuatur] retribuunt B 5 quia] qui F 5 humiliat exaltabitur] extaltat humiliabitur etc. B 6 infra XIV] infra IX B 6 humilem] humiles B 8 scilicet] spiritu β¹V 9 pauperes] om. β¹V 12 in] eas β¹V 13 nec... nec...] neque... neque V 14 isti] iste B 14 proprie dicuntur] dicuntur p. F¹V 15 quia] per add. F¹V 16 hominis] homines F¹V 16 abiiciat infra] abiat F¹V 16-17 ut nec etiam] ut neque F¹V

⁶² Is. 11,2: “et requiescet super eum spiritus Domini”; Is. LXVI, 2, ad quem respiciam, nisi ad pauperulum, et contritum spiritu, et trementem sermones meos?”.

⁶³ Lk. 14,11: “Quia omnis qui se exaltat humiliabitur, et qui se humiliat exaltabitur”; Prov. 29,23: “Superbum sequitur humilitas, et humilem suscipet gloria”.

⁶⁴ *Comm. Ier.* lib. I.5.3.

⁶⁵ Ps. 61,11: “Divitiae si adfluant, nolite cor apponere”.

[417] Istis autem repromittitur regnum celorum, in quo notatur non solum altitudo honoris sed affluentia diuitiarum. Iac. II: *nonne elegit Deus pauperes*.⁶⁶ Et nota quod Moyses primo promisit diuitias, Deut. XXVIII: *faciet te Dominus etc. et benedictus etc.*⁶⁷

5 Et ideo ut distinguat Dominus legem ueterem a noua aliam esse, ideo primo ponit beatitudinem in contemptu diuitiarum temporalium.

10 [418] Item secundum Augustinum notandum quod ista beatitudo pertinet ad donum timoris, quia timor maxime filialis facit habere reuerentiam ad Deum, et ex hoc contempnit homo diuitias.⁶⁸ Ponit Ysaïas beatitudines descendendo, Ys. *egredietur uirga etc.*⁶⁹ Christus e conuerso a dono timoris, scilicet a paupertate, quia Ysaïas prenuntiauit aduentum Christi ad terram, Christus autem de
15 terra sursum trahebat.⁷⁰

2 nonne] nos $\beta^1 V 3$ pauperes] *om.* $\beta^1 V 5$ aliam *om.* $\beta^1 V 9$ notandum] nota *V*
11 ponit] p. autem *B* 12 etc.] de radice *F* 14 prenuntiauit] pronuntiauit *FV*

⁶⁶ Iac. 2,5: “Audite, fratres mei dilectissimi: nonne Deus elegit pauperes in hoc mundo, divites in fide, et haeredes regni, quod repromisit Deus diligentibus se?”

⁶⁷ Dt. 28,1: “faciet te Dominus Deus tuus excelsiorem cunctis gentibus, quae versantur in terra”; Dt. 28,3: “Benedictus tu in civitate, et benedictus in agro”.

⁶⁸ *De Sermone* lib. I.3.10.

⁶⁹ Is. 11,1: “Et egredietur virga de radice Jesse, et flos de radice eius ascendet”.

⁷⁰ *De Sermone* lib. I.4.11.

[419] **Beati mites.** Hec est secunda beatitudo. Sed ne aliquis dicat quod sufficit paupertas ad beatitudinem ostendit quod non sufficit. Immo requiritur mansuetudo que temperat circa iras, sicut temperantia circa concupiscentias. Ille enim est mitis qui non irritat
 5 nec irritatur.⁷¹ Hoc autem poterit fieri per uirtutem ut scilicet non irascaris nisi causa iusta. Sed si etiam habet iustam causam et non prouocaris, hoc supra humanum modum. Et ideo dicit **beati mites.** Pugna enim est propter habundantiam exteriorum rerum. Et ideo numquam esset turbatio si homo diuitias non affectaret. Et ideo qui
 10 non sunt mites, non sunt pauperes spiritu et propterea statim subiungit **beati mites.**

Et nota quod hoc in duobus consistit. Primo quod homo non irascitur. Secundo quod si irascitur iram temperet. Ita dicit Ambrosius: prudentiarum est motum temperare, nec minor uirtus
 15 dicitur temperate irasci, quam omnino non irasci est, plerumque hoc leuius, illud fortius existimo.⁷²

[420] **Quoniam possidebunt.** Crisostomus: Dominus inter multas promissiones eternas ponit unam terrenam.⁷³ Vnde ad litteram terram istam possident mites. Multi enim litigant ut possessiones
 20 acquirant sed frequenter amittunt uitam et omnia. Sed frequenter mansueti totum habent, Ps. *mansueti autem hereditabunt.*⁷⁴

3 que] homines *add. B 4 non] nec β¹ | neque V 5 nec] neque V 5 poterit] potest β¹V 6 habet] habeas β¹V 8 pugna] pungna V 9 numquam]nunquam V 9 affectaret] affearet F 10 non] non *add. B 11* subiungit] subiunxit B 12 nota] notandum β¹V 13 si] *om. F¹V 13* si irascitur] si irascatur F 14 nec] neque F¹V 15 quam] non *add. B 18* Crisostomus] dicit *add. β¹V 18* Dominus] *om. β¹V 20* possessiones] possessionem B 21 amittunt] *om. β¹ 21* omnia] nomina V | perdunt *add. β¹V**

⁷¹ *Expositio* lib. V.54.

⁷² *Expositio* lib. V.54.

⁷³ *Homil.* XV.3, 226-227.

⁷⁴ Ps. 36,11: “mansueti autem hereditabunt terram et delectabuntur in multitudine pacis”.

Sed melius exponitur ut referatur ad futurum, et potest tunc exponi multipliciter. Hylarius ostendit sic: **possidebunt terram**, idest corpus Christi glorificatum, quia erunt conformes in corpore suo illi claritati, Ys. *regem in decore suo*.⁷⁵ Phi. III: *reformabit corpus humilitatis*.⁷⁶ Vel aliter: ista terra modo est mortuorum quia subiecta est corruptioni, sed liberabitur secundum apostolum, Rom.⁷⁷ Ergo ista terra quando erit glorificata et liberata a seruitute corruptionis uocabitur terra uiuentium. Vel per terram intelligitur celum empyreum in quo sunt beati.⁷⁸ Et uocatur terra quia sicut se habet terra ista ad celum, ita celum illud ad celum sancte trinitatis. Vel **possidebunt terram**, idest corpus suum glorificatum.⁷⁹ Augustinus exponit metaphoricè et dicit quod per hoc intelligenda est quedam soliditas sanctorum in cognitione prime ueritatis.⁸⁰ Ps. *credo uidere bona Domini in terra uiuentium*.⁸¹

[421] Ista secunda beatitudo adaptatur dono pietatis quia illi proprie irascuntur qui non sunt contenti diuina ordinatione.⁸²

2 ostendit] *om. β¹V 2* terram *om. β¹V 5* ista terra] terra idest *F 6* liberabitur] a corruptione *add. β¹V 7* Rom.] *VI add. β¹V 7* erit glorificata] est clarificata *β¹V 10* ista] *om. β¹V 10* ita...celum] *om. F 13* soliditas] solliditas *F 13* cognitione] congregatione *B 13* prime] patris *V 14* in...uiuentium] *om. β¹V*

⁷⁵ Is. 33,17: “Regem in decore suo videbunt oculi eius, cernent terram de longe”; *Comm. Hyl.* cap. IV.3.

⁷⁶ Phil. 3,21: “qui reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae, configuratum corpori claritatis suae, secundum operationem, qua etiam possit subicere sibi omnia”; *Opus Imp.* cap. V hom. IX, 681.

⁷⁷ Rom. 8,21: “quia et ipsa creatura liberabitur a seruitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei”.

⁷⁸ *Opus Imp.* cap. V hom. IX, 681.

⁷⁹ *Opus Imp.* cap. V hom. IX, 681-682.

⁸⁰ *De Sermone* lib. I.2.4. Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 69 a. 4 resp.: “per quam significatur soliditas aeternorum bonorum”.

⁸¹ Ps. 26,13: “Credo uidere bona Domini in terra uiventum”.

⁸² *De Sermone* lib. I.3.10.

[422] **Beati qui lugent.** Posite sunt due beatitudines per quas abstrahimur a malo auaritie et crudelitatis. Nunc autem ponitur tertia, per quam abstrahimur a malo noxie uoluptatis uel iocunditatis et hoc est **beati qui lugent.** In ueteri testamento, que
 5 terrena promittebat, pro magno erat promittere terrenam iocunditatem, Ier. XXXIII: *uirgo in choro.*⁸³ Sed per contrarium Dominus ponit beatitudinem in luctu.

10 Notandum autem quod non quicumque ploratus luctus dici potest, sed ille quo quis mortuum plorat sibi dilectum.⁸⁴ Dominus enim per excessum loquitur hic. Sicut supra **beati pauperes**, ita hic de maximo luctu mentionem facit. Sicut enim nullam recipiunt consolationem hii qui mortuum plorant, ita Dominus uult uitam
 15 nostram in luctu esse, Ie. *luctum unigeniti fac.*⁸⁵ Et potest esse iste luctus tripliciter. Primo pro peccatis non solum propriis sed etiam alienis, quia si lugemus mortuos carnaliter, multo magis spiritualiter, I Reg. XVI: *usquequo tu.*⁸⁶ Et Ier. IX: *quis dabit capiti.*⁸⁷

2 auaritie] cupiditatis $\beta^1 V$ 2 nunc autem] hic $\beta^1 V$ 3 per] *om.* B 4 que] quod B 5 magno] magis V 6 Ier. XXXIII] Ier. XXXI $\beta^1 V$ 6 uirgo in choro] uirgines in plana $\beta^1 V$ 10 dilectum] delictum V 12 enim] illi $\beta^1 V$ 14 Ie. luctum unigeniti fac] Ier. VIII, luctum fac V 15 esse] *om.* $\beta^1 V$ 15 tripliciter] exponi *add.* $\beta^1 V$ 17 I Reg. XVI] Reg. III B 17 et] *om.* $\beta^1 V$

⁸³ Ier. 31,13: “Tunc laetabitur uirgo in choro, iuvenes et senes simul; et convertam luctum eorum in gaudium et consolabor eos et laetificabo a dolore suo”.

⁸⁴ *De Sermone* lib. I.2.5.

⁸⁵ Ier. 6,26: “Filia populi mei, accingere cilicio et conspergere cinere, luctum unigeniti fac tibi, planctum amarum, quia repente ueniet vastator super nos”.

⁸⁶ I Reg. 16,1: “Usquequo tu luges Saul, cum ego proiecerim eum ne regnet super Israel?”; *Enarrationes*, cap. V, 1286b.; *Comm. Ier.* lib. I.5.5; *Expositio* lib. V.55; *Homil.* XV.3, 226; *Opus Imp.* cap. V hom. IX, 681.

⁸⁷ Ier. 9,1: “Quis dabit capiti meo aquam et oculis meis fontem lacrimarum, et plorabo die ac nocte interfectos filiae populi mei?”

Ponitur autem satis congrue ista beatitudo post premissam. Posset enim quis dicere: sufficit non facere malum. Et uerum est a principio, ante peccatum. Sed post commissum peccatum non sufficit nisi satisfacias. Secundo potest accipi de luctu pro incolatu presentis miserie, Ps. *heu michi quia incolatus*.⁸⁸ Istud est *irriguum superius et inferius* de quo indicatur Ios.⁸⁹ Pro peccatis plorate et pro celestis patrie incolatu. Tertio, secundum Augustinum, pro luctu quem habent homines de gaudiis seculi que dimittunt ueniendo ad Christum, ut dolor ille uocetur luctus.⁹⁰ Homines enim aliqui seculo moriuntur et seculum moritur eis, Gal. ult: *per quem michi mundus*.⁹¹ Nos autem de mortuis lugemus, ita illi lugent quia non potest esse quin in dimittendo aliquem dolorem sentiant.

[423] Isti autem triplici luctui triplex consolatio respondet quia luctui pro peccatis datur remissio peccatorum quam petebat Dauid dicens *redde michi letitiam*.⁹² Desolationi celestis patrie et incolatui presentis miserie respondet consolatio uite eterne de qua Ier. XXXI: *conuertam luctum uestrum*.⁹³ Et Ys. ult. *in Ierusalem consolabimini*.⁹⁴

4 satisfacias] satisfaciat V 4 incolatu] incellatu B 5 irriguum] irrigum B 8 que] qui B 9 ut...luctus] om. β' V 10 ult.] om. F' V 11 de mortuis] sicut mortui B 16 dicens] Ps. I add. β' V 16 desolationi] dilationi β' 16 celestis patrie] patrie c. V

⁸⁸ Ps. 119,5: "Heu mihi, quia incolatus meus prolongatus est!"

⁸⁹ Ios. 15,19: "Dedit itaque ei Caleb irriguum superius et inferius".

⁹⁰ *De Sermone* lib. I.2.5.

⁹¹ Gal. 6,14: "Mihi autem absit gloriari, nisi in cruce Domini nostri Iesu Christi, per quem mihi mundus crucifixus est, et ego mundo".

⁹² Ps. 1,14: "Redde mihi laetitiam salutaris tui et spiritu principali confirma me"; *Expositio* lib. V.55.

⁹³ Ier. 31,13: "Tunc laetabitur uirgo in choro, iuuenes et senes simul; et conuertam luctum eorum in gaudium et consolabor eos et laeticabo a dolore suo".

⁹⁴ Is. 66,13: "Quomodo, si cui mater blandiatur, ita ego consolabor vos, et in Ierusalem consolabimini".

Tertio luctui respondet consolatio diuini amoris. Quando enim aliquis dolet de amissione rei dilecte, consolationem recipit si aliam rem magis dilectam acquirit. Vnde homines consolantur quando pro temporalibus rebus recipiunt spirituales et eternas, quod est per Spiritum Sanctum, et ideo dicitur paraclitus, Io. XV.⁹⁵ Per Spiritum Sanctum, qui est amor diuinus, homines gaudebunt, Io. XVI: *tristitia uestra*.⁹⁶

[424] Et notandum quod ista beatitudo appropriatur dono scientie, quia illi lugent miserias aliorum qui cognoscunt.⁹⁷ Vnde de quibusdam scientiam talem non habentibus dicitur Sap. XIV: *in magno uiuentes inscientie*.⁹⁸ E conuerso Eccl. I: *qui addit scientiam*.⁹⁹

[425] Et notandum quod ista premia ita ordinantur quod semper secundum addit super primum. Primo enim dixit *beati pauperes* etc. *quoniam ipsorum est regnum celorum*. Postea *quoniam ipsi possidebunt terram*. Plus enim est possidere quam habere tantum. Item postea *quoniam ipsi consolabuntur*, plus est consolari quam possidere. Aliqui enim possident aliqua sed non delectantur in eis.¹⁰⁰

2 aliam] illam $\beta^1 V 5$ et] *om.* $F^1 V 5$ ideo] quare $\beta^1 V 6$ sanctum] enim *add.* $\beta^1 V 6$ Io. XVI] Io. XIV $\beta^1 V 11$ quibusdam] quibus $B 12$ uiuentes] inueni $\beta^1 V 15$ ita] *om.* $B 15$ quod semper] quia s. $B 20$ aliqua] ista $\beta^1 V$

⁹⁵ Io. 15,26: “Cum autem uenerit Paraclitus, quem ego mittam uobis a Patre, Spiritum ueritatis qui a Patre procedit, ille testimonium perhibebit de me”; *De Sermone* lib. I.2.5.

⁹⁶ Io. 16,20: “Amen, amen dico uobis: quia plorabitis, et flebitis uos, mundus autem gaudebit; uos autem contristabimini, sed tristitia uestra uertetur in gaudium”.

⁹⁷ *De Sermone* lib. I.3.10.

⁹⁸ Sap. 14,22: “Et non suffecerat errasse eos circa Dei scientiam, sed et in magno uidentes inscientiae bello tot et tam magna mala pacem appellant”.

⁹⁹ Eccl. 1,18: “eo quod in multa sapientia multa sit indignatio, et qui addit scientiam addit et laborem”.

¹⁰⁰ *Enarrationes* cap. V, 1289c.

[426] Consequenter, positus beatitudinibus que pertinent ad remotionem mali, hic ponitur beatitudo que pertinet ad operationem boni. Est autem duplex bonum nostrum, iustitie scilicet et misericordie. Et ideo duo ponit.

5

[427] Quantum ad primum dicit *beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam*. Iustitia tripliciter sumitur secundum Crisostomum et philosophum.¹⁰¹ Quandoque pro omni uirtute et dicitur omnis uirtus iustitia legalis, que precepit de actibus omnium uirtutum. Vnde inquantum homo obedit legi implet opus omnium uirtutum.

10

Alio modo, secundum quod est specialis uirtus, de quatuor cardinalibus, que opponitur auaritie uel iniustitie. Et est circa uenditiones, emptiones, conductiones et huiusmodi.¹⁰² Quod ergo dicit hic *qui esuriunt iustitiam* potest intelligi generaliter uel specialiter. Si intelligatur de generali, hoc dicit propter duas rationes. Prima Ieronymus qui dicit quod non sufficit quod homo opus iustitie operetur nisi cum desiderio operetur, Ps. *uoluntarie sacrificabo*.¹⁰³ Et alibi: *sitiuit anima mea*.¹⁰⁴ Amos VIII: *mittam famem in terram istam*.¹⁰⁵ Ergo est esuries quando cum desiderio operatur quis.

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1 positus] de *add. V 9* omnium] *om F¹V 11* est] *om. F 13* uenditiones, emptiones] emptiones, uenditiones *β¹V 13* et huiusmodi] *om. β¹V 14* dicit hic] hic dicit *B 17* opus iustitie] iustitie opus *β¹V 18* Amos VIII] Amos III *β¹V 19* famem] famam *V 19* terram istam] terra ista *B 19* esuries] exuries *F¹*

¹⁰¹ I.e. *dupliciter*: *Ethica M.* lib. V cap. 1, 1129a; *Homil.* XV.3, 227; *SLE* lib. V cap. 1, 45-55.

¹⁰² *Homil.* XV.4, 227.

¹⁰³ Ps. 53,8: “Voluntarie sacrificabo tibi confitebor nomini tuo, Domine, quoniam bonum est”; *Comm. Ier.* lib. I.5.6.

¹⁰⁴ Ps. 41,3: “Sitiuit anima mea ad Deum fortem vivum”.

¹⁰⁵ Am. 8,11: “Ecce dies veniunt, dicit Dominus, et mittam famem in terram, non famem panis neque sitim aquae, sed audiendi verbum Domini”.

Alia ratio. Iustitia est duplex: perfecta et imperfecta. Perfectam in mundo habere non possumus, quia *si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus*, Io.¹⁰⁶ Ys. LXIV: *omnis iustitiae nostrae*.¹⁰⁷ Sed hanc habebimus in celo, Ys. LX: *populus tuus omnes iusti*.¹⁰⁸ Sed desiderium iustitiae possumus hic habere et ideo dicit **beati qui esuriunt**.¹⁰⁹

Et est simile ad illud quod Pitagoras fecit. Ante enim Pitagore tempus illi qui studebant uocabantur *sophi*, idest sapientes. Pitagoras autem noluit sic uocari sed sapientie amator.¹¹⁰ Ita uult Dominus quod sui sint amatores iustitiae et uocentur. Si autem intelligatur de iustitia speciali que est quod homo reddat unicuique quod suum est, conuenienter dicitur **beati qui esuriunt**. Quia esuries et sitis proprie auarorum est quia numquam satiantur et aliena iniuste possidere desiderant. Vnde ista esuries de qua dicit Dominus, opponitur huic, scilicet auarorum. Et uult Dominus quod ita anhelemus ad istam iustitiam quod numquam quasi satiemur in uita ista, sicut auarus numquam satiatur. **Beati** ergo **qui esuriunt** etc. **quoniam ipsi saturabuntur**.

1 est] in *add. B 2* habere] haberi *B 2* possumus] potest *B 8* Pitagoras] Pittagoras *F* | Pythagoras *F^lV 8* Pitagore] Pittagore *F* | Pythagore *F^lV 9* *sophi*] *sopho B 9* idest] et *V 10* Pitagoras] Pittagoras *F* | Pythagoras *F^lV 14* auarorum] auaro *B 14* satiantur] satientur *B 14* et (aliena)] quia *β^lV 15* iniuste] iuste *B* | iniusta *V 16* opponitur] apponitur *F 17* anhelemus] anelemus *F* | anellemus *F^l* | hanelemus *V 17* satiemur] satietur *B*

¹⁰⁶ 1 Io. 1,8: “Si dixerimus quoniam peccatum non habemus, ipsi nos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est”.

¹⁰⁷ Is. 64,6: “et facti sumus ut immundus omnes nos, et quasi pannus menstruatae universae iustitiae nostrae”.

¹⁰⁸ Is. 60,21: “Populus autem tuus omnes iusti, in perpetuum hereditabunt terram”.

¹⁰⁹ *Enarrationes* cap. V, 1286d.

¹¹⁰ *Enarrationes* cap. V, 1287a.

[428] Conueniens premium ponitur, *saturabuntur*. Et primo in eterna Dei uisione. Videbunt enim Deum per essentiam, Ps. *satiabor cum apparuerit*.¹¹¹ Ibi enim nichil restabit ad desiderandum, Ps. *qui replet in bonis desiderium*.¹¹² Prou. X: *desiderium suum iustis*.¹¹³ Secundo in presenti, et hec est duplex. Vna in spiritualibus bonis, hoc est impletione mandatorum Dei, Io. IV: *meus cibus est*.¹¹⁴ Et de isto exponit Augustinus.¹¹⁵ Alio modo accipitur de saturitate rerum temporalium. Homines enim iniusti numquam saturantur quia concupiscentia eorum numquam saturatur. Sed homines qui habent terminum suum ipsam iustitiam non procedunt ultra, Prou. *comedit et replet animam suam*.¹¹⁶

[429] Ista beatitudo secundum Augustinum reducitur ad donum fortitudinis.¹¹⁷ Quia quod homo iuste operetur, hoc pertinet ad fortitudinem. Item supperaddit aliquid premio supraposito, quia saturari est implere totaliter desiderium.

1 saturabuntur] saturare V 2 Dei] *om.* β¹V 4-5 Prou. X desiderium] *om.* F 5 et] *om.* β¹V 6 una] est *add.* β¹V 6 est] in *add.* β¹V 7 Io. IV] Io. VI β¹V 9 enim] *om.* β¹V 9 iniusti] in iusti V 9-10 quia...saturatur *om.* β¹V 11 non procedunt ultra] ultra non p. β¹V 11 ultra] ut Iacobus dicit: et replet anima sua *add.* β¹V 11-12 Prou...suam *om.* β¹V 16 item] a *add.* F¹V 16 aliquid] *om.* β¹V

¹¹¹ Ps. 16,15: “Ego autem in iustitia apparebo conspectui tuo, satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua”.

¹¹² Ps. 102,5: “qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum: renovabitur ut aquilae iuventus tua”.

¹¹³ Prov. 10,24: “Quod timet impius veniet super eum, desiderium suum iustis dabitur”.

¹¹⁴ Io. 4,24: “Dicit eis Iesus: Meus cibus est ut faciam voluntatem eius qui misit me, ut perficiam opus eius”.

¹¹⁵ *De Sermone* lib. I.2.6.

¹¹⁶ Prov. 13,25: “Iustus comedit et replet animam suam, venter autem impiorum insaturabilis”.

¹¹⁷ *De Sermone* lib. I.3.10.

Item nota quod primo dicit *beati qui lugent*. Homo enim quando infirmus est non appetit comedere, sed tunc incipit appetere quando iam incipit sanari. Et ita est in spiritualibus. Quod quando homines sunt in peccato non sentiunt famem spiritualem. Sed quando
 5 dimittunt peccata sentiunt, et de ipsis lugent esuriem iustitie. Et quia iustitia sine misericordia crudelitas, misericordia sine iustitia mater est dissolutionis.¹¹⁸ Et ideo oportet quod utrumque coniungatur secundum illud Prou. III: *misericordia et ueritas etc.*¹¹⁹ Et Ps. *misericordia et ueritas obuauerunt.*¹²⁰

10 [430] Et ideo subdit *beati misericordes*. Misericordem esse est habere miserum cor de miseria aliorum.¹²¹ Tunc autem habemus misericordiam de miseria aliorum quando illam reputamus quasi nostram. De nostra autem dolemus et studemus repellere. Ergo tunc
 15 uere misericors est quando miseriam aliorum studemus repellere.

1 enim] est *add. F 2* incipit appetere] appetere incipit $\beta^1 V 5$ peccata] *om. F^1 V 5* sentiunt] tunc s. $\beta^1 V$] et ideo statim subdit beati misericordes *add. \beta^1 V 5-6* et...iustitie *om. \beta^1 V 5* et] *om. \beta^1 V 6* crudelitas] est *add. F^1 V 8* ueritas etc.] iustitia etc. $\beta^1 V 11$ et ideo subdit] *om. \beta^1 V 11* misericordem] misericordes *F 12* miserum cor] misericordiam *V 12-13* tunc... aliorum *om. \beta^1 V 14-15* tunc uere] uere tunc *F^1 15* est] es $\beta^1 V 15$ studemus] studes $\beta^1 V$

¹¹⁸ *Glossa in Mt.* cap. V, 90c.

¹¹⁹ Prov. 3,3: “Misericordia et ueritas te non deserant: circunda eas gutturi tuo, et describe in tabulis cordis tui”.

¹²⁰ Ps. 84,11: “Misericordia et ueritas obuauerunt sibi, iustitia et pax osculatae sunt”.

¹²¹ *Contra Adimantum* 11, 137; *De Ciuitate* lib. IX cap. 5; *S.Th.* Ila Ilae q. 30 a. 1 resp.

- Est autem duplex miseria proximi. Prima in istis rebus temporalibus, et ad istam debemus habere miserum cor, Thob. IV: *quomodo potueris ita esto misericors*.¹²² Secunda qua per peccatum miser efficitur. Quia sicut beatitudo est in operibus uirtutum, ita miseria proprie in uitiiis, Prou. XIV: *miseros facit populos*.¹²³ Et ideo quando admonemus corruentes ut redeant misericordes sumus, infra IX: *uidens autem Iesus turbas misertus eis quia erant sicut oves non habentes pastorem*.¹²⁴ Isti ergo misericordes beati.
- 10 [431] Et quare? ***Quoniam ipsi misericordiam consequentur***. Et sciendum quod semper dona Dei superexcedunt merita nostra, Ecli. XXXIV: *quoniam Dominus etc*.¹²⁵ Et septempler, sic multo maior est misericordia quam Dominus impendet nobis quam illa quam impendimus proximo.

2 Thob. IV] Col. III $\beta^1 V$ 3 ita esto misericors] om. $\beta^1 V$ 3 qua] que B | quia $F^1 V$ 5 uitiiis] quod add. F 6 admonemus] amonemus F^1 7-8 eis...pastorem] om. $\beta^1 V$ 8 misericordes beati] beati m. V 10 consequentur] om. β^1 11 superexcedunt] excedunt $\beta^1 V$ 13 et] per add. B | post et add. $\beta^1 V$ 13 sic] ergo $\beta^1 V$ 13 impendet] impendit BF

¹²² Tb. 4,8: “Quomodo potueris, ita esto misericors”.

¹²³ Prou. 14,34: “Iustitia elevat gentem, miseros autem facit populos peccatum”.

¹²⁴ Mt. 9,36: “Videns autem turbas misertus est eis, quia erant vexati et iacentes sicut oves non habentes pastorem”.

¹²⁵ Ecli. 35,13: “quoniam Dominus retribuens est et septies tantum reddet tibi”; *Homil. XV.3*, 226.

Ista misericordia inchoatur in hac uita tripliciter. Primo quia relaxantur peccata, Ps. *qui propitiatur omnibus*.¹²⁶ Secundo quia remouet defectus temporales, infra *qui solem suum facit oriri*.¹²⁷ Perficietur tamen in futuro quando omnis miseria culpe et pene remouebitur, Ps. *Domine in celo misericordia*.¹²⁸ Et hoc est ***quoniam ipsi misericordiam***.

[432] Ista beatitudo reducitur ad donum consilii, quia hoc est singulare consilium ut inter pericula huius mundi misericordiam consequamur, I Thi. IV: *pietas ad omnia utilis est*.¹²⁹ Dan. IV: *consilium meum regi placeat*.¹³⁰

[433] Sic ergo positi sunt actus uirtutum quibus et remouemur a malo et operamur bonum. Nunc ponuntur actus quibus disponimur ad optimum, unde ***beati mundo***. Ista beatitudo in duobus consistit: in uisione Dei et dilectione proximi. Vnde primo ponit beatitudinem que pertinet ad uisionem Dei. Secundo beatitudinem que pertinet ad dilectionem proximi, ibi ***beati pacifici***.

1 tripliciter] *om. B* 2 relaxantur] relaxat *B* 3 infra] ita *F¹V* 4 tamen] *om. V*
 4 miseria culpe et pene] miseria et culpe et pene *β¹V* 5 remouebitur]
 remouebuntur *β¹V* 13 sic] sicut *β¹V* 14 quibus] quibus *add. B*

¹²⁶ Ps. 102,3: “qui propitiatur omnibus iniquitatibus tuis, qui sanat omnes infirmitates tuas”.

¹²⁷ Mt. 5,45: “ut sitis filii Patris vestri qui in caelis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos”.

¹²⁸ Ps. 35,6: “Domine, in caelo misericordia tua, et veritas tua usque ad nubes”.

¹²⁹ I Tim. 4,8: “pietas autem ad omnia utilis est, promissionem habens vitae quae nunc est et futurae”; *De Sermone* lib. I.3.10.

¹³⁰ Dan. 4,24: “Quam ob rem, rex, consilium meum placeat tibi, et peccata tua elemosynis redime et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum”.

[434] Dicit ergo *beati mundo corde*. Hic primo est questio litteralis. Habemus enim quod Deus uideri non potest, Io. I: *Deum nemo uidit*.¹³¹ Et ne aliquis diceret quod quamuis nullus uideat in presenti, uidebit in futuro. Remouet hoc apostolus, Thi. ult. *lucem habitat inaccessibilem que nullus homo uidit nec uideri potest etc.*¹³² Sed sciendum est quod circa hoc sunt diuerse opiniones. Nam aliqui posuerunt quod numquam Deus per essentiam uideretur sed in aliqua refulgentia sue claritatis. Sed hoc reprobatur Glossa super illud Exo. XXXIII: *non uidebit me homo et uiuet*.¹³³ Propter duo: primo quia hoc repugnat auctoritati sacre scripture, I Io. III: *uidebimus eum sicuti est*.¹³⁴ Item I Cor. XIII: *uidemus nunc per speculum*.¹³⁵ Item rationi, quia beatitudo hominis est ultimum bonum hominis in quo quietatur desiderium eius. Naturale autem desiderium est, quod homo uidens effectus inquirat de causa.¹³⁶ Vnde etiam admiratio surrexit philosophorum que fuit origo philosophie, quia uidentes effectus admirabantur et querebant causam. Istud ergo desiderium non quietabitur donec perueniat ad primam causam que Deus est, scilicet ad ipsam essentiam. Videbitur ergo per essentiam.

1 corde] om. β^1 3 uidit] uidet $\beta^1 V$ 3 presenti] preterito B 4 uidebit] tunc add. B 4 Thi.] ibi F¹ | Phil. V 5 que...etc.] om. $\beta^1 V$ 6 est] om. F¹ V 6 nam] om. $\beta^1 V$ 6 aliqui] non add. F | enim add. F¹ V 7 uideretur] uidetur BF¹ 8 aliqua] quadam B 8 Glossa] om. $\beta^1 V$ 9 XXXIII] XXIII $\beta^1 V$ 9 primo] prima B 10 sacre] om. $\beta^1 V$ 11 est] om. B 11 speculum] om. B β^1 13 quietatur] quietabitur V 13 naturale autem desiderium] om. F 14 etiam] om. V 15 surrexit] insurrexit V 17 perueniat] perueniant B 17 causam] om. F 17 Deus est] est D. V 18 ipsam] diuinam add. $\beta^1 V$

¹³¹ 1 Io. 4,12: “Deum nemo uidit unquam”.

¹³² 1. Tim. 6,16: “qui solus habet immortalitatem et lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem, quem nullus hominum uidit, sed nec videre potest”.

¹³³ Ex. 33,20: “Rursumque ait: Non poteris videre faciem meam: non enim uidebit me homo et uiuet”; *Glossa in Ex.* cap. XXXIII, 289b-c.

¹³⁴ 1 Io. 3,2: “Scimus quoniam, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus; quoniam uidebimus eum sicuti est”.

¹³⁵ 1 Cor. 13,12: “Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem”.

¹³⁶ Cf. *Sup. Io.* #212.

Alii etiam plus errauerunt ponentes contrarium: quia dixerunt quod non solum uidebimus oculo mentis sed etiam corporis essentiam Dei, et quod Christus uidet oculo corporali essentiam diuinam.¹³⁷ Sed hoc non conuenit, quod patet primo ex auctoritate que hic ponitur quia non diceret *beati mundo corde*, sed beati qui habent mundos et puros oculos. Ergo dat intelligere quod non uidetur nisi corde, idest intellectu. Sic enim accipitur hic cor, sicut Ad Eph. III: *illuminatos oculos cordis*.¹³⁸ Secundo, quia sensus corporis non potest nisi in suum obiectum. Si autem dicatur quod tunc habebit maiorem potentiam, dicendum quod tunc non esset uisio corporalis quia oculus corporalis non uidet nisi colores, essentiam autem per accidens, secundum Augustinum in libro de Ciuitate Dei.¹³⁹ Et sic possibile est Deum uideri in patria. Sicut cum uideo hominem possumus dicere quod uideo uitam, inquantum uideo quedam indicia quibus indicatur michi uita sua. Ita erit in uisione diuina, quia tanta erit refulgentia in celo nouo et terra noua et corporibus glorificatis, quod per ista dicemur uidere Deum quasi oculis corporalibus. Ergo *beati mundo corde*.

1 plus] plus *add. V* 1 quod] quia *B* 3 essentiam] *om. V* 3 quod] quia *B* 4 conuenit] erit *B* 10 non] uero *V* 12-13 Et...patria] *om. β¹V* 13 cum] enim *B* 13 hominem] uiuens *β¹V* 14 possumus] possum *B* 16 erit in] erit *F* 17 dicemur] dicemur *V*

¹³⁷ *De Sermone* lib. I.2.8.

¹³⁸ Eph. 1,17-18: “ut Deus, Domini nostri Iesu Christi, Pater gloriae det uobis spiritum sapientiae et reuelationis in agnitione eis; illuminatos oculos cordis uestri”.

¹³⁹ *De Ciuitate Dei* lib. XXII.29, l. 99ff.

Soluit ergo illud *Deum nemo uidit unquam* tripliciter. Primo, quia non uisione comprehensiuua. Secundo, <non> oculis corporalibus. Tertio, <non> in hac uita. Quia si alicui datum fuerit quod uiderit in hac uita Deum, hoc fuit quia totaliter alienatus est et eleuatus supra sensus corporales.¹⁴⁰ Et ideo dicebat apostolus cui hoc concessum fuit, II Cor. XII: *scio hominem in Christo ante annos XIII siue in corpore siue ex corpore nescio, Deus scit, raptum*.¹⁴¹ Et ideo dicitur *beati mundo corde*, quia sicut oculos uidens colorem oportet quod sit depuratus, ita mens uidens Deum, Sap. I: *In simplicitate cordis querite etc. Apparet autem hiis qui fidem etc.*¹⁴² Fide enim purificatur cor, Act. XV: *fide purificans*.¹⁴³ Et ideo dicitur quod uisio succedet fidei.

[435] *Beati ergo mundo corde*, qui scilicet habent munditiam generalem, Cor. III: *templum Dei sanctum est etc.*¹⁴⁴ Templum a contemplando dicitur. Vel *beati mundo corde*, idest qui habent munditiam carnis. Nichil enim ita impedit spiritualem contemplationem sicut immunditia carnis, *pacem sequimini et sanctimoniam*.¹⁴⁵

1 soluit] soluitur $\beta^1 V 1$ Deum] Deus $B 2$ non] nullius $B 3$ fuerit] fuit 3 uiderit] uident $V 4$ est] fuit est $B 4$ et eleuatus] *om. V 5-7* Et...raptum *om. $\beta^1 V 7$ scit] mg. B 12* succedit] succedit $V 18$ immunditia] in munditia F

¹⁴⁰ *De Genesi* lib. XII cap. 27.

¹⁴¹ 2 Cor. 12,2: "Scio hominem in Christo ante annos quattuordecim, sive in corpore nescio sive extra corpus nescio, Deus scit, raptum huiusmodi usque ad tertium caelum"; *II Ad. Cor.* #462; *De Genesi* lib. XII cap. 1-2.

¹⁴² Sap. 1,1-2: "Diligite iustitiam, qui iudicatis terram, sentite de Domino in bonitate et in simplicitate cordis quaerite illum; quoniam invenitur ab his qui non tentant illum, apparet autem eis qui fidem habent in illum"; *De Sermone* lib. I.2.8.

¹⁴³ Act. 15,9: "et nihil discrevit inter nos et illos fide purificans corda eorum".

¹⁴⁴ 1 Cor. 3,17: "Templum enim Dei sanctum est, quod estis vos".

¹⁴⁵ Hebr. 12,14: "Pacem sequimini cum omnibus et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum"; *Homil.* XV.4, 227.

- Et ideo quidam dicunt quod uirtutes morales proficiunt ad uitam contemplatiuam et precipue castitas. Et sciendum quod hoc **beati mundo** potest intelligi de uisione uie. Sancti enim, qui habent cor repletum iustitia, uident excellentius quam alii qui uident Deum per effectus corporales. Quanto enim effectus sunt propinquiores, tanto Deus magis cognoscitur per eos. Vnde sancti qui habent iustitiam, caritatem, et huiusmodi effectus, qui sunt simillimi Deo, cognoscunt magis quam alii, Ps. *gustate et uidete*.¹⁴⁶
- 5
- 10 [436] **Beati pacifici**. Hic ponitur septima beatitudo, et sicut dictum est uirtutes ad optimum disponentes disponunt ad duo, scilicet ad uisionem Dei et dilectionem proximi. Et sicut munditia cordis disponit ad uisionem Dei, ita pax disponitur ad dilectionem proximi qua filii Dei nominamur et sumus, quia sicut dicitur Io. IV: *qui fratrem suum quem etc.*¹⁴⁷
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- [437] Et notandum quod hic ponuntur duo premia beatitudinis, unde **beati pacifici** et **beati qui persecutionem**. Et omnia precedentia reducuntur ad ista duo et sunt effectus omnium precedentium. Quid enim agitur per paupertatem spiritus, per luctum, per mansuetudinem, nisi ut mundum cor habeatur? Quid per iustitiam et misericordiam, nisi ut pacem habeamus? Ys. *fructus iustitie pax*.¹⁴⁸
- 20

2 hoc] hec *F*¹ 4 Deum] *om.* *β*¹*V* 5 tanto] tante enim *F* | enim *add.* *F*¹*V* 8 Ps.] XXXIII *add.* *F*¹*V* 10 septima] *om.* *F*¹*V* 12-13 et dilectionem...Dei] *om.* *F* 13 disponitur ad dilectionem proximi] ad dilectionem Dei disponit *β*¹*V* 13 proximi] *mg.* *B* | *om.* *F*¹*V* 14 sumus] disponit ad dilectionem proximi *add.* *β*¹*V* 14 sicut] *om.* *F.* 14 qui] quia *FV*

¹⁴⁶ Ps. 33,9: “Gustate et videte quoniam suavis est Dominus: beatus vir qui sperat in eo”.

¹⁴⁷ 1 Io. 4,20: “Qui enim non diligit fratrem suum quem videt, Deum quem non videt, quomodo potest diligere”.

¹⁴⁸ Is. 32,17: “et erit opus iustitiae pax, et cultus iustitiae silentium et securitas usque in sempiternum”.

[438] *Beati* ergo *pacifici*. Sed uidendum est quid sit pax et quomodo ad eam possimus peruenire. Pax est tranquillitas ordinis. Ordo autem est parium dispariumque sua loca cuique tribuens dispositio. Ergo pax est in hoc quod omnia teneant loca sua.¹⁴⁹

5 Vnde debet mens hominis primo subiecta esse Deo. Secundo, motus et uires inferiores que sunt nobis et brutis communes subiecta esse rationi, per rationem enim homo preest animalibus, Gen. I: *faciamus homines*.¹⁵⁰ Tertio, ut homo pacem habeat ad alios, et sic totaliter erit ordinatus.¹⁵¹ Ista autem ordinatio non potest esse nisi

10 in hominibus sanctis, Ps. *pax multa diligentibus*.¹⁵² Ys. XLVIII: *non est pax impiis*.¹⁵³ Pacem enim interiorum habere non possunt, Sap. XIV: *in magno uiuentes*.¹⁵⁴ Pacem talem mundus dare non potest, Io. XIV: *non quomodo mundus dat*.¹⁵⁵ Item non sufficit totum hoc sed debent inter discordes pacem facere, Prou. XII: *qui*

15 *pacis ineunt consilia, sequitur eos gaudium*.¹⁵⁶

2 quomodo] quo *F¹V 2* ad eam] eadem *F 2* ordinis] cordis *F 4* omnia] omnes *β¹V 4* teneant] teneatur *V 4* loca sua] sua l. *F¹V 5* esse] est *FV 6* que] qui *B 7* rationi] homini *β¹V 7* animalibus] alibus *Bβ¹ 8* et] quia *β¹V 10* Ys. XLVIII] Ysa. LXVII *β¹V 12* XIV] XVII *β¹V 12* uiuentes] *om. β¹V 15* pacis ineunt consilia] querunt pacis consilia *β¹V 15* sequitur eos gaudium] *om. β¹V*

¹⁴⁹ *De Ciuitate Dei*, lib. XIX.13.

¹⁵⁰ Gen. 1,26: “et ait: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram”; *De Sermone* lib. I.2.9.

¹⁵¹ *De Sermone* lib. I.2.9; cf. *STh* I, q. 95, a. 1 resp.

¹⁵² Ps. 118,165: “Pax multa diligentibus legem tuam, et non est illis scandalum”.

¹⁵³ Is. 48,22: “Non est pax impiis, dicit Dominus”.

¹⁵⁴ Sap. 14,22: “Et non suffecerat errasse eos circa Dei scientiam, sed et in magno viuentes inscientiae bello tot et tam magna mala pacem appellant”.

¹⁵⁵ Io. 14,27: “Pacem relinquo vobis, pacem meam do vobis: non quomodo mundus dat ego do vobis”.

¹⁵⁶ Prou. 12,20: “qui autem pacis ineunt consilia, sequitur eos gaudium”; *Opus Imp.* cap. V hom. IX, 682.

Tamen sciendum quod ista pax hic inchoatur, sed non perficitur, quia nullus potest habere totaliter motus brutales rationi subiectos, Rom. VII: *uideo aliam legem*.¹⁵⁷ Vnde uera pax erit in uita eterna, Ps. *in pace in idipsum*.¹⁵⁸ Phil. IV: *pax Dei que exuperat*.¹⁵⁹

5

[439] **Quoniam filii Dei uocantur.** Triplici ratione. Prima est, quia habent officium filii Dei. Ad hoc enim Filius Dei uenit in mundum ut congregaret dispersos, Eph. II: *ipse enim est pax nostra*.¹⁶⁰ Col. I: *pacificans in sanguine*.¹⁶¹ Secundo, quia per pacem cum caritate peruenitur ad regnum eternum in quo omnes filii Dei uocantur, Sap. V: *ecce quomodo computati sunt inter filios Dei et inter sanctos et sors illorum est*.¹⁶² Eph. IV: *solliciti seruire unitatem*.¹⁶³ Tertio, quia per hoc homo assimilatur Deo, quia ubi est pax non est aliqua resistentia.¹⁶⁴ Deo autem nullus resistere potest, Iob. *quis resistit ei et pacem*.¹⁶⁵

10

15

2 habere totaliter] totaliter habere $\beta^1 V 3$ pax] om $\beta^1 V 7$ Filius Dei] Filius dicitur B 8 enim] om. B 11-12 inter...est om. $\beta^1 V 13$ unitatem] om. $\beta^1 V$

¹⁵⁷ Rom. 7,23: “uideo autem aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivantem me in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis”; *Retractationes* lib. I c. XIX.1.

¹⁵⁸ Ps. 4,9: “In pace in idipsum dormiam et requiescam”.

¹⁵⁹ Phil. 4,7: “et pax Dei, quae exuperat omnem sensum, custodiat corda uestra et intelligentias uestras in Christo Iesu”.

¹⁶⁰ Eph. 2,14: “Ipse enim est pax nostra, qui fecit utraque unum, et medium parietem maceriae soluens, inimicitias in carne sua”.

¹⁶¹ Col. 1,20: “et per eum reconciliare omnia in ipsum, pacificans per sanguinem crucis eius sive quae in terris sive quae in caelis sunt”.

¹⁶² Sap. 5,5: “ecce quomodo computati sunt inter filios Dei, et inter sanctos sors illorum est”.

¹⁶³ Eph. 4,3: “solliciti seruire unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis”.

¹⁶⁴ *De Sermone* lib. I.2.9.

¹⁶⁵ Iob. 9,4: “Sapiens corde est et fortis robore. Quis restitit ei et pacem habuit?”

5 [440] Et notandum quod iste beatitudines sibi inuicem superaddunt. Plus enim est misericordiam consequi quam saturari, quia saturari est impleri eo quod est sibi proportionatum, sed misericordia superhabundat. Item non omnes qui misericordiam accipiunt a rege admittuntur ad uidendum regem. Item plus est esse filium regis quam regem uidere.¹⁶⁶

10 [441] Et tamen sciendum quod per omnia ista unum premium designatur.¹⁶⁷ Sed quare ita Dominus per multa uoluit significare illud? Dicendum quod omnia que in inferioribus diuisa sunt, in superioribus congregantur. Sed quia in rebus humanis ista inueniuntur dispersa et nos manuducimur per sensibilia, ideo Dominus per multa significauit illud premium eternum.

15 [442] Ista autem septima beatitudo adaptatur dono sapientie, quia sapientia facit esse filios Dei.¹⁶⁸ Item notandum quod in septima beatitudine ponitur pax sicut in die septima requies, Gen. II.¹⁶⁹

1 beatitudines] per ordinem *add. B 3* quia saturari] *om. B 5* a rege admittuntur] admittuntur ad regem *β¹V 9* significare] signare *β¹V 10* que in] que *β¹V 11* sed] et *β¹V 13* significauit] signauit *β¹V 15* adaptatur] aptatur *B 15* dono] duo *V 15* quia] *om. β¹V 17* Gen. II] *om. F¹V*

¹⁶⁶ *Enarrationes* cap. V, 1290a.

¹⁶⁷ *De Sermone* lib. I.4.12.

¹⁶⁸ *De Sermone* lib. I.3.10.

¹⁶⁹ Gen. 2,2: “Complevitque Deus die septimo opus suum, quod fecerat, et requieuit die septimo ab universo opere quod patrarat”; *Enarrationes* cap. V, 1288c; *Expositio* lib. V.51.

[443] Consequenter ponitur octaua beatitudo que designat perfectionem omnium precedentium. Tunc enim homo in omnibus illis perfectus est, quando nullam deserit propter tribulationes proprii: *uasa figuli probat*.¹⁷⁰ **Beati** ergo **qui persecutionem**. Sed aliquis forte audiens *beati pacifici*. Sed certe non tantum interiorem sed exteriorem, Ps. *pax multa diligentibus*.¹⁷¹

Ipsa autem persecutio non facit beatum sed causa, unde dicit **propter iustitiam**, I Pet. III: *si quid patimini*.¹⁷² Crisostomus: non dicit a paganis et pro fide sed **propter iustitiam**.¹⁷³ Quia <non> a quo et propter quacumque causam. Sed propter iustitiam patris martirium est, Ecli. IV: *pro iustitia agonizare*.¹⁷⁴

[444] Prophete occisi sunt non quia negauerunt fidem sed quia ueritatem annuntiauerunt. Ioannes Baptista quia ueritatem annuntiabat occisus est et martir fuit.¹⁷⁵ Et notandum quod hec beatitudo octaua loco ponitur sicut octaua die circumcisio fiebat, in qua quedam generalis circumcisio martirum prenuntiatur.¹⁷⁶

4 sed] si B 5 tantum] om. β¹V 8 beatum] pacem β¹V 9 si quid] quidquid β¹ | quidquid V 10 pro fide] secundum fidem B 10-18 quia...prenuntiatur om. β¹V

¹⁷⁰ Ecli. 27,6: “Vasa figuli probat fornax, et homines iustos tentatio tribulationis”.

¹⁷¹ Ps. 118,165: “Pax multa diligentibus legem tuam, et non est illis scandalum”.

¹⁷² I Pt. 3,14: “Sed, etsi quid patimini propter iustitiam, beati”.

¹⁷³ *Opus Imp.* cap. V hom. IX, 683.

¹⁷⁴ Ecli. 4,33: “Pro iustitia agonizare pro anima tua et usque ad mortem certa pro iustitia, et Deus expugnabit pro te inimicos tuos”.

¹⁷⁵ *Opus Imp.* cap. V hom. IX, 683.

¹⁷⁶ *Comm. Ier.* lib. I.5.10; *De Sermonibus* lib. I.4.12.

[445] *Quoniam ipsorum est regnum*. Hoc uidetur esse idem ex eo quod ponitur in prima beatitudine, unde a sanctis diuersimode exponitur. Quidam enim dicunt quod idem est istud et id quod dicitur *beati pauperes, quoniam ipsorum*. Et hoc ad designandum perfectionem patientie, Iac. I.¹⁷⁷ Perfectio autem semper designatur per hoc quod reuertitur ad sui principium, sicut apparet in circulo.¹⁷⁸ Item ille qui persecutionem patitur propter iustitiam pauper est et debentur sibi omnia alia quia mites et mundis cordes et sic de omnibus. Et ideo non solum primum premium debetur sibi sed omnia premia. Alii dicunt quod non est idem, unde dicit Ambrosius quod ponitur regnum celorum quantum ad gloriam anime et <corporis>.¹⁷⁹ Virtuti enim anime respondit regnum celorum, sed martirio respondit beatitudo que consistit in glorificatione corporum propter supplicia que passa sunt. Vel aliter: regnum celorum pauperibus promittitur in spe quia non statim euolant, sed martiribus in re quia statim euolant.¹⁸⁰

1-16 quoniam...euolant] *om. β¹V 6 sui] mg. B 12 corporis] con.*

¹⁷⁷ Iac. 1,4: “Patientia autem opus perfectum habet, ut sitis perfecti et integri in nullo deficientes”.

¹⁷⁸ *De Sermone* lib. I.3.10.

¹⁷⁹ *Expositio* lib. V.61; cf. *STh* I-II, q. 69, a. 4 ad 2.

¹⁸⁰ *Enarrationes* cap. V, 1289b; *Expositio* lib. V.59.

DE PREDIKHEER EN DE FILOSOOF
Aristoteles in de Academische Preken van Thomas van
Aquino

Jörgen Vijgen

Zoals bekend had een 13^{de}-eeuwse theoloog, of beter, een *Magister in Sacra Pagina*, aan de Parijse universiteit een drievoudige taak. Hij diende (1) de Schrift uit te leggen (*lectio*), (2) aan debatten deel te nemen (*disputatio*) en hierin een eigen positie innemen (*determinatio*) en (3) tot slot op geregelde tijdstippen preken (*praedicatio*) te houden voor de universitaire gemeenschap.¹ Deze drievoudige taak illustreert hoe voor een middeleeuwse theoloog

¹ Dit kan hier niet nader uitgewerkt worden maar om precies te zijn dient men te zeggen dat de uitleg van de H. Schrift zelf deze drie onderdelen bevat. Petrus Cantor, *Verbum adbreuiatum*, textus prior, I : “In tribus igitur consistit exercitium sacre Scripture : circa lectionem, disputationem et predicationem [...]. Lectio autem est quasi fundamentum et substratorium sequentium quia per eam cetere utilitates comparantur. Disputatio quasi paries est in hoc exercicio et edificio ; quia “Nichil plene intelligitur fideliter predicatur nisi prius dente disputationis frangatur”. Predicatio uero, cui subseruiunt priora, quasi tectum est tegens fideles ab estu et a turbine uiciorum. Post lectionem igitur sacre Scripture et dubitabilium disputationem et inquisitionem, et non prius, predicandum est, ut sic cortina cortinam trahat, etc.” (CCCM 196 A, 14-15, ll. 37-48). Vanuit deze optiek wordt het begrijpelijk dat de Thomas “de uitdrukkingen ‘sacra doctrina’, ‘theologia’ en ‘sacra scriptura’ als synoniemen gebruikt en het geheel van goddelijk onderricht, gebaseerd op de openbaring, aanduiden”: Gilles Emery, ‘Biblical Exegesis and the Speculative Doctrine of the Trinity in *St. Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on St. John*’, in *Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas*, Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology, ed. by Michael Dauphinais & Matthew Levering, Washington D.C. 2005, 23-61, hier 56; cf. Nicholas M. Healey, ‘Introduction’, in *Aquinas On Scripture: A Critical Introduction To His Commentaries*, ed. by Thomas Weinandy et al., London-New York 2005, 1-20.

exegese, systematische theologie en verkondiging geen gescheiden werelden waren. Het is onmiskenbaar dat voor Thomas van Aquino de filosoof Aristoteles de primaire wijsgerige gesprekspartner is bij de uitleg van de Schrift² en de beoefening van de systematische theologie.³ Maar is dit ook het geval voor Thomas als predikant? Of nog, wat is de functie en betekenis van Aristoteles in het preekoeuvre van Thomas? De langverwachte kritische uitgave van Thomas van Aquino's *Sermones*⁴ door L. J. Bataillon biedt een mogelijkheid deze vraag te beantwoorden.

Deze zgn. 'academische preken'⁵, in totaal 23 preken en preekfragmenten, worden onderscheiden van de reeksen van thematische preken die Thomas gehouden heeft aan het einde van zijn leven, veelal te Napels, over het Onze Vader, het Wees Gegroet, de Geloofsbelijdenis en de Tien Geboden. Deze thematische preken werden gehouden in de volkstaal ter gelegenheid van de Vasten en nadien opgetekend en vertaald naar het Latijn.⁶ De academische preken, een integraal onderdeel van de

² Cf. J. Vijgen, 'The use of Aristotle in Aquinas's biblical commentaries', in *Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas. Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives*, ed. by J. Vijgen & P. Roszak, Turnhout, 2015, 287-346.

³ Voor een case study cf. J. Vijgen, 'Aquinas's Use of Aristotle in the Sacramental Theology of the Summa Theologiae, qq. 60-90' in *Divinitas. Rivista internazionale di ricerca e di critica teologica* 57, 2 (2014), 187-241.

⁴ *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita ..., t. 44,1: Sermones*, ed. by L. J. Bataillon; G. Berceville; M. Borgo; I. Costa; A. Oliva; P. Krupa; M. Millais; J. Ch. de Nadal; Z. Pajda, Roma-Paris 2014. In wat volgt verwijs ik naar deze editie door middel van 'L.', gevolgd door pagina- en regelnummer.

⁵ Thomas van Aquino, *De academisch preken*, ingeleid, vertaald en van aantekeningen voorzien door Mark-Robin Hoogland C.P.. Met medewerking van Harm Goris en Henk Schoot, Almere 2015. In wat volgt verwijs ik naar deze vertaling door middel van 'Hoogland', gevolgd door de paginanummering.

⁶ Thomas van Aquino. *Over de Tien Geboden*. Ingeleid, vertaald en geannoteerd door Carlo Leget, Zoetermeer 1999; Thomas van Aquino. *Over het Onzevader en het Weesgegroot*. Ingeleid, vertaald en

‘lesopdracht’ van Thomas echter werden in het Latijn gehouden voor studenten (van de Parijse universiteit maar ook o.a. te Milaan, Bologna en vermoedelijk Orvieto) en nadien op basis van aantekeningen door studenten uitgeschreven.⁷ Dit verschil in doelgroep zou tot de conclusie kunnen leiden dat middeleeuwse *magistri* in zulke academische preken voor studenten, die reeds een ‘wijsgerig’ curriculum aan de Artes faculteit achter de rug hebben, vanzelfsprekend wijsgerig taalgebruik en/of argumentatie gebruiken. Bataillon heeft echter met vele voorbeelden aangetoond dat deze algemene conclusie onterecht is en geval per geval moet bestudeerd worden.⁸

In deze bijdrage bestudeer ik eerst Thomas’ positie ten aanzien van de relatie tussen filosofie en theologie in het algemeen zoals deze naar voren komt in de preken en vervolgens ga ik nader in op de wijze waarop hij Aristoteles gebruikt.

1. Filosofie en theologie als voedsel voor het intellect

Voor Thomas is Christus de bron van de prediking⁹ en het is aan Hem dat wij ons moeten “vastklampen opdat wij zijn onderwijzing begrijpen”.¹⁰ Christus heeft zich dienaren uitgekozen, niet om

geannoteerd door Carlo Leget, Zoetermeer 2000; Thomas van Aquino. *Preken over de geloofsbelijdenis. Over de geloofsartikelen en de sacramenten*. Vertaling: Jörgen Vijgen, Eric Luijten, Harm Goris, Henk Schoot en Jacco Verburgt. Inleiding en annotaties: Jörgen Vijgen, Almere 2013.

⁷ L., 16*. Voor kwesties omtrent authenticiteit, datering, bronnen en stijl in deze preken verwijs ik naar de inleiding van de kritische uitgave 1*-201* en de inleiding tot de Nederlandse vertaling van Hoogland, 9-25.

⁸ Cf. hiervoor L.J. Bataillon, ‘L’emploi du langage philosophique dans les sermons du 13me siècle’, in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, ed. by A. Zimmermann, Berlin-New York 1981, 983-991. Bataillon komt in dit artikel echter nauwelijks te spreken over Thomas van Aquino.

⁹ Cf. Preek 9: Hoogland, 124; L., 119, ll. 3-7

¹⁰ Preek 4: Hoogland, 55; L., 41, ll. 6-8

eender welk woord te spreken, maar “om te prediken en redding te brengen”.¹¹

In Preek 13 *Homo quidam fecit cenam* over Lc 14,16: “Iemand bereidde een groot avondmaal ...” stelt Thomas Christus (*Homo quidam*) voor die ons geestelijke verkwikking (*fecit cenam*) aanbiedt. Deze geestelijke verkwikking kent drie vormen: sacramenteel, intellectueel en affectief. Bij elk van deze drie verkwikkingen onderscheidt Thomas een vroegmaal en een avondmaal. Bij de eerste, sacramentele verkwikking is het vroegmaal het Oude Testament met de Wet en de offers en het avondmaal het Nieuwe Testament met de Eucharistie. De tweede, intellectuele verkwikking heeft als vroegmaal de filosofie (*doctrina philosophorum*) en als avondmaal de H. Schrift. In de derde, affectieve verkwikking is de genade die ons in dit leven gegeven wordt het vroegmaal en het avondmaal de heerlijkheid van de eeuwige gelukzaligheid.

Het is Christus zelf, aldus Thomas, die deze drie verkwikkingen voor de mens voorbereidt. Aangezien Christus zelf “vol waarheid is” ligt Hij ook aan de oorsprong van de intellectuele verkwikking. Christus, die de Wijsheid van God is, geeft zichzelf als voedsel. Dit voedsel is echter zo sterk dat de mens het niet kon verdragen en daarom heeft Christus dit voedsel “gematigd” door een geestelijke leer (*dogmata*) uit te vaardigen. In de woorden van Thomas:

“De Wijsheid van God is Christus [1 Kor. 1,24]. Hij heeft de wijn gemengd, te weten het dogma van de geestelijke wijsheid; die wijn was namelijk zo sterk, dat de mens hem niet kon verdragen tenzij die vermengd zou worden en daarom heeft Hij hem gematigd toen Hij de geestelijke dogma's uitvaardigde.”¹²

¹¹ Preek 4: Hoogland, 58; L., 43, ll. 112-113.

¹² Preek 13: Hoogland, 192; L., 200, ll. 196-200. In noot 25 wordt opgemerkt: “Thomas gebruikt hier het woord dogma (*dogma sapientiae spiritualis, spiritualia dogmata, dogma sapientiae*) in contrast met de term *doctrina*, in de volgende alinea, voor de onderwijzingen van de filosofen (*doctrina philosophorum*). Een dogma is in de gebruikelijke zin van het woord een leesregel die het

Thomas vervolgt door een onderscheid te maken tussen de geestelijke leer, het “dogma van de Wijsheid” van brood en wijn enerzijds en de tafel (*mensa*) van geheel de schepping anderzijds. Dit onderscheid omvat het “middagmaal” en het “avondmaal” van de intellectuele verkwikking. Zoals de profeet Habakuk (Dan. 14,33) een middagmaal bereidde voor de maaiers op het veld die de oogst van de akker verzamelen, zo heeft de eeuwige Wijsheid aan de filosofen de gehele schepping gegeven om daarin de “waarheden die in de schepping te vinden zijn” te verzamelen, overeenkomstig Romeinen 1,20: “Van de schepping der wereld af wordt zijn onzichtbaar wezen door de rede in zijn werken aanschouwd, zijn eeuwige macht namelijk en zijn godheid.”

In het avondmaal daarentegen staat de onderwijzing van de H. Schrift centraal. De verkwikking die eruit volgt is niet het resultaat van waarheden gevonden door de rede maar van de inspiratie van de H. Geest. De waarheid waartoe de H. Geest inspireert gaat alle zintuiglijke, natuurlijke kennis te boven. De kwalificatie van het brood als hetgeen “ons staande houdt” en de wijn “die vrolijk maakt en in vuur en vlam zet”¹³ zijn een verwijzing naar de theologie die zowel speculatief (brood) als praktisch (wijn) is.¹⁴ Voor Thomas is hier sprake van een ‘avondmaal’ omdat het avondmaal voorbehouden is voor verwanten en huisgenoten die de “Geest van de waarheid” ontvangen en van Hem “elke waarheid leren” (Joh. 16,22).¹⁵

In wat volgt legt Thomas de nadruk op het verschil aan intimiteit met God dat verkregen wordt in het middagmaal van de filosofen

leergezag van de Kerk alle gelovigen aanreikt, om dwalingen en misinterpretaties van de Bijbel te voorkomen.” In zijn commentaar op Boethius’ *De Trinitate* gebruikt hij het beeld van de vermenging van water met wijn om de noodzaak van wijsgerige argumenten in de theologische redenering aan te duiden: “Illi qui utuntur philosophicis documentis in sacra doctrina redigendo in obsequium fidei, non miscent aquam vino, set aquam convertunt in vinum” (*In De Trin* q. 2, a. 3, ad 5, ed. Leon. t. 50, 100, ll. 213-216).

¹³ Preek 13: Hoogland, 192; L., 200, ll. 201-203.

¹⁴ Cf. Thomas van Aquino, *STh* I, q. 1, a. 4.

¹⁵ Preek 13: Hoogland, 193; L., 200, ll. 218-220.

en het avondmaal van de gelovige die de H. Schrift overweegt. Dit komt mooi naar voren in de volgende vergelijking van Thomas. Men kan genieten (*delectabilis*) van een analyse van de eigenschappen van een driehoek maar dit genieten blijft als het ware hangen op het intellectuele niveau. De analyse zegt wel iets over de vermogens van het menselijke intellect om tot kennis van een ding te komen maar “niemand geeft veel om een driehoek”. De overweging van de H. Schrift, daarentegen, leert ons niet enkel over bepaalde waarheden maar het gaat ook over zaken waar de gelovige wel degelijk veel om geeft, om “geliefde zaken” (*rebus amatis*) en leidt dus naar het volmaakte genieten.¹⁶

¹⁶ Thomas laat duidelijk blijken dat er een onderscheid is tussen beide, een onderscheid waarbij sprake is van een echt genieten enerzijds en een volmaakt genieten anderzijds. Dit participatiemodel lijkt afwezig te zijn in Bonaventura. Het is interessant te merken dat Bonaventura in zijn *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* eveneens komt te spreken over het “voedsel” dat de Schrift is en over de “verkwikking van het intellect” (*refectio intellectus*) bij de overweging ervan. Bonaventura presenteert de overweging van de Schrift als een tegenwicht voor het feit dat de mens, sinds hij uit de tuin van het paradijs geworpen is, een “mens vagabunda, non habens cibum discurret et est instabilis.” Bij de overweging van de Schrift echter is er een “geestelijk genieten” (*delectatio spiritualis*) en door het overwegen en bewaren (*operans et custodiens*) van de Schrift ontstaat er in de ziel “een heerlijk tuintje” (*hortum parvum in mente deliciosum*). Hij contrasteert dit eveneens met een voorbeeld uit de geometrie, afkomstig uit Boethius’ vertaling van Aristoteles’ *Topica* 1, 15 (106a37-b1; AL V, p. 22, ll. 18-20: “Amplius si huic quidem est aliquid contrarium, illi autem simpliciter nichil, ut ei quae est a potu delectationi ea quae est a siti tristitia contrarium, ei autem quae est ab eo quod est considerare quoniam diameter est costae asymeter nichil, quare multipliciter delectatio dicitur”): “In hac sola scientia est delectatio, non in aliis. Philosophus dicit, quod magna delectatio est scire, quod diameter est asymeter costae; haec delectatio sit sua; modo comedat illam.” (*Collationes in Hexaëmeron* 17, 7, ed. Quaracchi 1891, vol. 5, 410). Afgezien van het feit dat Aristoteles hier eigenlijk doelt op de vele betekenissen die het woord ‘genieten’ kan hebben, laat Bonaventura er geen twijfel over bestaan wat zijn positie is. In de proloog op zijn *Sententiëncommentaar*

Hiermee geeft Thomas op beknopte wijze weer wat hij elders uitvoeriger uiteenzet over de principes en methode van de filosofie als ook over het onderscheid met de theologie. Beiden hebben hun oorsprong in de wijsheid van Christus en dus bestaansrecht maar de filosofie verhoudt zich tot de theologie in een dienende functie.

In dit licht is het des te opmerkelijker wat Thomas schrijft over de filosofie in Preek 14 *Attendite a falsis prophetis*, gedateerd 14 juli 1269. Onder de valse profeten uit de titel van de preek schaaft hij ook diegenen die “een menselijke redenering volgen” en “spreken vanuit hun eigen geest”. Als voorbeeld geeft Thomas zij die “Platoonse redeneringen”¹⁷ volgen en de eeuwigheid van de wereld verdedigen. Zelf zal Thomas de stelling verdedigen dat de eeuwigheid van de wereld plausibel is en dat kennis over een begin van de wereld enkel gegeven is met de openbaring.¹⁸ Maar meer nog heeft Thomas diegenen op het oog die beweren dat, wanneer zij de eeuwigheid van de wereld verdedigen, zij enkel de woorden van Aristoteles herhalen. Iemand die zuiver historisch de filosofiegeschiedenis benadert, vindt geen genade in de ogen van

(1252/53) had hij hetzelfde voorbeeld reeds gebruikt: “Nam haec cognitio, quod Christus pro nobis mortuus est, et consimiles, nisi sit homo peccator et durus, movet ad amorem; non sic ista: quod diameter est asymeter costae” (ed. Quaracchi 1882, vol. 1, p. 13). Nog interessanter is de vaststelling dat in de Reportatio A van de *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, uitgesproken tussen 9 april en 28 mei 1273, een kortere versie die de gesproken versie méér benadert dan Reportatio B in de Quaracchi editie, het voorbeeld van de driehoek geeft: “Non sic est de triangulo, de quo licet aliquantulum delectetur sciens quare tres habet angulos intrinsecus aequipollentes duobus rectis extrinsecus, tamen ignorans negative non contristatur.” (P. Bonaventura *Collationes in Hexaemeron et Bonaventuriana selecta quaedam*, ed. F. Delorme, Quaracchi 1934, 61). Gezien het tijdstip van Thomas’ preek 13 *Homo quidam fecit cenam*, gedateerd 2 juni 1269 of 22 juni 1270 of 14 juni 1271 is het mogelijk dat Bonaventura hier een antwoord biedt aan Thomas.

¹⁷ Preek 14: Hoogland, 216; L., 218, ll. 181.

¹⁸ Aan dit vraagstuk wijdt hij een zelfstandig werk *De aeternitate mundi* tijdens zijn tweede Parijse periode in 1271.

Thomas: “Zo iemand is een valse profeet of een valse leraar, omdat twijfel oproepen en deze niet oplossen, hetzelfde is als erin toestemmen”.¹⁹ Deze woorden dienen geplaatst te worden in de context van de toenmalige crisis aan de Parijse universiteit omtrent de rol van de filosofie en het bijzonder van Aristoteles in de theologie²⁰, een crisis die ook in de preken van *magistri* merkbaar is.²¹ Deze crisis kwam in zekere zin tot een hoogtepunt in het verwijt van bisschop Etienne Tempier aan het begin van zijn veroordeling van 219 stellingen op 7 maart 1277 omtrent de zgn. ‘leer van de dubbele waarheid’. Volgens Tempier meenden

¹⁹ Preek 14: Hoogland, 216; L., 218, ll. 189-191.

²⁰ Een voorbeeld dat de scepsis omtrent de rol van de filosofie niet beperkt was tot de Franciscaanse traditie is de Dominicaan Hugo van St. Cher (gest. 1263) die in zijn commentaar op psalm 119 (118) opmerkt dat vele theologen steun zoeken in de filosofie en al doende de woorden van de Heer verduisteren in plaats van de verhelderen. Méér nog, zij maken God belachelijk en bedriegen hun publiek. Hij merkt op dat Christus in zijn preken nooit aan filosofie gedaan heeft en dat zij die dit nu wel doen niet begaan zijn met de woorden van Christus of met diens leer maar met hun eigen nieuwsgierigheid. Hugo a Sancto Caro, *Postillae super totam Bibliam*. Opera omnia Hugonis de Sancto Caro... editio ultima praecaeteris... Venetis : apud Nicolaum Pezzana, 1703, vol. 2, 316a-b: “Immo etiam multi Theologi magis innituntur Philosophiae, legendo, disputando et praedicando, quam Theologiae. Et tales non declarant sed magis obscurant sermones Domini [...] Eccles 24,31 : ‘Qui elucidant me, vitam aeternam habebant’. Ergo qui obscurant, habebunt mortem. Prov. 14,6 : ‘Quaerit derisor sapientiam, non invenit, doctrina prudentium facilis’. Philosophantes enim in Theologia, derisores sunt, quia Deum derident et audientes deludunt. Et tales licet sapientiam quaerere videantur, non inveniunt eam. [...] Qui enim relictis sermonibus et verbis Jesu Christi, qui nunquam philosophice praedicavit, verbis Philosophiae utuntur, sermonibus Christis videntur non acquiescere nec doctrinae quae est secundum pietatem sed ei quae est secundum curiositatem.”

²¹ Cf. L.J. Bataillon, ‘Les crises de l’Université de Paris d’après les sermons universitaires’, in *Die Auseinandersetzungen an der Pariser Universität im XIII Jahrhundert*, ed. by A. Zimmermann, Berlin-New York 1976, 155-169.

sommige *magistri* dat een stelling waar kon zijn volgens de filosofie maar onwaar volgens het katholieke geloof “quasi sint due contrarie ueritates”.²²

In een hierop volgende passage, waarbij Hoogland terecht opmerkt dat er sprake is van “bevlogenheid” bij Thomas en van diens “betrokkenheid op het welzijn en het heil van zijn toehoorders”²³, lijkt Thomas een vernietigend oordeel uit te spreken over de filosofie. De filosofiegeschiedenis lijkt een opeenstapeling van disputen te zijn die niet tot overeenkomst hebben geleid en indien er dan toch iets van waarheid is gevonden dan is dit altijd vermengd met valsheid.²⁴ In een scherpe tegenstelling plaatst Thomas Pythagoras, die alles achterliet om zich te wijden aan de studie van de filosofie na het horen van argumenten ten gunste van de onsterfelijkheid van de ziel, tegenover “een oud vrouwtje” (*vetula*): “Maar welk oud vrouwtje is er vandaag de dag, die niet zou weten dat de ziel onsterfelijk is? Het geloof vermag veel meer dan de filosofie. Vandaar dat, als een filosofie tegengesteld is aan het geloof, zij niet aanvaard moet worden.”²⁵

Hoogland verwijst in voetnoot 22 naar *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 32, q. 4, ad 3 en III, q. 79, a.5 voor passages waarin Thomas, in navolging van de Schrift, lovend spreekt over een oude vrouw en haar als voorbeeld aanwijst. De eerste verwijzing betreft echter de

²² David Piché (ed.), *La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire*, Paris 1999, 74. Omtrent de betekenis en impact van de veroordelingen van 1277 zie J. Vijgen, *The status of Eucharistic accidents ‘sine subiecto’: An Historical Survey up to Thomas Aquinas and selected reactions*, Berlin 2013, 261-269.

²³ Preek 14: Hoogland, 217, n. 20.

²⁴ Preek 14: Hoogland, 217; L., 218, l. 204 – 219, l. 208: “Zie toch, mijn dierbare: er zijn vele filosofen geweest en veel hebben zij gezegd over de dingen die samenhangen met het geloof maar jullie zullen er nauwelijks twee vinden die het eens zijn met één opvatting. En welke filosoof dan ook die iets van waarheid gezegd heeft, heeft dit niet gezegd zonder dat het vermengd was met valsheid.”

²⁵ Preek 14: Hoogland 217-218; L., 219, ll. 215-218. Op basis van deze “weinig thomistische passage” meende E. Gilson dat deze preek eerder aan Bonaventura diende toegeschreven te worden. Zie L., 210.

waarde van het geven van aalmoezen²⁶; de tweede verwijzing heeft te maken met de effecten van de Eucharistie en meer bepaald met de voldoening die uit het offer van de Eucharistie volgt. In deze laatste context onderstreept Thomas dat de affectie en devotie waarmee de oude vrouw/weduwe in Lc. 21,4 haar twee penningen geeft belangrijker is dan de kwantiteit van het offer.²⁷ Deze verwijzingen lijken mij daarom niet meteen toepasbaar op de kwestie van een tegenstelling tussen filosofische kennis en de kennis die het geloof levert. Een gelijkaardige tegenstelling vinden we trouwens aan het begin van zijn commentaar op het Credo.²⁸ Volgens Bataillon betreft het hier een “*exemplum banal*”²⁹ dat zijn oorsprong heeft in Augustinus.³⁰ Ook Torrell spreekt over “ce lieu commun de la ‘petite vieille’ chrétienne”.³¹ Thomas werpt een licht op deze zaak in zijn commentaar op Ef. 3,18-19 (“Moogt gij in staat zijn met alle heiligen te vatten, wat de

²⁶ *STh* II-II, q. 32, q. 4, ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod vidua, quae minus dedit secundum quantitatem, plus dedit secundum suam proportionem; ex quo pensatur in ipsa maior caritatis affectus, ex qua corporalis elemosyna spiritualem efficaciam habet.”

²⁷ *STh* III, q. 79, a.5: “Inquantum vero est sacrificium, habet vim satisfactivam. Sed in satisfactione magis attenditur affectus offerentis quam quantitas oblationis, unde et dominus dixit, Luc. XXI, de vidua quae obtulit duo aera, quod plus omnibus misit.”

²⁸ *Collationes super Credo*, Prol., ed. Marietti, nr. 862: “nullus philosophorum ante adventum Christi cum toto conatu suo potuit tantum scire de Deo et de necessariis ad vitam aeternam, quantum post adventum Christi scit una vetula per fidem.”

²⁹ L., 210.

³⁰ L., 219, noot bij regels 208-216 waar verwezen wordt naar Augustinus, *Epist.* 137 III, 12 (CSEL 44, p. 113-114: “Quis nunc extremus idiota uel quae abiecta muliercula non credit animae immortalitatem uitamque post mortem futuram? Quod apud Graecos olim primus Pherecydes Syrius cum disputauisset, Pythagoram Samium disputationis illius nouitate permotum ex athleta in philosophum uertit?”).

³¹ Thomas d’Aquin, *Sermons. Traduction française d’après le texte latin de l’édition Léonine*, introduction et commentaire de J.-P. Torrell, Paris 2014, 234, n. 1.

breedte en lengte en diepte is, en te kennen de liefde van Christus, die alle kennis te boven gaat.”). Naar aanleiding van deze passage stelt hij de vraag of het correct is dat een liefde met kennis meer verheven (*superemineat*) is dan een liefde zonder kennis (*scientia*).³² Als objectie werpt hij op dat, indien een liefde met kennis méér verheven was, “een slechte theoloog (*malus theologus*) een méér verheven liefde zou bezitten dan een heilig oud vrouwtje (*sancta vetula*)”. In zijn antwoord bemerkt Thomas dat de liefde van Christus waarvan Paulus wenst dat de gelovigen deze zouden kennen, een kennis is die iets tot stand brengt (*scientia afficiente*): de kennis van de liefde van Christus is een kracht die aanzet nog méér te beminnen want hoe meer God in de kennis van de liefde van Christus bemind wordt, des te meer wordt deze persoon bemind. Het heilig oud vrouwtje bezit weliswaar niet het verstandelijk inzicht van de theoloog maar zij bezit wel degelijk de kennis van de liefde van Christus, een liefde die zich bij uitstek toonde aan het kruis op Goede Vrijdag³³ en een liefde die aanzet tot steeds grotere ijver voor God. In deze zin kan Thomas bevestigen dat een liefde met kennis méér verheven is dan een liefde zonder kennis en tegelijkertijd deze liefde met kennis toeschrijven aan een “heilig oud vrouwtje”.

Bovendien dient men in rekening te brengen dat Thomas aan het begin van het eerste deel van de *Summa Theologiae*, beëindigd in september 1268 en dus minder dan een jaar voordien, beargumenteert dat het gebruik van de filosofie in de theologie niet accidenteel is maar wezenlijk: “Het is immers zo dat ons verstand

³² *In Eph* III, l. 5, nr. 181: “Sed numquid est verum quod charitas quae est cum scientia superemineat charitati quae est sine scientia? Et videtur quod non, quia sic malus theologus esset supereminentioris charitatis quam sancta vetula. Respondeo. Dico quod hoc intelligitur de scientia afficiente: nam ex vi cognitionis inducitur ad magis diligendum, quia, quanto Deus magis cognoscitur, tanto et magis diligitur. Propter quod petebat Augustinus: noverim te, noverim me. Vel hoc dicitur propter quosdam qui habent zelum Dei, sed non secundum scientiam. Talium enim charitati supereminet charitas, cum habetur praedicta scientia Christi.”

³³ *In Eph* III, l. 5, nr. 180.

gemakkelijker geleid wordt door wat gekend wordt door de natuurlijke rede, die aan de oorsprong ligt van de andere wetenschappen, dan door wat onze rede te boven gaat en wat de inhoud is van de gewijde leer.”³⁴ Tot slot vinden we op geregelde tijdstippen dat Thomas wel degelijk vooruitgang vaststelt in het filosofisch onderzoek.³⁵ Aangezien de authenticiteit van deze preek vaststaat dienen we daarom te besluiten dat Thomas’ persoonlijke betrokkenheid bij de toenmalige discussies aan de Parijse universiteit en zijn bezorgdheid over het geestelijk welzijn van zijn publiek hem ertoe geleid hebben hyperbolisch te spreken om zo zijn publiek te overtuigen.

2. Aristoteles in de Academische Preken

Op dertien plaatsen in zes preken verwijst Thomas expliciet naar Aristoteles. Meestal gebeurt dit onder verwijzing naar de ‘Filosoof’ (*Philosophus*) en enkele malen onder verwijzing naar één van diens werken (tweemaal naar diens *Ethica Nicomachea*, éénmaal naar diens *De Caelo et Mundo* en éénmaal naar diens *Physica*). Op tien bijkomende plaatsen zijn er impliciete verwijzingen te vinden naar Aristoteles. Het merendeel van deze verwijzingen betreffen de *Ethica* maar ook wordt er verwezen naar *De generatione et corruptione*, de *Politica* en de *Topica*. Veeleer dan al deze verwijzingen individueel na te gaan, kunnen we ze ordenen volgens de functie die ze innemen in de argumentatie.

2.1 Aristoteles als woordvoerder van Thomas

Een eerste functie betreft het gebruik van Aristoteles als woordvoerder van Thomas’ eigen gedachten. Een voorbeeld vinden we in de context van de reeds aangehaalde vergelijking met de driehoek in Preek 13. Thomas leidt dit voorbeeld in met het onderscheid tussen genieten vanwege datgene wat overwegen wordt en genieten vanwege de overweging zelf. In het geval van de

³⁴ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3.

³⁵ Cf.. *STh* I, q. 44, a. 1 en *De Pot* q. 3, a. 5 over schepping bij de antieke filosofen.

Schrift hebben we te maken met een volmaakt genieten want het betreft hier niet alleen de overweging zelf, het leren kennen van de waarheid, maar tevens “geliefde zaken”.³⁶ Wat Thomas hier zegt over het genieten van de Schrift, had Aristoteles reeds toegeschreven aan het kennen van de waarheid door middel van de filosofie in EN X, 8 (1177a20-25). Eén van de redenen die Aristoteles aangeeft is de “zuiverheid en stabiliteit” die samengaat met de filosofische genieting. In Thomas’ commentaar op deze passage voegt hij eraan toe dat zuiverheid en stabiliteit verwijzen naar het feit dat het object van filosofische genieting onstoffelijke objecten betreft en dat deze objecten onveranderlijk zijn.³⁷ Thomas transposeert dit alles probleemloos naar de overweging van de Schrift als overweging van “geliefde zaken”.

Een tweede voorbeeld vinden we in Preek 15 over Lc. 16,1-13. In zijn analyse van Lc. 16,1 (“Er was een rijke mens die een rentmeester had ...”) gaat Thomas uitvoerig in op de vraag waarom God hier ‘mens’ genoemd wordt. Eén van de redenen is vanwege “het eigene van de mens”. In tegenstelling tot wat verwacht zou kunnen worden, vervolgt Thomas niet met de gebruikelijke definitie van Boethius (*rationalis naturae individua substantia*) of met het vermelden van intellect en wil als typische menselijke vermogens. “Wat is het eigene van de mens? Mild zijn qua karakter (*mansuetum natura*), omdat de mens van nature een sociaal wezen is. Sommige levende wezens leven apart, zoals de wilde dieren, leeuwen en beren. Maar deze eigenschap is zo zeer natuurlijk voor de mens, dat vriendelijkheid menselijkheid genoemd wordt.” Vervolgens past Thomas dit toe op God en Christus: “Deze eigenschap (van milde vriendelijkheid) past God in hoogste mate, aangezien “zijn barmhartigheid (*miserationes*) over al zijn werken ligt [Psalm 145,9]. Jazeker, Hij is de goedheid en vriendelijkheid

³⁶ Preek 13: Hoogland, 194; L., 201, ll. 246..

³⁷ Aristoteles, EN X, 8, 77a20–77a25 (AL XXVI.1–3, fasc. 4, ll. 576–577): “Delectabilissima autem earum que secundum virtutem operationum que secundum sapienciam confesse est. Videtur enim philosophia admirabiles delectaciones habere, puritate et firmitate”; Thomas de Aquino, *In X Eth*, c. 10 (ed. Leon., t. 47.2, 584, ll. 121–124, Marietti nr. 2090).

zelve. Zo schrijft de Apostel aan Titus: “De vriendelijkheid en de menselijkheid van onze Redder is verschenen”; ...”.³⁸ Deze Schriftcitaten lijken voor zichzelf te spreken maar Thomas’ bron voor de beschrijving van het eigene van de mens (mild qua karakter omdat de mens van nature een sociaal wezen is) vinden we bij Aristoteles. In diens *Topica* definieert hij herhaaldelijk het eigene (*proprium*) van de mens als *mansuetum natura*³⁹ en in diens *Ethica* benadrukt hij voortdurend de sociale natuur van de mens.⁴⁰ Zonder hem bij name te noemen wordt Aristoteles gebruikt als woordvoerder van Thomas én van de Schrift.

2.2 *Aristoteles in de context van een polemiek*

Deze functie komt het duidelijkst naar voren in de reeds besproken Preek 14, gedateerd op 14 juli 1269. Enige tijd tevoren, waarschijnlijk in september 1268, was Thomas begonnen aan zijn tweede Parijse periode (1268-1272). Volgens Torrell moest Thomas op drie gebieden tegelijkertijd “strijd voeren”: tegen krachten in de theologie faculteit die vijandig stonden tegenover Aristoteles; tegen averroïstische interpretaties van Aristoteles die in tegenspraak stonden met het christelijke geloof, met name inzake de eenheid van het intellect, en tot slot tegen krachten die de bedelordes wilden bannen uit de universiteit.⁴¹ De polemische aard van Thomas’ opmerkingen over Aristoteles en Thomas’ verdediging van een correct begrepen autonomie van de filosofie in onderschikking aan de theologie passen goed bij een passage uit diens *De unitate intellectus*, een werk beëindigd vóór september 1270. Hij besluit dit werk, waarin hij verkeerde interpretaties van

³⁸ Preek 15: Hoogland, 233; L., 235, ll. 122-126..

³⁹ Aristoteles, *Topica* V, 128b17-18; 130a28; 132a7; 138a10-11; 139a19. Bv. AL V.1, p. 86, l.5: “per se quidem hominis animal mansuetum natura”.

⁴⁰ Aristoteles, *EN* VI, 8, 1142a9; VIII, 5, 1157b18; VIII, 6, 1158a23; IX, 9, 1169b16; IX, 9, 1169b18.

⁴¹ J.-P. Torrell, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin. Sa personne et son œuvre. Nouvelle édition profondément remaniée et enrichie d’une bibliographie mise à jour*, Paris 2015, 237.

Aristoteles omtrent de eenheid van ziel en lichaam en de numerieke eenheid van het intellect door volgelingen van Averroës bekritiseert, als volgt:

“Dit is dan wat wij hebben geschreven om de genoemde dwaling te vernietigen. Hierbij hebben wij de argumenten en leringen van de filosofen gebruikt en niet de geloofsdocumenten. Indien er echter iemand is die, pochend in de naam van een valse wetenschap, iets wil zeggen ten aanzien van wat wij geschreven hebben, laat hij niet spreken in achterkamertjes en evenmin tegenover kinderen (*coram pueris*) die niet weten een oordeel te vellen over deze moeilijke zaken maar laat hij schriftelijk antwoorden op wat wij geschreven hebben, indien hij durft. Hij zal tot de slotsom komen dat niet enkel ik, die de minste ben onder dezen, maar vele anderen die ijveren voor de waarheid zijn dwaling zullen weerstaan of zijn onwetendheid zullen verbeteren.”⁴²

Thomas verdedigt hier impliciet een discussie op basis van argumenten, een discussie zoals hij die zelf gevoerd heeft in de voorgaande hoofdstukken van *De unitate intellectus*. Maar, zoals zijn opmerking over kinderen laat zien, is hij tevens begaan met het welzijn, zowel intellectueel als spiritueel, van de studenten. In Preek 14 beschuldigt hij, zoals we gezien hebben, diegenen die beweren enkel Aristoteles te herhalen, ook indien Aristoteles lijkt in te gaan tegen het geloof, ervan valse leraren te zijn “omdat twijfel oproepen en deze niet oplossen, hetzelfde is als er in toestemmen”.⁴³ Zaken die in tegenspraak lijken te zijn met het geloof, “moeilijke zaken”, zoals hij deze noemt in *De unitate intellectus*, zomaar in de lucht laten hangen en dit voor een publiek dat niet toegerust is om zich te verdedigen, beschouwt Thomas als een onverantwoordelijke manier van lesgeven omdat dit schadelijk kan zijn voor geesten van de toehoorders. Voor Thomas is het niet

⁴² *De Uni Int*, c. 5 (ed. Leon. 43, 314, ll. 431-441). Vertaling Jörgen Vijgen.

⁴³ Preek 14: Hoogland, 216; L., 218, ll. 189-191.

Aristoteles die twijfel zaait maar wel zulke onverantwoordelijke commentatoren van Aristoteles. Op deze manier wil Thomas niet enkel onervaren studenten in bescherming nemen maar ook Aristoteles zelf.

Een polemiek is ook aan het werk wanneer Thomas in Preek 20, waarschijnlijk daterend van 1 november 1271, komt te spreken over het verwerven van het hemels koninkrijk door het achterlaten van alles (Mt. 19,27), overeenkomstig de zaligspreking in Mt. 5,3: “Gelukkig de armen van geest want van hen is het koninkrijk der hemelen”. Thomas opent de polemiek door op te merken dat er “beginnelingen (*novi argumentatores*) [zijn] die niet weten wat ze zeggen”.⁴⁴ Zich beroepend op Aristoteles weidt Thomas deze onwetendheid toe aan onervarenheid in het lezen van Aristoteles. Een oppervlakkige lectuur van Aristoteles’ stelling dat deugd in het midden bestaat leidt deze beginnelingen er immers toe te denken dat deugd een kwestie is van een midden in de kwantitatieve zin. Volgens deze oppervlakkige lezing kunnen armoede, maagdelijkheid en onthouding geen deugden zijn. Het is bekend dat Thomas meermaals stelling genomen heeft in het debat omtrent de navolging van Christus door middel van materiële armoede zoals deze door de recentelijk opgerichte Bedelordes werd voorgehouden.⁴⁵ Maar de lectuur van Aristoteles bracht ook discussies op gang over de evangelische raad van de kuisheid. De 217 veroordeelde stellingen van 1277 bevatten onder meer de stelling 168 “dat zelfbeheersing (*continentia*) niet wezenlijk een deugd is” en stelling 169 “dat volmaakte onthouding (*abstinentia*) van de vleselijke daad de deugd corrumpeert”.⁴⁶ Net zoals in de *Summa Theologiae* berust Thomas’ verdediging op twee passages uit Aristoteles. Allereerst weerlegt hij de idee dat Aristoteles het

⁴⁴ Preek 20: Hoogland, 336, L., 323, l. 414.

⁴⁵ Cf. U. Horst, *Evangelische Armut und Kirche. Thomas von Aquin und die Armutskontroversen des 13. Und beginnenden 14. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin 1992 en Idem, ‘Evangelische Armut und Kirche. Ein Konfliktfeld in der scholastischen Theologie des 13. Jahrhunderts’, in *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Jan Aertsen & A. Speer, Berlin-New York 2000, 308-320.

⁴⁶ Cf. David Piché (ed.), *La condamnation parisienne de 1277*, 130.

midden van de deugd in kwantitatieve zin opvat. “Zij [de deugd] behoort niet in het midden te zijn qua kwantiteit, maar volgens een juiste manier van denken.”⁴⁷ Ten tweede illustreert Thomas dit door te verwijzen naar wat Aristoteles zegt over de grootmoedige persoon, nl. dat deze “tot het uiterste gaat” en hierbij toch het midden houdt omdat hij grootmoedig is “waar hij dat behoort te zijn, op de manier waarop hij dat behoort te zijn, en voor de goede reden waarom hij dat behoort te zijn.”⁴⁸ Zo is het bv. mogelijk tot het uiterste te gaan in het afzien van seksueel genot in het geval van de maagdelijkheid en toch deugdzaam te handelen omdat de reden past bij het ‘tot het uiterste gaan’.⁴⁹

Maar het waren niet enkel de ‘radicale Aristotelisten’ die Thomas voor ogen had in zijn verdediging van Aristoteles. In 1250-1252 schreef Albertus de Grote zijn *Super Ethica*, de eerste volledige Latijnse commentaar op Aristoteles’ *Ethica Nicomachea*; Thomas was op dat moment diens assistent in Keulen.⁵⁰ In zijn commentaar beargumenteert Albertus dat zelfbeheersing geen deugd is in de eigenlijke en volle zin van het woord.⁵¹ Gezien de aard van

⁴⁷ Preek 20: Hoogland, 336; L., 323, ll. 419-421; cf. *STh* II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 2: “Medium autem virtutis non secundum quantitatem, sed secundum rationem rectam determinatur, ut dicitur in II Ethic.” De bron is Aristoteles, *EN* II, 6 (1107a7).

⁴⁸ Preek 20, Hoogland, 336; L., 323, ll. 421-425; cf. *STh* II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 2: “Unde de magnanimo dicitur, in IV Ethic., quod est magnitudine extremus, eo autem quod ut oportet, medius.” De bron is Aristoteles, *EN* IV, 3 (1123b31).

⁴⁹ Cf. *STh* II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 2 waar Thomas weerlegt dat de maagdelijkheid zou vallen onder wat Aristoteles beschouwde als de deugd van de ongevoeligheid. Soms is het echter prijzenswaardig en zelfs noodzakelijk voor het bereiken van een doel, in dit geval de contemplatie, af te zien van seksueel genot.

⁵⁰ Zie ed. Leon. 47.1, 235* en 256* voor de precieze aard van Thomas’ kennis van Albertus’ *Super Ethica*.

⁵¹ Albertus Magnus, *Super Ethica* 7.1, ed. W. Kübel, Münster 1987, 517, ll. 89-90: “Non sunt proprie et substantialiter virtutes”. Albertus spreekt over zelfbeheersing als ook over de heroïsche deugden.

Thomas' commentaar op de Ethica gaat hij niet zozeer in op dit vraagstuk in zijn commentaar maar hij doet dit wel in *STh* II-II, q. 155, a. 1. Hij gaat hierbij zeer behoedzaam te werk. Eerst herinnert hij aan de mening van sommige Kerkvaders zoals Augustinus voor wie de volmaakte zelfbeheersing identiek is aan de maagdelijkheid. Thomas had reeds in *STh* II-II, q. 152, a. op Aristotelische gronden verdedigd dat maagdelijkheid een deugd is; dezelfde gronden die hij in Preek 20 gebruikt. Vervolgens merkt hij op dat Aristoteles' positie overeenkomt met Kerkvaders zoals Hiëronymus voor wie zelfbeheersing inderdaad niet de "perfecte *ratio*" van de deugd bezit omdat zelfbeheersing een voortdurende strijd tegen de passies omvat en dus nog niet tot een stabiele habitus geworden is. Bij wijze van argument citeert hij Aristoteles *EN* IV, 9 (1128b33-34) waar Aristoteles expliciet zegt dat zelfbeheersing geen deugd is maar mengeling van deugd en passies. In deze zin gaat Thomas akkoord dat zelfbeheersing strikt genomen tekort schiet om een deugd genoemd te worden. Hij staat echter toe dat er een brede betekenis (*largius accipiendo*) van deugd mogelijk is, nl. hetgeen het principe is van prijzenswaardige handelingen (*principio laudabilium operum*), en in deze brede betekenis kan zelfbeheersing daadwerkelijk een deugd genoemd worden. De gedachte dat deugd in de volle zin van het woord stabiliteit vereist, keert terug in Preek 19. Hier lijkt Thomas de stabiliteit van de zaligspreking "Gelukkig zij die vervolgd worden ..." te contrasteren met het gebrek aan stabiliteit in het geval van degene die enkel "door vervolging weggerukt wordt van armoede, mildheid en de andere (deugden)..."⁵²

⁵² Preek 19: Hoogland, 316-317; L., 304, ll. 298-302: "Echter, de uitspraak "Gelukkig zij die vervolgd worden [...] benoemt geen andere gelukzaligheid maar is het fundament (*firmamentum*) van het voorafgaande. Want iemand die door vervolging weggerukt wordt van armoede, mildheid en de andere (deugden), is er niet blijvend in verandert (*non enim est firmus*). De vertaling kan geen recht doen aan Thomas' woordspel: *firmamentum* als verwijzend naar de zaligspreking en het gebrek hieraan (*non enim est firmus*). Hij lijkt te suggereren dat een deugdzame handeling onder invloed van de H. Geest, beschreven in de zaligspreking, een bijzondere stevigheid of

Keren we terug naar Preek 20, dan merken we dat, na het beroep op Aristoteles om de onervaren beginnelingen te instrueren, Thomas een apologetisch argument ontwikkelt, nl. als de heidense filosofen al afstand deden van hun bezittingen “om vrij te zijn voor de filosofie” en ook in onthouding leefden, dan dient dit des te meer bij christenen het geval te zijn.⁵³ De levenswijze van heidense filosofen fungeert hier als een *praeparatio evangelica*.

Nochtans is het Thomas niet te doen om Aristoteles *an sich* en zelfs niet om wat Thomas als leraar zegt. In Preek 8, gedateerd januari 1271 of januari 1272, verwoordt hij dit als volgt: “Maar niemand behoort een vriend te hebben als het gaat om de waarheid; men dient alleen de waarheid aan te hangen⁵⁴, want zoals de Filosoof zegt: ‘Onenigheid in meningen is niet onverenigbaar met vriendschap’”.⁵⁵ In zijn commentaar op deze passages van Aristoteles onderstreept Thomas dat men zelfs niet moet aarzelen de waarheid te verkiezen boven een vriend omdat dit behoort tot het deugdzame leven. Onware oordelen vellen omwille van een vriendschap is voor Thomas iets wat ingaat tegen de deugd (*contra virtutem*).⁵⁶ Er is bovendien een fundamenteel verschil tussen

stabiliteit verleent. Cf. A. ten Klooster, ‘The Beatitudes as Acts of the Virtues in Aquinas’ *Lectura on Matthew*, in *Jaarboek Thomas-Instituut te Utrecht* 35 (2016), 75-91.

⁵³ Preek 20: Hoogland, 336; L., 323, ll. 425-427.

⁵⁴ Preek 8: Hoogland, 116; L., 109, ll. 398-401. Zie Aristoteles, *EN I*, 6, 1096a16-17 (AL XVII.1-3, 146, ll. 14-16): ‘Videbitur autem utique forsitan melius esse et oportere et pro salute veritatis et familiaria {seu propria} destruere, Aliterque et philosophos existentes. Ambobus enim existentibus amicis, sanctum prehonore veritatem.’ Deze passage ligt mede aan de oorsprong van de zin “Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas”.

⁵⁵ Aristoteles, *EN IX*, 6, 1167a24-26 (AL XVII.1-3, 332, ll. 6-7): “Neque circa quodcumque consencientes, concordare aiunt, puta eos qui de celestibus. Non enim amicabile, de hiis concordare.”

⁵⁶ *In I Eth*, c. 6 (ed. Leon., t. 47.1, 22, ll. 29-55, Marietti nr. 76). Zie ook p. 22, ll. 69-75, Marietti nr. 78: “Haec etiam fuit sententia Platonis, qui reprobandis opinionem Socratis magistri sui dixit quod

vriendschap en waarheid. Vriendschap is het resultaat van voorkeuren en keuzes terwijl waarheid een noodzakelijkheid bezit vanwege de conclusie die volgt uit de premissen. Overeenstemming over bepaalde zaken behoort dus niet als zodanig tot vriendschap.⁵⁷ Wat opvalt aan deze Preek 8 is dat, alhoewel zij in dezelfde polemische sfeer is tot stand gekomen, er nergens een spoor van polemiëk te bespeuren valt. Integendeel, de preek bevat een gloeiend betoog om te komen tot een groei in wijsheid door aandachtig te luisteren, niet enkel naar één stem maar naar velen om later hiervan de goede vruchten te plukken. Zulk een groei in wijsheid vereist ook nauwgezet studiewerk waarbij men niet enkel hedendaagse auteurs moet bevragen maar ook “de ouden”⁵⁸ door middel van hun geschriften. Maar Thomas is ook van mening dat er een grondige basiskennis vereist is alvorens men naar verschillende leraren gaat luisteren als ook dat een leraar zijn antwoord dient af te stemmen op de toehoorder. Hiermee verwoordt Thomas op een positieve manier waarvoor hij gewaarschuwd had in Preek 14 en in *De unitate intellectus*, nl. dat zij die nog niet voldoende zijn toegerust niet zomaar meningen moeten voorgeschoteld krijgen die in tegenspraak zijn met het geloof omdat hen de middelen ontbreekt deze meningen te weerleggen. Mogelijk is het vanwege deze positieve aanpak omtrent het leerproces dat Thomas in Preek 8 vermijdt polemische onderwerpen ter sprake te brengen.

2.3 *Aristoteles als bijkomende argumentatie*

Een volgende functie van Aristoteles bestaat erin Thomas' eigen gedachten argumentatief te versterken door te verwijzen naar Aristoteles. Een voorbeeld hiervan vinden we Preek 6 dat als thema heeft “Hemel en aarde zullen voorbijgaan” (Lc. 21,33). Meteen aan het begin lezen we:

oportet de veritate magis curare quam de aliquo alio; et alibi dicit: amicus quidem Socrates sed magis amica veritas; et in alio loco: de Socrate quidem parum est curandum, de veritate autem multum.”

⁵⁷ *In IX Eth*, c. 6 (ed. Leon., t. 47.2, 521, ll. 26-30, Marietti nr. 1831).

⁵⁸ Preek 8: Hoogland, 117; L., 109, l. 430.

“Zeer dierbare broeders, hoe groot het genoeg, hoe groot het genot, hoe groot de zoetheid in de woorden van de hemelse wijsheid moge zijn, is ook (*etiam*) duidelijk door de natuurlijke filosoof, die in boek 10 van de *Ethica* schrijft over de geschapen heilige kennis: ‘Alle genoegens volgens op activiteiten’.⁵⁹ Welnu, ‘het grootste genoeg doet zich voor in de activiteit van de wijsheid’⁶⁰, en de meest genoeglijke activiteit is het bestuderen en toepassen van de deugd van de wijsheid. Ook de theologische filosoof schrijft in *Wijsheid* 7,8 dat hij haar ‘boven goud en boven uiterlijk’ heeft liefgehad – haar, dat wil zeggen: de hemelse wijsheid waarover wij het hebben.”⁶¹

In zijn commentaar op deze passages van Aristoteles verbindt hij de “zuiverheid en stabiliteit” waarover we eerder spraken met Aristoteles’ verwijzing naar het goddelijke in *EN X*, 6 (1177a12-15) zodanig dat Thomas kan bemerken dat het object, in dit geval de “intelligibilia, et praecipue divina” de soortelijkheid van de activiteit bepaalt zodanig dat in het overwegen van deze dingen het volmaakte geluk ligt.⁶²

De overeenkomst die Thomas ziet tussen Aristoteles en het christelijke geloof aangaande het object van de contemplatie wordt

⁵⁹ Aristoteles, *EN X*, c. 5, 1175a20-21 (AL XXVI.1-3, p. 354, l. 9): “Sine operatione enim, non fit delectatio.”

⁶⁰ Aristoteles, *EN X*, c. 6, 1177a12-15 (AL XXVI.1-3, p. 358, ll. 25-26): “Si autem est felicitas secundum virtutem operatio, rationabile secundum optimam. Hec autem utique erit, optimi. Sive utique intellectus hoc sive aliud quid, quod utique secundum naturam videtur principari et dominari et intelligenciam habere de bonis et divinis, sive divinum et ipsum sive eorum que in nobis divinissimum, huius operatio secundum propriam virtutem erit utique perfecta felicitas.”

⁶¹ Preek 6 : Hoogland, 91; L., 83, ll. 4-9.

⁶² *In IX Eth*, c. 6 (ed. Leon., t. 47.2, 583, ll. 87-93, Marietti nr. 2087): “Alio modo ex parte obiecti, quod dat speciem operationi. Et secundum hoc etiam haec operatio est optima; quia inter omnia cognoscibilia optima sunt intelligibilia, et praecipue divina. Et sic in eorum speculatione consistit perfecta humana felicitas.”

nog onderstreept in zijn commentaar op Mt. 5,8 (“Zalig de zuiveren van hart want zij zullen God zien”). Thomas wijst erop dat er vier opvattingen bestaan omtrent de inhoud van ‘zaligheid’ (*beatitudo*). Hij wijst de gedachte dat zaligheid te vinden is in uitwendige, tijdelijke dingen of in de uitvoering van de eigen wil zonder meer af. Zaligheid als identiek met het actieve leven betreft een minder ernstige dwaling (*errant, sed minus*) omdat deugden zoals de matigheid een weg zijn naar de zaligheid (*virtutes sunt viae in beatitudinem*). De vierde opinie, nl. dat zaligheid te vinden is in de contemplatie van goddelijke zaken, een opinie die hij toeschrijft aan Aristoteles, wijst hij met Mt. 5,8 af. Immers, Christus zegt niet “zien” maar “zullen zien”. Aristoteles vergist zich met andere woorden wat de chronologie (*quantum ad tempus*) betreft maar voor het overige heeft hij het bij het rechte eind (*alias vera est*).⁶³

⁶³ Er is zelfs een evolutie waar te nemen wat betreft de aannemelijkheid dat Aristoteles een gelukzaligheid na dit leven erkende. In boek IV van zijn *Sententiën* commentaar (1253-1254) is hij nog van mening dat Aristoteles zulk een gelukzaligheid noch ontkend noch bevestigd had. (“Et ideo simpliciter concedimus veram hominis beatitudinem esse post hanc vitam. Non negamus tamen quin aliqua beatitudinis participatio in hac vita esse possit, secundum quod homo est perfectus in bonis rationis speculativae principaliter, et practicae secundario; et de hac felicitate philosophus in Lib. Ethic. determinat, aliam, quae est post hanc vitam, nec asserens nec negans.”: *In IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 1 a. 1 qc. 4 co.). In zijn commentaar op Aristoteles’ *Ethica* (1271-1272) en meer bepaald op de enigmatische passage “beatos ut homines” (*EN I*, 10, 1101a20-21), lijkt Thomas, op basis van het axioma dat een natuurlijke verlangen niet tevergeefs is, te suggereren dat redelijkerwijze kan aangenomen (*recte aestimari potest*) worden dat Aristoteles een gelukzaligheid na dit leven voor ogen stond. (“Et si ita est ut dictum est, <beatos dicemus> illos de numero viventium in hac vita quibus existunt in praesenti et existent in futuro ea quae dicta sunt ; sed quia ista videntur non usquequaque attingere ad condiciones supra de felicitate positas, subdit quod tales dicimus beatos sicut homines, qui in hac vita mutabilitati subiecta non possunt perfectam beatitudinem habere. Et quia non est inane naturae desiderium, recte aestimari potest quod reservatur homini perfecta beatitudo post hanc

En om dit nog eens te onderstrepen bevestigt hij dat Aristoteles zowel wat betreft het object, nl. God, als wat betreft de benaderingswijze, nl. liefde en genieten, overeenstemt met het christelijk geloof.⁶⁴

Thomas lijkt deze aristotelische benaderingswijze te onderscheiden van een filosofische benaderingswijze. In Preek 19 contrasteert hij op twee manieren de filosofische benaderingswijze met deze van de Schrift. De filosofen leren de waarheid en vooral de goddelijke waarheid “alleen ... kennen door zich toe te leggen op de studie” en het verwerven van gezag. Thomas contrasteert ‘studie’ met de zuiverheid van het hart: “Maar de Heer onderwijst een kortere weg, namelijk de zuiverheid van het hart, waar Hij zegt: “Gelukkig de zuiveren van hart want zij zullen God zien” [Mt. 5,8].”⁶⁵ Deze zuiverheid omvat een verlichting van het intellect⁶⁶ door de Gave van de Wijsheid waardoor de H. Geest in staat stelt een meer heldere kennis van God te verwerven⁶⁷, een kennis die niet discursief is maar vanuit een ontvangende sympathie (*connaturalitas*) met God het oordelen en handelen richting geeft

vitam. Ultimo epilogat dicens quod de his in tantum dictum sit.” (*In I Eth*, l. 16, ed. Leon., 47.1, 60, ll. 215-226; ed. Marietti nr. 202).

⁶⁴ *In Matt*. V, l. 3, ed. Marietti nr. 408: “Illorum autem opinio qui dicunt quod beatitudo consistit in contemplatione divinorum, reprobatur dominus quantum ad tempus, quia alia vera est, quia ultima felicitas consistit in visione optimi intelligibilis, scilicet Dei: unde dicitur *videbunt*. Et notandum quod, secundum philosophum, ad hoc quod actus contemplativi faciant beatum, duo requiruntur: unum substantialiter, scilicet quod sit actus altissimi intelligibilis, quod est Deus; aliud formaliter, scilicet amor et delectatio: ‘delectatio enim perficit felicitatem, sicut pulchritudo iuventutem’ [Aristoteles, EN X, 4, 1174b31-34 (AL XXVI, 4, 570, ll. 27-28)]. Et ideo dominus duo ponit Deum *videbunt* et filii Dei *vocabuntur*: hoc enim pertinet ad unionem amoris; I Io. cap. III, v. 1: *videte qualem caritatem dedit nobis pater, ut filii Dei nominemur et simus.*” Voor eenzelfde argument met een beroep op dezelfde tekst van Aristoteles zie *De Virt.* a. 5, ad 8.

⁶⁵ Preek 19: Hoogland, 316; L., 304, ll. 276-283.

⁶⁶ *In Matth* V, l. 2, nr. 434

⁶⁷ *In Eph.* I, l. 6, nr. 52.

overeenkomstig Gods plan.⁶⁸ Het verwerven van gezag “door strijdlustige debatten” vanwege filosofen contrasteert Thomas met de vrede als middel tot het bereiken van goddelijk gezag. “Daarom ook wordt gezegd: “Gelukkig de vredestichters, (want zij zullen kinderen van God worden genoemd)” [Mt. 5,9].”⁶⁹ Dit herinnert aan Thomas’ bekende stelling dat gezagsargumenten gebaseerd op de menselijke rede de zwakste argumenten zijn terwijl gezagsargumenten gebaseerd op de goddelijke openbaring de sterkste zijn.⁷⁰ De vrede als weg om dit goddelijke gezag te bereiken heeft te maken met de inwendige en uitwendige rust die voortkomt uit het juist ordenen van de geest, de lichamelijke vermogens en de relaties tot anderen. Enkel op deze wijze wordt duidelijk dat iemand een “volgeling van God” (*imitator Dei*)⁷¹ is en ontstaat er een gelijkenis met God (*assimilatur Deo*) die de weerstand ten aanzien van het gezag van God wegneemt.⁷²

Voor Thomas is het dus gerechtvaardigd door het gebruik van het woord ‘ook’ (*etiam*) aan te duiden dat Aristoteles kan aangeropen worden om te benadrukken dat de woorden van de “hemelse wijsheid”, de woorden van de Schrift, het grootste genoegen, genot en zoetheid in zich bevatten.⁷³

Een tweede voorbeeld is te vinden in Preek 15 waar Thomas, uitgaande van Lc. 16,1 (“Er was een rijke mens die een rentmeester had en deze kreeg klachten over hem omdat die zijn goederen verkwistte.”), erop wijst dat een rentmeester de goederen van zijn heer ook kan verkwisten door wat de rentmeester niet toekomt toch voor zich te houden. In Thomas’ pleidooi om tijdelijke goederen uit te delen aan anderen verwijst hij naar de brief van Paulus aan Timotheus (6,17-18) waar gezegd wordt dat het aanbevolen is voor rijken om gemakkelijk uit te delen. Thomas onderstreept dit Schriftcitaat door een verwijzing naar Aristoteles’ *Politica* II

⁶⁸ *STh* II-II, q. 45, aa. 1-2.

⁶⁹ Preek 19: Hoogland, 316; L., 304, ll. 286-296.

⁷⁰ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.

⁷¹ *STh* I-II, q. 69, a. 4.

⁷² *In Matth* V, l. 3, nr. 439.

⁷³ Preek 6: Hoogland, 9; L., 83, ll. 7-8.

(1263a25-40) wanneer hij schrijft: “De Filosoof zegt dat die steden het beste zijn, waar de bezittingen privé zijn en het gebruik ervan algemeen”.⁷⁴

2.4 *Aristoteles als inhoudelijk argument*

Een laatste functie die we kunnen onderscheiden betreft het gebruik van Aristoteles als onderdeel van een inhoudelijke argumentatie. Aristoteles fungeert als een bron van kennis om Thomas' argumentatie te onderbouwen. Een voorbeeld vinden we in Preek 5. Naar aanleiding Mt. 21, 5 (“Kijk, uw koning komt voor u, de milde”) onderzoekt Thomas het verschil tussen een heerser en een koning. Eén van deze verschilpunten betreft de onpartijdigheid van een koning: “Ten vierde, een koning moet onpartijdig zijn; anders zou hij geen koning zijn, maar een tiran. Want een tiran zet alles in zijn rijk naar zijn hand voor zijn eigen gewin, terwijl een koning zijn rijk organiseert met het oog op het algemene goed.” Een bevestiging hiervan ziet Thomas in de Schrift: “Zoals (*unde*) we lezen in Spreuken 29,4: ‘Een rechtvaardige koning richt het land op, een hebzuchtig man vernietigt het.’”⁷⁵ Het verschil tussen een tiran en een koning is te vinden in verscheidene teksten uit Aristoteles' *Ethica* en *Politica*⁷⁶ en wordt vaak door Thomas gebruikt in diens zelfstandige werken.⁷⁷ In Preek 19 thematiseert hij dit onderscheid opnieuw uitdrukkelijk en ook ditmaal zonder expliciete verwijzing naar Aristoteles. De context is hier de vaststelling van een rangorde tussen gelukzaligheid door middel van “wereldlijke zaken”, politieke gelukzaligheid en gelukzaligheid door middel van contemplatie van de goddelijke waarheid. Aangezien hij de relativiteit van de politieke

⁷⁴ In zijn commentaar onderstreept Thomas met Aristoteles dat dit systeem afhankelijk is van correcte wetten en gebruiken en Thomas voegt eraan toe dat het tevens vrijgevigheid en welwillendheid van de burgers vereist: *In Pol* II, c. 4 (ed. Leon. t. 48, A132, ll. 104-150).

⁷⁵ Preek 5, Hoogland, 80; L., 64A, ll. 231-232.

⁷⁶ Aristoteles, *EN* VIII, 12, 1161a11-14; 1161a32; *Pol.* III, 6, 1279a32-34; 1279b6-7.

⁷⁷ Zie L., 64, notities bij ll. 227-231.

gelukzaligheid wil aantonen onderstreept Thomas dat een koning, indien hij geen tiran wil worden, de “orde van de wijsheid” dient te volgen. Het transcendente fundament van het koningschap komt hier, anders dan bij Aristoteles, naar voren. Hij citeert Spreuken 8,15: “Door mij (de Wijsheid) regeren koningen” en ook Spreuken 28,15: “Een goddeloze vorst over een arm volk is als een brullende leeuw en een hongerige beer.”⁷⁸

In Preek 6, gedateerd 1256-1258, reflecteert Thomas over de morele betekenis van Lk 21,33: “Hemel en aarde zullen voorbijgaan” waarbij ‘hemel’ verwijst naar de “hemelse man” waarnaar Ef. 4,13 verwijst inzake de verschillende gaven die geschonken worden “tot opbouw van het lichaam van Christus, (13) totdat wij allen tezamen komen tot de eenheid in het geloof en de kennis van Gods Zoon, tot de volmaakte Man, tot de gehele omvang van de volheid van de Christus.” Vanuit deze optiek dringt zich volgens Thomas een analyse op van de redenen waarom hier wordt gebruik gemaakt van het begrip ‘hemel’. Alhoewel Thomas pas vele jaren later zijn commentaar op Aristoteles’ *Physica* (1268-1270) en *De Caelo* (1272-1273) zal schrijven, beroept hij zich hier al uitvoerig en expliciet op deze werken.⁷⁹ Net zoals de hemel zelf een lichtgevende materie is, bolvormig en dingen in beweging zet, zoals aangetoond (*probat, ostenditur*) door Aristoteles⁸⁰, zo dient ook de hemelse man lichtgevend te zijn door zijn wijsheid, weids en breed in barmhartigheid en toewijding en bewogen door de zorg en aandacht voor anderen.⁸¹ Dit gebruik van Aristoteles illustreert hoe een natuurwetenschappelijke uitleg ten dienste kan staan van een exegetisch doel, nl. de morele uitleg van het begrip ‘hemel’.

⁷⁸ Preek 19: Hoogland, 314; L., 303, ll. 242-260.

⁷⁹ Van deze preek zijn twee versies overgeleverd. Versie P (Parijs) verwijst uitvoerig en expliciet naar Aristoteles, versie M (Milaan) doet dit in het geheel niet. Preek 6: Hoogland, 93; L., 84P, ll. 32-49.

⁸⁰ Aristoteles, *De Caelo* II, 289a19-21; *De Caelo* II, 286b10; *Physica* VIII, 259b28-260a19. Aangezien dit niet de opzet is van zijn Aristotelescommentaren zijn zulke Schriftuurlijke implicaties van Aristoteles’ tekst niet te vinden in de commentaren op de *Physica* en de *De Caelo*.

⁸¹ Preek 6: Hoogland, 93; L., 84P, ll. 32-49. .

In Preek 12, ter gelegenheid van het feest van de Heilige Drie-eenheid en gedateerd in zijn eerste Parijse periode (1251/2-1259) prijst Thomas het christelijke geloof vanwege het “voorrecht” (*privilegio*) dat het - méér dan eender welke godsdienst of geloofsstroming – zeer veel geloofsonderwerpen bezit die zowel ons verstand als ons verlangen te boven gaan.⁸² Het is in deze context dat hij schrijft: “Nu kunnen wij de dingen die onze rede te boven gaan niet weten. Wij dienen ze dan ook te geloven. Want weten is eigen aan de rede, geloven echter is eigen aan de wil.”⁸³ Thomas geeft geen bron aan voor deze bewering maar in een werk uit dezelfde periode, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate* laat hij wel in zijn kaarten kijken. In *De Ver.* q. 14, a. 1 komt hij te spreken over wat geloof (*fides*) is. Hij maakt een onderscheid tussen de toestand van iemand die kent (*dispositio scientis*) en van iemand die gelooft (*dispositio credentis*). In beide gevallen is er sprake van een volledig aanhangen (*totaliter adhaereat*) van een bepaalde inzichtelijkheid terwijl het verschil afkomstig is van de oorzaak. In het geval van kennis is er sprake van een onmiddellijk (principes) of middellijk (conclusies) duidelijk worden van een bepaalde inzichtelijkheid die zich aan het verstand opdringt en het verstand bepaalt tot het noodzakelijkerwijze aanhangen van een bepaalde stelling. Hierbij verwijst Thomas expliciet naar Aristoteles *Analytica Posteriora* I, 4 (73a23-74a1). Er zijn echter situaties waarin deze onmiddellijke of middellijke bepaling van het verstand niet mogelijk is. In dit geval is er sprake van een bepaling van het verstand door de wil die kiest in te stemmen omdat het “goed of passend” is ergens mee in te stemmen. “En dit is de toestand van iemand die gelooft zoals wanneer iemand gelooft wat een ander zegt omdat het passend of nuttig lijkt dit te doen.”⁸⁴

⁸² Bemerkt dat Thomas hier spreekt over een voorrecht of privilege. Hij beschouwt de mysteries van het christendom (M. Scheeben) dus niet als tekortkomingen aan de zuivere rede (I. Kant) maar als een geschonken belofte.

⁸³ Preek 12: Hoogland, 171; L., 182, ll. 8-32.

⁸⁴ *De Ver.* q. 14, a.1 (ed. Leon. t. 22.2, 437, ll. 129-138): “Quandoque vero intellectus non potest determinari ad alteram partem contradictionis [...] determinatur autem per voluntatem quae eligit

In de reeds genoemde Preek 14 komt Thomas tevens te spreken over de kleding die Christus' schapen dienen te dragen als ook over de valse profeten, de huichelaars die als wolven in schaapskieren getooid gaan. Eén van deze klederen is de boetvaardigheid. "Deze kledingstukken, te weten dingen die een (boetvaardig en) streng leven simuleren, worden door huichelaars gebruikt".⁸⁵ In wat volgt gaat Thomas in op het letterlijk dragen van versleten en slordige klederen als een teken van een boetvaardig en streng leven. Hij wijst deze praktijk af met behulp van Aristoteles voor wie "het met verwaandheid kan samenhangen, als een mens een goedkopere manier van leven leidt dan zijn staat vereist."⁸⁶ Ook voor Aristoteles beantwoordt zulk gedrag niet aan het midden dat de deugd moet nastreven.⁸⁷ Het is in Thomas' commentaar op deze

assentire uni parti determinate et praecise propter aliquid quod est sufficiens ad movendum voluntatem non autem ad movendum intellectum, utpote quia videtur bonum vel conveniens huic parti assentire. Et ista est dispositio credentis, ut cum aliquis credit dictis alicuius hominis, quia videtur ei decens vel utile." In deze context maakt Thomas geen verdere melding van Aristoteles. Twee elementen lijken verder nog van belang. In zijn latere commentaar op de *De Anima* zal hij oog hebben voor de beweging van het verstand door de wil (cf. *In III De An*, l. 15, ed. Leon. 245, ll. 77-89, Marietti nr. 824). Vanaf 1270 neemt hij kennis van Willem van Moerbeke's vertaling van het zgn. *Liber de bona fortuna*, uittreksels uit de *Ethica Eudemia* en de *Magna Moralia*, waar Thomas kan lezen dat Aristoteles een beweging van God door de wil verdedigt. Cf. bv. *STh* I-II, q. 68, q. 1. Voor de historische achtergrond cf. V. Cordonier, 'Guillaume de Moerbeke Traducteur du 'Liber de bona fortuna' et de 'l'Éthique à Eudème'', in: *The Letter before the Spirit: The Importance of Text Editions for the Study of the Reception of Aristotle*, ed. by A. van Oppenraay e.a., Leiden 2012, 401-446.

⁸⁵ Preek 14: Hoogland, 222; L., 221, ll. 363-366.

⁸⁶ Preek 14: Hoogland, 223; L., 221, l. 374-221, l. 376.

⁸⁷ Aristoteles *EN* IV, l. 13, 1127b27-28 (AL XXVI, 2, p. 222, ll.17-19): "Qui autem parva manifesta fingunt, baukopianurgoi dicuntur, et facile contemptibiles sunt. Et quandoque iactancia videtur, puta Laconiorum {seu Laconum} vestis. Et enim superhabundancia et valde defectus, iactativum." Aristoteles verwijst hier naar het gebruik van de

passage dat hij komt te spreken over een “levensstaat” waaraan men geen gevolg geeft maar waarbij men “beter” en “meer gematigd” wil zijn dan de levensstaat waarin men zich bevindt. Ook voor Thomas is dit een uiting van verwaandheid.⁸⁸

Een gelijkaardige oproep tot deugdzame matigheid vinden wij in Preek 15. Weliswaar is het verlangen naar een doel, zeker wanneer het geestelijke goederen betreft, mateloos maar de weg naar dit doel, de middelen die naar dit doel leiden, kennen wel degelijk een maat. Ook ditmaal verwijst Thomas niet naar zijn bron, nl. *Politica* I, 8 (1257b25-28). Ook het voorbeeld van de arts stamt van Aristoteles. Echter, waar Aristoteles enkel zegt dat het doel van de arts, nl. gezondheid, mateloos is, voegt Thomas in zijn commentaar, net zoals in Preek 15, eraan toe dat de middelen die leiden tot dit doel gematigd dienen te zijn.⁸⁹

Spartanen die, zodanig onverschillig ten aanzien van comfort, versleten klederen droegen, een voorbeeld dat ook door sommige Atheners werd nagevolgd.

⁸⁸ *In IV Eth.*, l. 15 (ed. Leon., t. 47.2, 254, ll. 232-240, Marietti nr. 847): “Et talis defectus in exterioribus quandoque videtur ad iactantiam pertinere, dum per hoc volunt se ostendere meliores et magis moderatos, sicut Laconii qui deferebant vestimenta magis despecta quam deceret statum eorum, quia tam superabundantia exteriorum quam etiam immoderatus defectus videtur ad iactantiam pertinere, inquantum per utrumque ostenditur quaedam hominis excellentia.”

⁸⁹ *In Pol.* I, 8 (ed. Leon., t. 48, A105, 17-21): “Desiderium finis in unaquaque arte est in infinitum; desiderium autem eius, quod est ad finem, non est in infinitum, sed habet terminum secundum regulam et mensuram finis: sicut ars medicinalis intendit ad sanandum in infinitum, cum inducit sanitatem quantumcumque potest; sed medicinam non dat quantumcumque potest, sed secundum mensuram, quae est utilis ad sanandum; et ita est in aliis artibus.” Vergelijk deze passage met de tekst van Preek 15 (ed. Leon. t. 44.1, 236, ll. 180-190): “Appetitus finis non habet modum neque mensuram, set appetitus in hiis que sunt ad finem regulantur secundum mensuram finis. Verbi gratia, finis quem intendit medicus est sanitas; ea que sunt ad finem istum sunt medicine. Medicus non dicit: ‘Volo istum curare non perfecte’ set : ‘quantum melius possum’, unde respectu finis non ponit mensuram set si diceret: ‘Dabo ei fortissimam medicinam quam

Een laatste voorbeeld dat we signaleren vinden wij in Preek 19, gehouden ter gelegenheid van Allerheiligen. Naar aanleiding van Ps. 84,5 (“Gelukkig zij die wonen in uw huis, Heer ...”) begint Thomas, na een inleiding over de betekenis van het feest van Allerheiligen, met de stelling (“men moet weten dat...”) dat alle mensen weliswaar naar gelukzaligheid verlangen maar hieromtrent verschillende opinies bestaan. Deze stelling herinnert zowel aan de openingszin van Aristoteles’ *Metaphysica* (980a21: “Alle mensen verlangen van nature tot kennis te komen”) als ook aan diens opmerking aan het begin van de *Ethica* dat iedereen het erover eens is dat geluk hetgeen is waar allen naar streven maar er verschillende opinies zijn omtrent wat geluk nu eigenlijk is.⁹⁰ Net zoals Aristoteles vervolgt met de verschillende opinies omtrent geluk kritisch te bespreken en Thomas dit zelf ook doet aan het begin van zijn traktaat over het geluk in zowel de *Summa contra Gentiles*⁹¹ in de *Summa Theologiae*⁹², gaat hij ook in deze preek nader in op verschillende misvattingen omtrent de aard en inhoud van wat geluk is. Een eerste misvatting situeert geluk in iets van deze wereld: stoffelijke dingen, deugden of kennis. Thomas bemerkt: “Tegen hen zegt de Heer door middel van Jesaja 3,12: ‘Mijn volk, zij die jou gelukkig noemen, misleiden je.’ En terecht (*et merito*), omdat deze mening ten eerste ingaat tegen de volmaaktheid van de gelukzaligheid. Gelukzaligheid is immers volgens de Filosoof (*enim secundum Philosophum*), het volmaakt goede.”⁹³ Niet enkel

potero’; male diceret quia medicine sunt ad finem et in hiis debet habere mensuram.” Beide teksten stammen uit dezelfde periode (1269-1272). Dit voorbeeld kan gelden als wijze waarop Thomas een inzicht uit zijn commentaar vertaalt in de context van een preek en van de toehoorders.

⁹⁰ Aristoteles, *EN* I, 4, 1095a17-21 (AL XXVI.2.1, 144, ll.1-4): “Nomine quidem igitur fere a plurimis confessum est. Felicitatem enim et multi et excellentes dicunt. Bene vivere autem et bene operari, idem existimant ei quod est felicem esse. De felicitate autem que est alterantur, et non similiter multi sapientibus, tradiderunt.”

⁹¹ *ScG* II, cc. 26-40; Zie L., l. 296.

⁹² *STh* I-II, q. 2.

⁹³ Preek 19: Hoogland, 306; L., 300, ll. 49-51.

verschijnt Aristoteles hier met een inhoudelijk argument; volgens Thomas wordt de Schrift tevens goedkeurend bevestigd door Aristoteles.⁹⁴ Thomas becommentarieert Aristoteles' idee over de volmaaktheid van de gelukzaligheid door eraan toe te voegen dat "het uiteindelijke doel is het uiteindelijke eindpunt van een natuurlijke beweging van het verlangen."⁹⁵ Dit vinden we tevens in deze preek: "Omdat het gaat om het ultieme doel, behoort het ons verlangen geheel en al tot rust te brengen."⁹⁶ Het tot rust komen van een natuurlijk verlangen als voorwaarde voor ware gelukzaligheid volgt uit een teleologische opvatting van de natuur zoals bij Aristoteles zodanig dat elk onderdeel van de natuur een actieve neiging in zich bevat naar haar eigen volmaaktheid.⁹⁷ Vanwege de rusteloosheid van al wat de mens nog niet bezit in alles wat hij verwerft, kan het ware geluk niet in het verwerven van wereldlijke zaken gelegen zijn. De volmaaktheid van het goede en het rusten in het bereiken van dit volmaakt goede staan ook centraal in Thomas' argumentatie dat bestendigheid nodig is om te kunnen spreken van echt geluk. "Want gelukzaligheid zou het verlangen alleen tot rust brengen, als het bestendig zou zijn." Opnieuw vindt Thomas een bevestiging (*unde*) bij Aristoteles. "Daarom moeten we volgens de Filosoof niet denken dat een gelukkige (mens) een kameleon is, die in een oogwenk van kleur verandert; hij dient veeleer onveranderlijk te zijn, iets wat wij niet kunnen zijn, in dit leven tenminste."⁹⁸ Aristoteles vergelijkt inderdaad een mens die meent gelukkig te zijn maar geen zicht heeft op wat het "rad van fortuin" nog tijdens diens leven gaat brengen met iemand die onzeker is en een kameleon.⁹⁹ Zulk een mens kan niet gelukkig zijn want hij

⁹⁴ Aristoteles, *EN I*, 6, 1097a24-b6 (AL XXVI.2.1, p. 149, ll. 13-29).

⁹⁵ *In I Eth*, l. 9 (ed. Leon., t. 47.1, 31, ll. 60-61, Marietti nr. 107): "Ultimus enim finis est ultimus terminus motus desiderii naturalis."

⁹⁶ Preek 19: Hoogland, 306; L., 300, ll. 51-53. Cf. *In Matt V*, l. 2, nr. 434 en *In Joh I*, l. 11, nr. 212.

⁹⁷ Cf. J. Vijgen, 'Bemerkingen bij het thomistische adagium 'Appetitus naturalis non potest esse frustra', in *Indubitanter ad Veritatem*, ed. by J. Vijgen, Budel 2003, 423-445.

⁹⁸ Preek 19: Hoogland, 307; L., 300, ll. 77-81.

⁹⁹ Aristoteles, *EN I*, 10, 1100b4-7 (AL XXVI.2.1, 156, ll. 24-26).

verandert voortdurend van kleuren zonder een kleur vast te houden terwijl zijn natuurlijk verlangen streeft naar het rusten in het volmaakt goede. Deze onzekerheid omtrent waar nu in feite geluk te vinden is, beschouwt Thomas als *contra rationem felicitatis*.¹⁰⁰ Op basis van dit alles kan hij besluiten: “Dus als de ziel geen eeuwige gelukzaligheid heeft verkregen, is haar natuurlijke verlangen niet bevredigd.”¹⁰¹

3. Conclusie

In de inleiding tot de kritische uitgave schrijft Bataillon dat filosofen en profane auteurs “zeer weinig gebruikt worden en nog meer zelden genoemd worden. Aristoteles zelf verschijnt tamelijk zelden.”¹⁰² Ik hoop aangetoond te hebben dat dit statistisch feit niet betekent dat Aristoteles een onbelangrijke positie inneemt, temeer daar alle verwijzingen te vinden zijn in preken die als zeker of hoogst waarschijnlijk authentiek beoordeeld worden. De relatie tussen filosofie en theologie (of de Schrift) is allereerst zelf een thema van één van de preken (Preek 13). Hierin zet hij op beknopte en verstaanbare wijze zijn positie uiteen. In Preek 14 vangen we een glimp op van de polemieken hieromtrent aan de Parijse universiteit en in het bijzonder van de rol van Aristoteles. Thomas slaagt erin zowel Aristoteles te verdedigen als ook de ondergeschikte rol van de filosofie te benadrukken. In het concrete, expliciete en impliciete, gebruik van Aristoteles kan men minstens vier functies onderscheiden: 1) Aristoteles als woordvoerder van Thomas; 2) Aristoteles als de inzet van een polemieken; 3) Aristoteles als versterking van de eigen argumentatie en tot slot 4) Aristoteles als diegene die inhoudelijk argumenten aanlevert. Juist vanwege de polemische context is het opmerkelijk dat Thomas op belangrijke momenten te rade gaat bij Aristoteles voor uitleg en verheldering maar ook dat Aristoteles weliswaar genuanceerd maar op geen enkel moment weersproken wordt.

¹⁰⁰ *In I Eth*, l. 15 (ed. Leon. t. 47.1, 55, ll. 148-149, ed. Marietti, nr. 186).

¹⁰¹ Preek 19: Hoogland, 317; L., 301, ll. 110-112.

¹⁰² L., 127*.

SUMMARY

It is well known that one of the tasks of a medieval *Magister in Sacra Pagina* consisted in preaching sermons on a regular basis. The long awaited critical edition of Thomas Aquinas' *Sermones* enables us to investigate the explicit and implicit sources used in this particular type of writing of Aquinas. In his other theological writings, as I have argued elsewhere, Aristotle functions as Aquinas' principal philosophical interlocutor with regard to clarifying the relation between faith and reason in general and intellectual argumentation in service of the faith in particular. In this contribution I try to answer the question if and to what extent Aristotle functions as a source for intellectual clarification and argumentation in the *Sermones* as well. The first part deals with the relation between faith and reason in general and the use of Aristotle to express this relationship. In the second part I divide the explicit and implicit references to Aristotle in his *Sermones* into four categories (Aristotle as spokesperson of Aquinas, Aristotle and polemical debates, Aristotle as providing supporting argumentation, Aristotle as providing material arguments) and analyze their use in the *Sermones*.

APPENDIX:

**EXPLICIETE EN IMPLICIETE VERWIJZINGEN NAAR
ARISTOTELES IN THOMAS' ACADEMISCHE PREKEN**

Expliciete verwijzingen			
Sermo	Vindplaats	Tekst	Bron
VI Celum et terra (1256-1258 ; zeer waarschijnlijk authentiek)	5	Ethic X	EN X, 1175a20-21 & 1177a12-27
	33-34M 39-40M	De celo II	Caelo289a19-21 Caelo286b10
	45-46m	Physica VIII	Phys VIII 259b28-260a19
VIII Puer Iesu (11 jan 1271 of 10 jan 1272; zeker authentiek)	250	Philosophus	EN III, 1119b8-9
	399-400	Philosophus	EN IX, 1167a24-26
Sermo XIV Attendite a falsis prophetis (14 juli 1269 ; zeker authentiek)	187	Philosophus	Geen eigen naam
	188	Philosophus	Geen eigen naam
	374	Philosophus	EN IV, 1127b27-28
Sermo XV Homo quidam erat dives (10 aug 1270 of 2 aug 1271 ; zeker authentiek)	410	Philosophus	Pol II 1263a25-40

Sermo XIX Beati qui habitant (Italië, Orvieto 1261- 1264 ; quasi zeker authentiek)	51	Philosophus	EN I, 1097a24-b6
	77-78	Philosophus	EN I, 1100b4-7
Sermo XX Beata gens (waarschijnlijk 1 nov 1271; quasi zeker authentiek)	248-249	Philosophus	EN VI, 1139a10-11
	418	Philosophus	Gen I 316a8- 10
	421	Ethica IV	EN IV, 1123b13-14
Subtotaal: 12 plaatsen in 6 preken			

Impliciete verwijzingen			
Sermo	Vindplaats	Tekst	Bron
Sermo V Ecce rex tuus (29 nov 1271; zeker authentiek)	227-231	Quarto ... bonum commune	EN VIII, 1161a11-14; 1161a32; Pol. III, 1279a32-34; 1279b6-7
Sermo VIII Puer Iesu (11 jan 1271 of 10 jan 1272; zeker authentiek)	398-399	Nullus ...adherere	EN I 1096a16-17
Sermo XII Seraphim stabant (voor of tijdens De veritate 1256-1259; quasi zeker authentiek)	23-33	Supra rationem non possumus scire set fide credere	An. Post. I, 4 (73a23-74a1); De ueritate, q. 14, a. 1, resp.
Sermo XIII Homo quidam fecit cenam (Juni 1269/1270/1271; zeker authentiek)	238-241	Aliqua consideracionem	EN X 1177a20-25.
Sermo XV Homo quidam erat dives (10 aug 1270 of 2 aug 1271 ; zeker authentiek)	114 115	Mansuetum Animal sociale	Topica V, 128b1718; V, 130a28; 132a7; 138a10-11; 139a19 Var. loc.

	183-190	Finis intendit mensuram	Pol I 1257b25- 28
Sermo XIX Beati qui habitant (Italië, Orvieto 1261- 1264 ; quasi zeker authentiek)	36-39 243-245	Omnium hominum affectus ad beatitudinem tendat Differenciam esse inter regem et tyrannum	EN I, 1095a20- 28 ; Met. I, 1, 980a21 EN VIII, 1161a11- 14; Pol III, 1279a32- 34; 1279b6-7
Sermo XX Beata gens (waarschijnlijk 1 nov 1271; quasi zeker authentiek)	415-416	Virtus consistit in medio	EN II, 1404a11- 27; 1106b36; 1107a7
Subtotaal: 10 plaatsen in 7 preken			

Totaal: 22 plaatsen in 7 verschillende preken (uit een totaal van 23 preken en preekfragmenten)

**THE RELEVANCE OF PRUDENCE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS**
A study on Thomas Aquinas' *secunda secundae*

Giuseppe Ferrari

Introduction: perplexity about virtue. Prudence and environmental ethics.

A certain suspicion surrounds the word “virtue” in our time - except when it is used ironically or in historical contexts. It is no longer obvious that virtue should offer guidance and be the unifying factor of human life. Virtue theoreticians like Alasdair MacIntyre develop their arguments from a realistic acknowledgement of the crisis of virtue in modern culture:¹ since the role and the worth of virtue (in the traditional sense) is no longer obvious, a work of interpretation is necessary to give it a renewed significance within the ethical discourse.

However, just the classic concept of virtue shows affinities with some of the core values of contemporary culture (at least in western societies), like self-fulfilment, (authentic) freedom, good life. In fact, what virtue - in both Aristotle's and Thomas' version- is ultimately about, is human self-fulfilment: virtue ethics is an ethic of perfection, i.e. focused on the achievement of a certain τέλος or goal of human maturity. Such a τέλος has been thought of chiefly in individual terms (virtue as the way to the single person's perfection), although already in ancient times, as is the case in Aristotle's ethic, it was also inseparably connected to the political dimension and to political happiness. But since in our time environmental quality and, more extensively, the relation to the environment is increasingly considered an essential component of good life (the εὖ ζῆν of Aristotle), virtue ethics has become a promising path in contemporary environmental ethics. Recently, Pope Francis' encyclical letter *Laudato si'* (2015) has drawn

¹ MacIntyre, *After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory*, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

attention to the relevance of virtues and lifestyles to promote the “care for our common home”. In paragraph 88 of the encyclical, he also explicitly refers, within this perspective, to “ecological virtues” which need to be cultivated.² In several subsequent paragraphs he also deals with some of these “attitudes” like gratitude and gratuitousness (220), sobriety and humility (222-223), inner peace (225), and love (225-232).³ The bishop of Rome points out the consequences of widespread disregard or even contempt of certain virtues:

Sobriety and humility were not favourably regarded in the last century. And yet, when there is a general breakdown in the exercise of a certain virtue in personal and social life, it ends up causing a number of imbalances, including environmental ones. That is why it is no longer enough to speak only of the integrity of ecosystems. We have to dare to speak of the integrity of human life, of the need to promote and unify all the great values. Once we lose our humility, and become enthralled with the possibility of limitless mastery over everything, we inevitably end up harming society and the environment. It is not easy to promote this kind of healthy humility or happy sobriety when we consider ourselves autonomous, when we exclude God from our lives or replace him with our own ego, and think that our subjective feelings can define what is right and what is wrong. (224)

² The Pope is referring precisely to a book edited by the National Conference of the Bishops of Brazil in 1992, on the eve of the Rio Conference: *A Igreja e a Questão Ecológica*, n. 61.

³ The term “virtues” applies to these attitudes only in a broad sense. Within Thomas’ theoretical framework, depending on the case they should be termed more precisely “virtues” (in the strict sense), “parts of virtues” or “fruits of virtues”.

Accepting somehow Pope Francis' appeal "for a new dialogue about how we are shaping the future of our planet",⁴ this essay analyses in a philosophical perspective the potentialities for environmental ethics of the first and most crucial among cardinal virtues, prudence, following Thomas Aquinas' treatise in the *Summa theologiae*.⁵ But, more generally, what kind of mutual enrichment is possible between virtue approach and environmental ethics? We may tentatively and sketchily distinguish a double advantage: for virtue ethics itself, and for environmental philosophy. Virtue ethics is substantially enriched and broadened in its scope by being applied to environmental issues. A classic charge against virtue in modern times revolves around the supposed narrowness and self-centredness of its scope, as if virtue should promote a moral egotism, caring for nothing but to keep a "beautiful soul" immaculate from the miseries of the world. By extending virtue ethics to environmental issues, we make clear that the perfection which is at the core of virtue is no longer limited to the individual's "spiritual" fulfilment, but involves somehow the bodily and material dimension, the social dimension, and implies a correct relationship to non-human nature as well. An unsuspected richness of virtue ethics is brought to light; new developments reveal the fruitfulness of the original approach, as has already been the case, to mention an analogous development, for Thomas' political thinking.⁶

In turn, introducing a virtue perspective into the study of environmental issues may bring to light their ethical and existential relevance, which is far from obvious, particularly when they are dealt with in merely technocratic terms or as boundary conditions

⁴ *Laudato si'*, 14.

⁵ *STh* II-II, q. 47-56.

⁶ A significant twentieth century line of research has been investigating Thomas' thought in order to provide a foundation for human rights or democracy, perspectives which fell *historically* outside the range of Thomas' political philosophy. Participants in such developments were convinced, rather than to stretch Thomas' original intention, to uncover the latent richness of his thought. See the classic Jacques Maritain, *La personne et le bien commun*, Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et C^{ie}, 1947.

for *survival*, which is of course much less than *good life*. On the contrary, reference to virtue shows that our “soul” itself is at play in environmental issues, i.e. the meaning of life or our authentic human self-fulfilment.

Since, as said, the understanding of virtue in general has suffered a process of impoverishment, before asking whether the old virtue of prudence may help us cope with our complex environmental issues, we should verify the adequateness of the concept of prudence from which we start, and beware of reductive versions. Thomas’ prudence corresponds, as we shall see, to the Aristotelian φρόνησις (wisdom) to a large extent, but in the course of the modern age the term has taken often a quite reductive meaning. Let us paradigmatically consider Adam Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments* of 1759 (which, significantly, never refers to Thomas):

Security, therefore, is the first and the principal object of prudence. It is averse to expose our health, our fortune, our rank, or reputation, to any sort of hazard. It is rather cautious than enterprising, and more anxious to preserve the advantages which we already possess, than forward to prompt us to the acquisition of still greater advantages. The methods of improving our fortune, which it principally recommends to us, are those which expose to no loss or hazard; real knowledge and skill in our trade or profession, assiduity and industry in the exercise of it, frugality, and even some degree of parsimony, in all our expenses.⁷

Although Smith’s reflection on prudence maintains and in many aspect develops the classic tradition of this virtue in an original way⁸, we cannot help noticing here a certain shift in meaning toward the sense of “cautiousness” and “circumspection” aimed at reducing the risks concerning “our fortune”. In this essay I will try to recover the original richness of meaning of φρόνησις / *prudentia*,

⁷ Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), London: Penguin, 2010, part VI, section I, 6.

⁸ See in particular part VI, section I; part VII, section II, 1 and section III,3; 15-21.

as it was understood by Thomas Aquinas, enlightening the resources it offers to environmental thought.⁹

1. The character of prudence in Thomas

Before investigating the potentialities of Thomas' treatise on prudence for environmental ethics, let us first point out its main features, necessarily in broad strokes. According to Thomas (and Aristotle), moral *choice* is not concerned with particular ends, nor with the ultimate end of human life. In fact, such an end is *given* to human nature itself, as Thomas makes clear in the first *quaestiones* of the *prima secundae*. Here he proves that *there is just one* end of human life,¹⁰ and that "man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end".¹¹ Humans being's ultimate end is complete happiness;¹² but the object or the cause of such a happiness is God himself, since "by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness".¹³ Therefore "it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life";¹⁴ such a happiness cannot consist in anything less than the vision of God, which is the cause of perfect and eternal happiness, the beatitude (*beatitudo*).¹⁵

According to Thomas, human beings are endowed with a natural habit (*synderesis*) by which they are inclined to pursue good and to reject evil;¹⁶ this makes them capable in principle, if we do not consider the consequences of sin, of observing the natural law¹⁷ and

⁹ As an earlier application of Thomas' virtue ethics to environmental issues, see Giuseppe Ferrari, "Temperance as an Environmental Virtue. An Interpretation of Thomas Aquinas in a 'Green Personalism' Perspective", *Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences* 2014, Vol. 64, Issue 172-173, 159-163.

¹⁰ *STh* I-II, q. 1, aa. 4-5.

¹¹ *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 6.

¹² *STh* I-II, qq. 2-5.

¹³ *STh* I-II, q. 5, a. 6.

¹⁴ *STh* I-II, q. 5 a. 3.

¹⁵ *STh* I-II, q. 12 a. 11.

¹⁶ *STh* I, q. 79 a. 12.

¹⁷ *STh* I-II, q. 94.

act morally, although this remains insufficient¹⁸ to attain human life's last end. What is more, *synderesis* is only concerned with the first principles of moral action, whereas natural law, seen in its generality, does not point to all single virtuous acts required to live in conformity with reason's dictates.¹⁹ To do this, we need rather an adaptable and flexible *habit* to orient ourselves within the varying circumstances of moral life. This is prudence (*prudentia*²⁰), which corresponds to a large extent to Aristotle's φρόνησις ("practical wisdom"), dealt with in book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Prudence has a mixed nature, since it belongs to both the theoretical and the practical dimension. It is theoretical, because it is rooted in the cognitive faculty (*in vi cognitiva* or *in ratione*²¹) and implies *knowledge* of the last end of human life. It may therefore be considered a kind of wisdom: "prudence is wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all".²² «Prudence is wisdom for man», but not

¹⁸ Participation in God's eternal life is an end which *exceeds* human nature, and therefore can be attained only by means of God's grace. Ancient philosophers and wise men in principle (regardless of God's extraordinary intervention) could only practice a *natural* moral righteousness, which however remained insufficient to assure the enjoyment of eternal life.

¹⁹ "All acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well-living" (*Sth* I-II, q. 94, a. 3).

²⁰ Prudence comes from the Latin term *prudentia*, a contraction of *providentia* ("foresight").

²¹ *Sth* II-II, q. 47, a. 1.

²² The English version weakens in part the anti-anthropocentric statement of the original text: "homo autem non est optimum eorum quae sunt".

wisdom absolutely”.²³ However, universal knowledge of the *causa altissima*, which pertains to prudence, is not sufficient to direct human life in all circumstances.

To prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.²⁴

For this reason, knowledge of particular circumstances also pertains to prudence.

Yet prudence is concerned not only with knowledge, but with appetite (*appetitus*) and will (*voluntas*) as well, since its object is “good under the aspect of good” (*bonum sub ratione boni*) and good is the aim of everyone’s desire; as a consequence, prudence plays a crucial role among the *moral virtues* “among which... it is enumerated”.²⁵ The definition of prudence reflects its mixed nature; it may be described as “right reason applied to action” or “the norm of actions to be performed” (*recta ratio agibilium*).²⁶ As said, prudence does not set up *ends*, but is concerned with the means (*ea quae sunt ad finem*) to achieve them: “About these²⁷ is prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means”.²⁸

²³ *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 2.

²⁴ *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 3.

²⁵ *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 4.

²⁶ *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 2.

²⁷ Thomas is referring to “certain things [that] are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves”.

²⁸ *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 6.

The leading role of prudence among virtues is elsewhere expressed with a famous definition: *Prudentia est auriga virtutum* (“the charioteer of the virtues”).²⁹ All moral virtues, indeed, consist of finding the “golden mean” between (vicious) extremes; to achieve this goal they are lead (“commanded”) by prudence: “it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds”.³⁰

2. Prudence as an intellectual virtue; analogy with art.

Looking into Thomas’ treatise on prudence in search of *contents* relevant to our environmental preoccupations is likely to prove a difficult and scarcely fruitful path to follow. A more promising approach consists perhaps in focusing on the very *nature* of prudence. Does it offer any elements that could meet our theoretical concerns?

Let us consider the *intellectual character* of prudence. As said, Thomas understands prudence not only, like all moral virtues, as an act of practical reason (*ratio practica*)³¹ but specifically as an *intellectual* virtue, in which knowledge plays a key role. Such a characterisation of prudence seems at first to be at odds with contemporary ecological awareness. In fact, after Jean Jacques Rousseau we notice a growing tendency to identify “natural” with “instinctive”, “spontaneous”, and “emotional”. Already the nineteenth century’s environmental culture, with its roots in the Romantic movement, had been reacting both to the one-sidedness of the Enlightenment’s intellectualism and its analytical, reductive vision of nature, and to the instrumental, technical rationality of the Industrial Revolution, held responsible for large-scale nature devastation. Many schools of environmental thought³² since then

²⁹ *II Sent.*, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, ob. 3.

³⁰ *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 7.

³¹ *STh* I-II, q. 57, a. 5.

³² As a classic example of this widespread assumption, let us as consider Carolyn Merchant’s ecofeminist critique to Scientific Revolution as a turning point toward an objectifying way of

have been praising instinctiveness and the emotional sphere as dimensions best suited to connect us with nature, while expressing scepticism toward (scientific) rationality as a barrier separating us from nature.

As far as prudence is concerned, we have good reasons to question this ideological rejection of intellectual knowledge and rationality. A first, obvious remark is that even the most fervent critics of the supposedly anti-ecological Western *lóγoc* cannot avoid resorting to prudential *reasoning* to manage complex environmental issues adequately: and this implies both scientific knowledge of natural systems and political rationality, which enables us to act wisely and effectively within environmental conflicts.

Secondly, at a deeper level, we should consider the implications of characterising prudence as an *intellectual* virtue. For both Aristotle and Aquinas knowledge of the *animal rationale* (ζῷον λόγον ἔχον), unlike divine, immediate knowledge, finds its first source in the experience and develops further as a discursive, demonstrative knowledge. Only the first principles, in intellectual as well as in moral knowledge, are the direct object of intuitive knowledge.

Human intellectual knowledge is marked by gradualness and dependence on experience of the physical word: in one word, finiteness. Human *lóγoc* (from the Greek verb λέγειν, which also means to choose and to collect) is by no means that creative power which philosophical idealists have dreamed of, but first of all a *potentia oboedientialis* (*oboedientia* comes from *ob-audio*, to listen), a faculty through which humans are *open* to existing reality (*natura*) in all its network of relationships. Therefore, the discursiveness or rationality of prudence, far from distancing humans from nature, is as it were the proof of their condition of natural beings or, to speak in theological terms, *creatures* that have not made themselves and structurally depend on their *received* being. Rationality is structurally connected with limitedness, as Nietzsche himself honestly acknowledges, putting his *Übermensch*

considering nature (*The Death of Nature*, New York: HarperCollins, 1980).

above all rational knowledge. Further, with Heidegger, we may maintain that thought is a mark of human finiteness.³³

However, the relationship of prudence, as an intellectual virtue and a *potentia oboedientialis*, to external reality, is far from being passive. It seems rather to be a combination of dependence and creativity, analogous to art. Art's creativity, far from being hindered by restrictions, internal as well as external, is just made possible by them: in fact, art depends on a certain matter; has to obey its specific rules, and serves ultimately to a fixed end (e.g. an utilitarian aim or beauty itself, as is the case for fine arts).³⁴ Similarly, the "art" of prudence enjoys its creativity not only in spite of, but thanks to several restrictions: it *finds* its matter in human life itself, to which we get acquainted through experience; its rules are given by (practical) reason; its end consist in human life's end. Similarly to arts, prudence is based on *knowledge* of its proper object and of the means to achieve it; but to humans, as said, knowledge is accessible through experience and reason.

3. Prudence, virtues and human limits

Prudence is concerned with finding out the means best suited to act morally and, ultimately, to achieve the ultimate end of human life. Is such a characterisation of prudence somehow relevant to the challenges of the ecological crisis? The necessity itself of something like prudence implies that *not all* means are adequate to achieve human life's very end. A moral choice is not an arbitrary act; its goodness depends *also* on objective qualities, both physical and moral, of an "external" reality (like acts and behaviours). The prudent person, as said, differs radically from a Nietzschean *Übermensch* that imposes or dictates his/her interpretations, ultimately his will to power, on external reality (to speak properly, he *creates his* reality); neither is he endowed with a Sartrean limitless freedom. On the contrary, the idea of prudence itself

³³ M. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Bonn: F. Cohen, 1929.

³⁴ Jacques Maritain, *The Responsibility of the Artist*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960.

implies the admission of human *finiteness*, both physical and moral: ends themselves are *given* to humans with their nature, what would make no sense to an infinite, (fully) self-determining being. But *human* finiteness is inseparable from corporeality, the existence in and as a vulnerable body, depending on a no less vulnerable and fragile natural environment. Therefore prudence may and also should be recognised as an ecological virtue, since it implies the acknowledgement of finiteness, opposite to hubris and every dream of self-sufficiency.

Furthermore, prudence is not merely a specific virtue, but a necessary prerequisite to all virtues. And all virtues indeed, somehow paradoxically, imply the acceptance of human vulnerability. *Virtus* is derived etymologically from *vir* (man)³⁵ and originally connected to all “manly” moral habits traditionally associated with manhood. Virtue understood in such a primitive meaning seems to be diametrically opposed to every acceptance of vulnerability, since it conveys an idea of strength and self-sufficiency. A. MacIntyre (1999) reflects on this supposedly “virtuous” refusal of dependence and vulnerability, referring in particular to the Aristotelian moral character called *megalòpsychos* (magnanimous man):³⁶ according to MacIntyre, this is rather a *vicious* character, incapable of admitting any dependence on other people and to feel and express gratitude.

However, although virtue has been understood often in the anti-ecological perspective of hubris and self-sufficiency, it is just by starting from this element of *strength*, from which virtue takes its name and its character, that we may discover an implicit reference to human vulnerability. First, the praiseworthiness of virtue depends on the fact that it is *difficult* to achieve, since it requires a

³⁵ Not differently in Old Greek, where ἀρετή (virtue) is connected both to ἄρρην (male) and to Ἄρης (the god of war). Nietzsche’s attempt has been somehow to restore this original, merely vitalistic idea of virtue. For a sharp criticism to this kind ethic, see Simone Weil, “The Iliad or the Poem of Force” (1939), people.virginia.edu/~jdk3t/WeilTheIliad.pdf.

³⁶ A. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals. Why Human Beings Need The Virtues*, London: Duckworth, 1999, p. 127.

fight and an ultimate victory on inclinations that arise from the human condition, inasmuch as it is characterised by corporeality, finiteness and weakness. This appears quite evident in the case of cardinal virtues,³⁷ starting with prudence. *Temperance* makes sense as a virtue only to finite beings who are by nature inclined to bodily pleasures and who only with difficulty find a balance in their use; *spiritual strength (fortitudo)* in the face of dangers is a virtue to mortal beings who may be hurt as far as to suffer bodily death; *justice* is a virtuous habit to needy beings naturally seeking self-conservation and therefore always tempted to claim a bigger share in resources and opportunities. Theological virtues³⁸ themselves, although their origin and object is the eternal God, ultimately imply the finiteness and corporeality of the human subject: *faith*, an “infused” knowledge in Thomas’ terms, is a virtue for a creature whose understanding is limited and structurally short-sighted because it necessarily starts by sensory knowledge; *hope* is virtue of a being who is *presently* endangered and threatened by physical and moral risks; and *love* as *caritas*, an infused virtue whose source and object is God himself, in so far it remains *human* love as well, necessarily requires a certain self-sacrifice to serve fellow human beings in the vulnerability and neediness that they share with the loving subject himself. To sum up, corporeality and vulnerability enter the definition of virtue itself as their constitutive elements. Virtue can make sense only to a *finite*, fragile, bodily being, which as such structurally depends on an external natural environment: therefore, how much the concept of virtue may convey ideas of self-sufficiency and impassibility, actual virtue is only possible on the background of human vulnerability and necessary dependence on or resistance to external, *sensu lato* environmental conditions. Alasdair MacIntyre has introduced the dialectic of virtues of independent reasoning and of acknowledged dependence.³⁹ On this path, a closer consideration of the first set of virtues leads us to the awareness that even “independent” and mature reasoning, as can be

³⁷ Cardinal virtues are dealt with in questions 47-170 of the *secunda secundae*.

³⁸ *STh* II-II, qq. 1-46.

³⁹ A. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 119-128

identified in prudence, is marked by human finiteness and dependence. We could therefore go, with MacIntyre, beyond MacIntyre, by recognising that not only the virtue of “acknowledging dependence”, but also virtues as such, including that of “independent reasoning” witness the finiteness of the human condition and the necessity of its acceptance.⁴⁰

But just the idea of limit, opposite to hubris, is a crucial matter of concern to environmental thinking. Prudence, we should remember again before entering any of its specific contents, is no virtue for a Promethean, self-sufficient hero, but rather for a subject humbly aware of the network of relationships that connect him/her, firstly through their own body, to their physical environment and ultimately to the Earth.

As M. Nussbaum puts it, there is a “fragility of goodness”,⁴¹ and specifically also a fragility of virtue, which already appears in the fact that virtuous habits require a slow and painful apprenticeship to be achieved, and no guarantee that they will be able to resist future assaults. Only “gods” cannot be, properly speaking, virtuous, and human godlike hubris or dreams of omnipotence are incompatible with virtues. We can recognise an “ecological” element in *all* virtues (and in prudence, which directs them, in particular) in so far as they require a certain *humility* (from *humus*, earth), as knowledge of our finiteness and vulnerability, i.e. a realistic acceptance of the human condition.

4. The subjective parts of prudence. Economic and political prudence

Prudence, according to Thomas, is not merely an individual’s virtue, but concerns the societal dimension as well, as Thomas argues in a *respondeo* which is worth quoting in full:

⁴⁰ A. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 81-98.

⁴¹ M. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, Cambridge, U.K. New York: Cambridge University Press (second ed.), 2001.

According to the Philosopher⁴² some have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to charity, which “seeketh not her own” (1 Corinthians 13:5): wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Corinthians 10:33): “Not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved.” Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the common good to be better than the good of the individual. Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude.⁴³

To characterise the essence of prudence, Thomas draws both on the New Testament and on philosophical analysis (following Aristotle) of its nature: these two *auctoritates* agree in connoting prudence, like justice, as an eminently *political* virtue, which has to be the guide of the individual as well as of the community.

Reducing prudence to mere *cautiousness* – a shift in meaning I have already referred to with regard to A. Smith – in order to avoid risks and troubles, is essentially misunderstanding it. The prevalence of such an interpretation of prudence in the modern age indicates the distance between Thomas and a vast tradition in ethics (paradigmatically represented by Hellenistic philosophies, like Epicureanism and, to a certain extent, Stoicism itself), which has understood prudence or wisdom as the prerogative of the “wise man”, enabling him to stay aloof from the assaults of external and mainly societal troubles. In order to reject this narrow, individualistic understanding of prudence, Thomas harmonizes the Aristotelian interpretation of φρόνησις as a political virtue with the precept of charity as the core of the Gospel. Prudence indeed, in its perfect or complete form, is a political virtue, concerned not only

⁴² *Nicomachean Ethic* VI, 8.

⁴³ *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 10.

with the perfection of the single person, but with the perfection of the community as well, seen not as juxtaposed, but rather as intimately connected dimensions. Thomas formulates this relationship in this way:

He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence *his own good*, for two reasons. First, because *the individual good is impossible without the common good* of the family, state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says⁴⁴ of the ancient Romans that “they would rather be poor in a rich empire than rich in a poor empire.” Secondly, because, since man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For the *good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole*; thus Augustine says⁴⁵ that “any part which does not harmonize with its whole, is offensive.”⁴⁶

“Individual” and “political” prudence cannot be separated from each other completely for the same reason why individual and common good cannot be separated, but imply rather each other. A really prudent individual knows that his/her own self-fulfilment is not possible in isolation, but needs a community in many different ways. In fact, not only the existence, but also the well-being of the individual depends on resources (both material and immaterial) *provided* by the community; in turn, without the individual’s active contribution, the community cannot maintain and improve itself. Consequently, true individual prudence cannot consist in the mere pursuit of private interests, but implies taking care of the social dimension as well, as a means which makes authentic self-realization possible. Mere egoistic behaviour is short-sighted rather than prudent, since it implies a wrong understanding of the individual himself/herself, deprived of the network of relationships which permits him/her to flourish. Inversely, true political prudence

⁴⁴ *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, IV, 6

⁴⁵ *Confessiones*, III, 8

⁴⁶ *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 10 (italics added).

cannot neglect or deny needs and rights of the individual (as is the case in totalitarian regimes) since the community itself cannot flourish properly without aiming at the perfection of every single person. Such a mutual implication of individual and social dimension of prudence, that we also could term the “political structure” of prudence, is of course of the highest importance in the perspective of environmental challenges. Failures in successfully dealing with them have often been caused by the prevalence of a short-sighted, reductive idea of (merely individual) “prudence”. Thomas distinguishes three kinds (*species*) of prudence, according to their respective ends:

Wherefore there must needs be different species of prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is “prudence” simply so called, which is directed to one’s own good; another, “domestic (*oeconomica*) prudence” which is directed to the common good of the home; and a third, “political prudence,” which is directed to the common good of the state or kingdom.⁴⁷

These are the so-called “subjective parts” (*partes subjectivae*) of prudence. Such an expression refers to the fact that a certain essence dwells in a subject, i.e. is realised or exemplified in it, “as ox and lion are parts of animal”: in our case, the essence of “prudence” de facto always manifests itself in one of these parts. The prudence of the individual comes first in the list; intermediate is the prudence necessary to the family (*oikos*) or to the economic life; the last mentioned is political prudence, which however has priority in terms of inclusiveness. Referring to these parts of prudence, Thomas writes:

The parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude, which differ specifically as stated above (Q. 47, a. 11). Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into

⁴⁷ *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 11.

various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called “military.” There is also the multitude that is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or family, and this is ruled by “domestic prudence”: and such again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is “regnative prudence” in the ruler, and “political prudence,” simply so called, in the subjects.⁴⁸

Having acknowledged the fundamental role of individual prudence, let us concentrate more in detail on its social forms.

Economic prudence is an intermediate dimension between individual prudence and political prudence since “it is evident that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom”.⁴⁹ In Thomas, like in Aristotle, *oekonomica* is the administration of an οἶκος (home, household). “House”, understood in these terms, not only includes more members (relatives and servants) than the modern nuclear family, but is based rather on economic, productive activities and interests than on mere emotional bonds. Referring to such aims characteristic of an οἶκος, Thomas raises the following objection:

It would seem that domestic (*oekonomica*) should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (*Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 5) “prudence is directed to a good life in general (*ad bene vivere totum*)”: whereas domestic prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic I, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ *STh* II-II, q. 48, a. 1.

⁴⁹ *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 3.

⁵⁰ *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 3.

A similar argument can also be found in the second objection of the same article: “prudence is only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household”. With these objections, Thomas points to the limitedness of the scope of domestic or economic prudence, which may go together with a distorted ethical orientation of the family as whole. Interestingly, these objections remind us of the famous Augustinian definition of a State devoid of any justice:

If it does not do justice, what is the government but a great criminal enterprise? For what are gangs of criminals but petty little governments? The pack is a group which follows the orders of its leader according to a social compact of sorts, sharing the spoils along the rules upon which they agree.⁵¹

This analogy warns us that “economy” (the legitimately autonomous sphere of material interests) as well can be understood and practised in a way that can result in a betrayal of its authentic vocation. However, Thomas answers both his objections by replying that true prudence, including its economic version, cannot be restricted to narrow utilitarian ends. Economy as such should not be reduced to the compulsive tendency to accumulate riches, an endless yearning in which the ultimate end of human life cannot consist.⁵² Thomas broadens and deepens the definition and the scope of economy instead:

Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in *Politics* I, 3. On the other end, the end of economic prudence is “a good life in general” (*totum bene vivere*) as regards the conduct of the

⁵¹ Augustine of Hippo, *De civitate dei contra paganos/ The City of God* (lib. IV), Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, vol. 2 of the Loeb Classical Library Edition, pp. 12, 16.

⁵² See *STh* I-II, q. 2, a. 1: “Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in divitiis”

household”. On Ethic. I, 1 the Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of economic prudence, by way of example and in accordance with the opinion of many (*secundum studium plurimorum*).⁵³

This is to say that a clear distinction thus should be made between the *current*, reductive way of thinking about economy, or the economic goals de facto most people are used to “yearn for” (what Thomas calls *studium plurimorum*⁵⁴), and the actual essence of *oeconomica*. Thomas makes clear that “the end of economic prudence is *totum bene vivere*”: according to him economy remains below its true standard and vocation, when it limits itself to the narrow perspective of the so-called “rational” economic decision-maker. The perfect egoist (*homo oeconomicus*) falls ultimately short of rationality, since good life and even durable economic prosperity cannot be achieved by accumulating riches, which are a means to obtain different goods and not an end in themselves, as Thomas points out in the beginning of the *prima secundae*⁵⁵. If *totum bene vivere* is the ultimate end, economic goals themselves should be pursued within a holistic, systemic, and not narrowly individualistic perspective.

Within our environmental perspective, we may add that the individual’s enlightened self-interest (that we could call the formal object of economy), in terms of survival as well as well-being, implies the awareness of one’s dependence on environmental conditions. Therefore the common root οἶκος of both ecology and economy is much more than a fortuitous coincidence. It makes rather clear how the latter, in order to guarantee *totum bene vivere*, should look after the preservation of a network of fragile ecological relationships, on which economy itself depends as a source of “ecosystemic services”. Thomas’ perspective of “good life in general” applied to economy also makes an encounter possible with recent developments of ecological thinking. The growth of

⁵³ *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 3.

⁵⁴ The quoted translation “the opinion of many” loses somehow the valency of “passionate research” conveyed by the term *studium*.

⁵⁵ See *STh* I-II, q. 2, a. 1.

“ecological economics”⁵⁶ has learnt to look at environment-damaging side-effects of economic activities not merely in terms of “externalities”. With this term we refer to costs or damages that fall outside the scope of a certain economic actor and as such remain unseen or hidden, although they are mostly believed to be minimized and compensated for within the general benefit for the economic system. This is actually not the case, since the costs of environment-exploiting activities fall ultimately onto the shoulders of “powerless” subjects like future generations or environment, powerless, since they are not in a position to assert their rights or interests. The *integrity* of good life is thus put at risk at different levels, from the individual to the community, in a synchronic as well as in a diachronic perspective. And Thomas’ integral approach to economy is ultimately coherent with our day’s idea of an all-encompassing “economy of *nature*”⁵⁷ that has to be taken into account if *human* economy is to develop in a sustainable way. Such a broader context seems to be forgotten when the exclusive private interest of the idealized economic actor is taken as the paradigm of rational behaviour: such an attitude should rather be considered short-sighted and imprudent, as it is based on a misunderstanding and an impoverishment of economy’s original vocation, which should prudently look after the sustainable connection of mankind to nature, as the ultimate source of economic wealth and human welfare itself. In this way, (economic) prudence becomes a guide to a wise, sustainable use of natural resources and, much more, to the acknowledgement and appreciation of nature’s inherent worth.

Political prudence, which differs specifically from individual prudence,⁵⁸ belongs properly to those who are in power

⁵⁶ M. Common and S. Stagl, *Ecological Economics: An Introduction*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005; H. Daly, *Economics, Ecology, Ethics: Essays Toward a Steady-State Economy*, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1980.

⁵⁷ D. Worster, *Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Idea*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

⁵⁸ *STh* II-II, q. 48, a. 11.

(*principes*),⁵⁹ so that it is called regnative (*regnativa*),⁶⁰ namely the virtue characteristic of the *regnum* (kingdom), the most perfect form of the State, according to Aristotle's classification.

Referring to Aristotle, Thomas maintains that prudence belongs in a particular way to those who have the mission to rule the community, since "ruling and governing belong properly to the reason", and "prudence is in the reason". To common citizens, Thomas actually acknowledges a kind of "passive" political prudence, necessary to obey the laws and disposals of the legislator:

Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (*ad modum artis architectonicae*),⁶¹ but in the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft."⁶²

Indeed, only in statesmen, according to Thomas, may political prudence be found in a proper sense, as Aristotle put it: "The Philosopher says (*Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 8) that «of the prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master-prudence and is called legislative (*architectonica prudentia legispositiva*); another kind bears the common name political, and deals with individuals»."⁶³ What does Thomas say to us with this distinction? Prudence manifests itself in its true nature and completeness, as the virtue whose object is the *common* good, only in those who are able not only to guide themselves, but also other people within the political community. Thomas, following Aristotle and in conformity with his time's societal structure, excludes serfs from the exercise of this kind of prudence, though with an important restriction:

⁵⁹ *STh* II-II, q. 48, a. 12.

⁶⁰ *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 1.

⁶¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 8.

⁶² *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 12.

⁶³ *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 2.

On the other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political.⁶⁴

A fortiori animals do not participate in this kind of prudence, since

Irrational and inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their power but in the power of their movers.⁶⁵

Thomas developed his reflection on political power against the backdrop of a feudal, highly hierarchical societal structure. In our days, this sharp opposition between rulers and ruled has been surpassed, at least in principle, since the democratic ideal considers *every* citizen as responsible for common good, though such an ideal may be contradicted *de facto* by the emergence of new features of inequality. Therefore we should go beyond Thomas' distinction between the two forms of political prudence, and consider governmental prudence somehow as a prerogative of *every* responsible, participating citizen, particularly inasmuch as it is concerned with the defence and promotion of environmental goods. In spite of the historical conditioning of Thomas' treatise, we should focus on his central idea that fully developed prudence, far from being identified with individualistic and short-sighted cautiousness, is a mature capacity for caring and taking responsibility. Only the politician - actually the true statesperson - who, being endowed with a vision, is able to plan the future for his/her community is really prudent in this sense. The structural

⁶⁴ *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 2.

⁶⁵ *STh* II-II, q. 50, a. 2.

relationship of prudence to common good manifests itself in a particularly clear way with regard to a core issue of the contemporary environmental debate: the problematic situation of the “commons”, particularly in a profit-oriented, individualistic private economy.⁶⁶ This term refers to resources like air, water, raw materials, and, in our time, biodiversity and climate, all that which, at the beginning of the industrial era, appeared to be virtually unlimited and not to belong to any private “owner” but was, in principle, accessible to all: due to this lack of jurisdiction, the commons have undergone a process of irresponsible damage and depletion, since no one saw his immediate interest questioned by such exploitative practices. If there is any “root” of the ecological crisis⁶⁷, perhaps it is to be identified in this wrong understanding of the Earth as *terra nullius*. Nature, indeed, does not belong to any *particular* owner: but natural resources are part of the *common* good, in so far as they are not only necessary for survival, but also contribute to life’s quality: for this reason, the mission of a really prudent statesman/ stateswoman (or politically responsible citizen) is to safeguard them and to improve their quality at the service of the common good.

5. Precautionary approach in the light of prudence: a short note

A key principle at the crossroads between politics, economy, and applied science, is the so-called precautionary principle.⁶⁸ Around it a vast literature has grown, concerning both environmental issues and other topics like food or drugs security. It is of course beyond the scope of this essay to analyse in detail either the principle itself

⁶⁶ Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, *Science*, 13 Dec 1968: Vol. 162, Issue 3859, 1243-1248.

⁶⁷ See well-known L. White’s article, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis”, *Science*, 10 March 1967: Vol. 155, Issue 3767, 1203-1207.

⁶⁸ Speaking instead of precautionary *approach* is sometimes more than a mere lexical variation. In the following I shall try to explain why such an expression seems to be preferable from the perspective of prudence.

or its numerous applications. Let us consider, albeit sketchily, the possible relationship between virtue ethics (and prudence in particular) and the principle. In the *Rio Declaration* (1992) the precautionary principle is formulated as follows:

In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.⁶⁹

In Thomas' understanding, the task of prudence is to find adequate *means* to given (morally good) ends; the precautionary principle is also concerned with means of human action, particularly with large-impact human activities such as industries or invasive technologies, from the point of view of their potential *risks* to the environment (or human health). The principle invites us to act prudently, by considering the possible consequences of certain actions. Technical feasibility or "lack of full scientific certainty" are no argument to act thoughtlessly, "where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage" to the environment.

The precautionary principle has often been attacked as an expression of an anti-technological, rigidly preservationist mentality. However, we should be aware of the somehow privileged role played just by *negative* maxims in affirming the non-negotiable value of *every* authentic moral value. For instance, the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" defines an insurmountable line designed to protect the non-negotiable value of life. Similarly, the negative formulation of the precautionary principle reminds us of the real seriousness of the issue at stake and of the irreplaceable value of the goods to be preserved. But this does not imply by any means that *only* negative precepts or merely conservative attitudes should be well-suited and sufficient in order to manage environmental problems, just like the *promotion* of the value "life" goes far beyond negative norms aiming at protecting threatened

⁶⁹ *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development*, principle 15.

human life. The *cautiousness* suggested by the principle should therefore not be understood merely in prohibitive terms, but as an appeal to act prudently, i.e. in a properly human way, avoiding absolutization of *partial* goods such as economic benefits or the intellectual or practical value of new scientific discoveries and technical devices. For this reason, the expression precautionary *approach*, rather than “principle”, seems to me best suited to express its dynamic and prudential dimension. Prohibitive, negative principles are necessary to protect the border, but do not describe the territory in its wealth of potentialities. In order to do this, we need to go beyond the rigid application of rules, to cultivate a *moral character* inspired by those same values that negative norms are designed to protect. The precautionary principle, understood in the light of prudence, should not be isolated or treated in a dogmatic way. Prudence itself, like the Aristotelian φρόνησις and any other virtue, by definition cannot consist in the mere application of a rigid rule of cautiousness, but implies rather a constitutive reference to the prudent *person*. The constructive, positive task connected to the precautionary approach is to cultivate morally mature (and environmentally sensible) individuals (in line with the the Aristotelian φρόνιμος) and communities who may be able to judge, among other issues, *when* “there are threats of serious or irreversible damage”.⁷⁰

In the light of prudence, we could therefore look at the precautionary principle differently, as a dynamic element or a hermeneutic criterion which stimulates us to compare every action,

⁷⁰ To avert the risk of weakening the principle in its binding force, by exposing it to subjective, arbitrary interpretations, we should consider that Thomas distinguishes what is *per essentiam* (essential, expressing a thing’s very nature) and what is *per accidens* (incidental). *Per essentiam*, not only the precautionary principle, but *every* moral principle necessarily is rooted in the moral experience of living individuals and communities: principles do not exist in a kind of Platonic *hyperouranios*, apart from moral *agents*. The fact that *all* moral principles are exposed, *per accidens*, to forced, softening interpretation, does not justify in any way legalism, which disregards the true nature of principles *at the service* of living *persons*.

beyond short-term or merely economic benefits, with broader goals including environmental quality as a requirement of authentic human self-fulfilment.

6. The vices opposed to prudence and the ecological crisis

In article 13 of question 47 Thomas interestingly discusses the problem whether prudence can be in sinners. Under consideration are those impoverished or even distorted forms of “prudence” which merely keep the formal structure of the virtue of prudence, i.e. the adequacy of means to the ends.

A prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called “a good robber,” and in this way may speak of “a prudent robber,” by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery.⁷¹

The “good of reason” that prudence has to safeguard can be better understood and appreciated by contrasting it with habits in which *absence* or *wrong understanding* of prudence result in spiritual deprivation. In questions 53 to 55 Thomas analyses imprudence (53), negligence (54) and “vices opposed to prudence by way of resemblance” (55). Within these questions, from our perspective some articles deserve more attention.

a) *Praecipitatio*

In art. 3 of q. 53, Thomas asks whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence. Why is acting hastily and inconsiderately (*praecipitatio*) a *vicious* habit? This question sounds a bit provoking to our ears, since we live in a society where precisely *speed* and promptness in deciding as well as in acting are usually magnified as virtues or, in a more current vocabulary, human

⁷¹ *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 12.

capital's necessary skills for the functioning of modern economic and societal life. In his *respondeo*, Thomas argues in this way:

Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of the soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is said to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is brought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement or of another's, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in the action performed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion are "memory" of the past, "intelligence" of the present, "shrewdness" in considering the future outcome, "reasoning" which compares one thing with another, "docility" in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes counsel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the vice of precipitation is contained under imprudence.⁷²

The term *praecipitatio* is analysed by Thomas on the basis of a physical metaphor, describing dangerously ruinous motion due to loss of control over one's body. A motion falls under *praecipitatio* when it takes place ruinously, i.e. when it happens *non ordinate incedendo per gradus* ("not in orderly fashion by degrees"), but "by the impulse either of its own movement or of another's". What makes *praecipitatio* vicious is not speed itself, but disorder and lack of control.

Transferring the image to the moral dimension, since *summum...animae est ipsa ratio* ("the summit of the soul is the reason"), a similar control should be exercised by the soul's highest faculties, enlisted by Thomas alongside with their function: "memory" of the past, "intelligence" of the present, "shrewdness" in considering the future outcome, "reasoning" which compares

⁷² *STh* II-II, q. 53, a. 3.

one thing with another, “docility” in accepting the opinions of others”. We may thus speak of *praecipitatio* when an action is taken inconsiderately, out of mere instinctiveness. In this case, the person does not act in an integrated way, involving his/her own whole personality and *story*. The “narrative unity” of human life⁷³ is broken. *Praecipitatio* neglects the relational character of the person, both inward (with respect to oneself) and outward (with respect to other people): consequently, the rushed action fails in integrating the various dimensions of one’s personality, including past experiences and expectations about the future. Other people are excluded as well, since they are not listened to and somehow involved as partners in a decision-making process. To apply the topic to our issue, a specific kind of “otherness” that an action characterised by *praecipitatio* fails to consider, is natural environment itself, on which we structurally depend, and on which every action always has an impact. Prudent conduct is complex and relational; imprudent conduct, on the contrary, shows a structural lack of “connectedness” - a key word to environmental thinkers- at different levels. A prudent action can be called “ecological” inasmuch as it is relational and tries to take into account all implications of a given alternative, particularly with respect to the natural environment, the largest and most inclusive context in which human life is situated. Social and economic life show plenty of decisions and actions characterised by such kinds of precipitation and hasty oversimplification of reality: in short, by a lack of “systemic wisdom”,⁷⁴ by a lack of φρόνησις/ prudence and by forgetfulness of our actual dependence on natural systems.

Neoliberal economics in particular seems often to encourage and praise similar procedures of quick decision-making, based on the oblivion of the limits of resources and of the ecosystems’ carrying capacity. Quite differently, Thomas’ analysis of *praecipitatio* highlights the value of thoughtfulness, which requires a calm and deep-going consideration of *all* involved factors. A similar attitude

⁷³ A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*.

⁷⁴ Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1972.

is closer to nature's biological rhythms themselves and better suited to take them into account.⁷⁵ On the contrary, an economic and consumer's ideology governed by short-sighted, scarcely integrated subjective wishes, runs the risk of ignoring the systemic consequences of our action, what may result in a growing unbalance in our relationship with nature. In this line of thought, much more could be said regarding the wider cultural consequences and the *educational* implications of the opposition between the impulsiveness encouraged by the current economic system and the new/old virtues of "slowness" and thoughtfulness,⁷⁶ considered in their impact on environmental issues.

b) *Luxuria* and imprudent behaviour

In article 6 of the same question, Thomas asks "whether the aforesaid vices [precipitation, inconstancy, thoughtlessness] arise from lust (*luxuria*)". The answer is affirmative, in agreement with an old tradition that could be traced back to the church fathers.⁷⁷ Thomas tries actually to account for this in anthropological terms. In the *respondeo*, approvingly referring to Aristotle, he argues:

As the Philosopher states (*Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 5) "pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly sexual pleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight. Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical reason, as stated above,⁷⁸ it follows that they arise chiefly from lust.⁷⁹

Aristotle's (and Thomas') relative mistrust toward sexual pleasure is based on its strength of mental absorption, which is believed to hinder the exercise of the superior faculties of the mind, since "the

⁷⁵ Enzo Tiezzi, *Tempi storici, tempi biologici*, Milano: Garzanti, 1984.

⁷⁶ Carl Honoré, *In Praise of Slowness: Challenging the Cult of Speed*, New York: HarperOne, 2004.

⁷⁷ Gregor the Great, *Moralia in Job* XXXI, quoted in the *sed contra*.

⁷⁸ Articles 2 and 5.

⁷⁹ *STh* II-II, q. 53, a. 6.

perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from sensible objects". As said, Thomas' assumptions on this point clash with some crucial aspirations of many environmental theorists of our time, such as their effort to retrieve the emotional, "animal" dimension in us, which is supposed to be "closer to nature", as well as all manifestations of spontaneity and instinctiveness.

Such an opposition cannot be denied, although we should go more in depth to do justice to Thomas' intention. Thomas does not condemn sexuality and sensual pleasure as such, but their distorted use which is the essence of the vice of luxury or lust (*luxuria*). If we concentrate on the *structure* of Thomas' argument on this point, we notice that, for him, it is not bodily pleasure itself that is a sin, but the yielding, for the sake of immediate pleasure, to acts and behaviours which are ultimately conducive not to truly human self-fulfilment, but to spiritual impoverishment and alienation. Lust, indeed, is a *greedy, voracious* style in experiencing our bodily dimension. Such a connection seems to me not arbitrary, since Thomas himself further on⁸⁰ asks whether other vices⁸¹ contrary to prudence arise from covetousness (*avaritia*).

Although doubts might be raised about the specific role of *luxuria* as the *source* of those vices, we may appreciate the connection which Thomas points to between a greedy and sensual frame of mind and corruption of prudence. Bodily creation - that we experience in our own body, as well as in physical nature as our "extended body" - offers us many occasions for delectation, since nature satisfies our natural needs, and pleasure necessarily follows their satisfaction. This happens according to the common nature of all animals,⁸² not only humans; therefore pursuit of pleasure and

⁸⁰ *STh* II-II, q. 55 a. 8.

⁸¹ As we shall see below, these are craftiness (*astutia*), guile (*dolus*), and fraud (*fraus*), dealt with in art. 3, 4, and 5 respectively.

⁸² "Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight". (*STh* I-II, q. 31, a. 1)

happiness as such is perfectly natural (*secundum naturam*) to us. However, humans may disregard to follow their *specific* nature, rationality, and act *only* greedily and sensually; but acting out of mere instinctiveness is *below* human nature, and therefore an *imprudent* behaviour as is every conduct lacking rational guidance. Consequent hedonism⁸³ is indeed self-destructive as well as, in the form of today's mass-hedonism and consumerism, nature-destructive. A correct attitude to natural environment requires empathy and sensibility as well as a certain *distance*, necessary to foster and safeguard *respect* for the *otherness* of nature.⁸⁴ When nature is considered *merely* as a resource or opportunity to maximize subjective delight (even with environment-friendly intentions), such an otherness is neglected and the door is opened for exploitive practices, just as sex-consumerism (a contemporary feature of Thomas' *luxuria*) can undermine gratuitousness inside human relationships. This point should not be misunderstood as if nature were a person, or even a super-person or a deity, as some environmental theorists maintain: I am only pointing to the inadequateness of the Cartesian view of nature as mere matter (*res extensa*), to be used (*uti* and often *abuti*) recklessly for our own purposes.

c) Intermezzo: *falsa similitudo virtutis*

As said, prudence in the classic sense is virtually unknown or misunderstood in modern culture. This virtue has suffered a process of impoverishment and fragmentation, so that we can only recognise broken pieces or elements of it, as is the case in "rational choice" (mostly economic) theories. If compared with Aristotle's

⁸³ Philosophically, I do not think either to ancient Epicurean hedonism or modern utilitarian eudaimonism -both actually driven by reason - but rather to nihilistic 17th century's libertinism, culminating in Sade's "necrophiliac" sensualism.

⁸⁴ On the necessity to preserve nature's otherness, see Peter Reed, "Man Apart: An Alternative to Self-Realization Approach", in *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 11 (Spring 1989), 53-69, drawing on Martin Buber. See also Giuseppe Ferrari, "Dire tu alla natura. Una lettura di Martin Buber", in *La Persona nella filosofia dell'ambiente*, Milano: Limina mentis, 2012, 171-198.

φρόνησις or Thomas' prudence, rational decision-making procedures, characterised by a narrower *idea of rationality*, could be considered as forms of prudence *secundum quid*: they share with authentic prudence their concern with the choice of means, though without aiming at self-fulfilment of human life as a whole, but merely to partial ends (such as, for instance, the maximization of financial incomes). This limited and partial "prudence" can sometimes be distinguished only with difficulty from a step further away from the virtue of prudence, represented by "the vices *opposed* to prudence by way of resemblance", dealt with by Thomas in q. 55. In this case, the name prudence is appropriated illegitimately and what we are actually dealing with is only a *falsa similitudo virtutis*.⁸⁵

In many impoverished forms of prudence ultimate ends (when they are not excluded from the beginning) are left *outside* the rational discussion as an object of merely individual, unquestionable choice. Rational planning culture is often combined with an actual value anarchism.⁸⁶ Philosophical *emotivism* could be understood as a consequence as well as a rationalisation of this widespread attitude:

⁸⁵ *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 7.

⁸⁶ This is a very short description of some *mainstream* tendencies in moral thinking. The thesis of the radical subjectiveness and the unquestionability of moral values could be traced back to F. Nietzsche or to M. Weber's *Polytheismus der Werte* (polytheism of values) at the beginning of the twentieth century, and culminates perhaps in Engelhardt 's (1996) definition of human subjects as "moral strangers". Needless to say, universalist counter-trends are well represented on the field of moral theories, from J. Habermas to Neo-Aristotelian thinkers such as A. MacIntyre or M. Nussbaum. For references, see H. T. Engelhardt, *The Foundations of Bioethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981; A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory*, Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1981; M. Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach*, Cambridge (Mass.) - London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011.

ethical choices are interpreted as nothing more than the expression of individual, arbitrary and unquestionable *feelings*.⁸⁷

Very interesting in this perspective is Thomas' analysis of the "vices opposed to prudence by way of resemblance" in q. 55. Indeed, humans can behave imprudently not only by neglecting prudence, as is the case in previous questions (53-54), but also by practising a distorted and impoverished version of "prudence". Among the vices opposed to prudence, they are those "*quae habent similitudinem cum ipsa*", like in a caricature. In the first article of q. 55 Thomas asks "whether prudence of the flesh (*prudencia carnis*) is a sin" and in a. 2 whether it is *mortal* sin. The *respondeo* points out to the core of the issue, the right definition of authentic prudence:

As stated above⁸⁸, prudence regards things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of the body, as stated above.⁸⁹ Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.

As we already pointed out, true prudence and false or apparent prudence differ in the first place with regard to their respective ends. Authentic prudence encompasses the *whole* human life, whereas false prudence is limited to *partial* ends. However, the limitedness of the scope is not enough to characterise prudence as apparent: there must also be a certain *distortion* consisting in the absolutisation of goals that, as such, are not necessarily morally evil. In fact, false prudence is *false*, and not merely limited or pre-moral (as it happens in the correct exercise of technical tasks), when

⁸⁷ Such a meta-ethical theory can be traced as far back as to A. J. Ayer's 1936 book *Language, Truth, and Logic*, (New York: Dover Publications, 1952).

⁸⁸ *STh* II-II, q. 47 a. 13.

⁸⁹ *STh* I-II, q. 2, a. 5.

it hinders the achievement of human life's last end. This can happen not only when means are evil in themselves, but also when means, though good or morally neutral or indifferent as such, are considered as an absolute, and become *de facto* ends in themselves. Let us consider some manifestations of false prudence according to Thomas: not surprisingly within our perspective, we will find a whole set of environment-destroying attitudes which play a major role particularly in today's economic life: craftiness (*astutia*), guile (*dolus*), and fraud (*fraus*), dealt with in art. 3,4, and 5 respectively. d) *Astutia* and *avaritia*

Let us concentrate on *astutia*. In the *respondeo* it is explained analogically with reference to theoretical topics:

Prudence is "right reason applied to action," just as science is "right reason applied to knowledge." On speculative matters one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit (*simulatis et apparentibus*), and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.⁹⁰

Astutia consists thus in a wrong choice of the means, which *seem* to be adequate, but are actually wrong and apparent. The subject falls somehow prey to a self-deceiving illusion, by taking a kind of "shortcut" to a given end: not necessarily a morally wrong end, as is the case for people pursuing quality of life, or welfare. However,

⁹⁰ *STh* II-II, q. 55, a. 3.

it may happen that individuals and societies, tending towards these ends, resort to wrong means like reckless environmental depletion or excessive land use. In such cases *astutia* is no longer an *actual* cleverness, but rather a self-deceiving or apparent craftiness, because, while guaranteeing limited individual or short-term advantages, it destroys the foundation itself of an *authentic* human welfare in the long term.

Thomas remarks that these vices, contrary to prudence by way of resemblance, arise specifically from covetousness (*avaritia*). The reason is that, differently from those vices which find their source in sensual disorders (*luxuria*), these ones are rooted in reason itself, although practised in a distorted way:

“On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its act: *whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate*”.⁹¹

Applying this concept to the environmental question, we may conclude that a merely “sensual” and hedonistic way of considering nature (a narcissistic *Lustprinzip*) may seriously hamper the possibility to recognise nature’s otherness and lead to nature’s abuse; however, reason itself, when practised in a *superficial* and merely instrumental way, may lead ultimately to an irresponsible and imprudent way of dealing with nature. This happens when reason is reduced to a tool to maximize a narrowly understood anthropocentric benefit, with insufficient awareness of our dependence on and solidarity with the natural environment. A merely calculating, instrumental reason does nothing but equip and strengthen with “rational” means an ultimately irrational, dehumanizing conduct. Yet, such a short-sighted prudence is actually no prudence at all, but rather self-deceiving *astutia*. Therefore, Thomas does not invite us generically to act rationally, but warns us about the *quality*, i.e. the depth of our practical reason with its core virtue of prudence.

e) *Sollicitudo*

⁹¹ *STh* II-II, q. 55, a. 8 (italics added).

In articles 6 and 7 of the same question 55 Thomas considers, among the vices opposite to prudence, solicitude (*sollicitudo*). Thomas' analysis brings out the ambiguity of this state of mind, characterised by concern, preoccupation or even anxiety. Both the object and the measure of solicitude are questioned. Some aspects of Thomas' argument seem to be particularly relevant to our topic:

Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three ways.⁹² First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says:⁹³ "When Our Lord said: 'Be not solicitous,' etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel." Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written (Matthew 13:[22]) that "the care of this world . . . chokes up the word."⁹⁴

The viciousness of solicitude is not obvious to Thomas at first sight: prudence as such requires an attitude of alertness and care, contrary to negligence and carelessness. In particular, just in our time we should be (virtuously) solicitous about threats to nature's fragile ecological balance. Therefore, Thomas specifically asks "Whether it is lawful to be solicitous *about temporal matters*" (*Utrum licitum sit sollicitudinem habere de temporalibus rebus*).⁹⁵

⁹² We shall consider only the first two, as especially relevant to our topic; the third may be originated "through over much fear (*ex parte timoris superflui*), when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought to do".

⁹³ *De operibus monachorum*, XXVI.

⁹⁴ *STh* II-II, q. 55, a. 6.

⁹⁵ My emphasis.

Solicitude is deemed morally wrong by Thomas when the acting person is, as it were, absorbed by “temporal things” considered as his/her ultimate end. Terms like “earthly” or “temporal” should not be exclusively identified with material or bodily; this ontological meaning combines often in Thomas with a moral and theological (eschatological) one: in this sense, it refers rather to egoistic and individualistic tendencies dependent on humans’ weak and bodily nature. The tendency to self-conservation as such is natural, but it turns out to be vicious when it becomes so dominant as to be the strongest or even unique motivation of one’s behaviour.

Solicitude in such cases limits itself to the service of our narrow ego and is forgetful of the wider network of relationships (including the natural environment) in which the individual himself/herself remains rooted. Not solicitude itself is wrong, but rather the limitedness of its object. Those who are solicitous about such things lose their energies in caring for a very narrow object and do not take into account the relational context of the individual’s self-realization. Their anxiety for such limited ends make them blind toward greater ends; people “are drawn away from spiritual things”. Once again, we should remember that in Thomas’ perspective “spiritual” does not mean only and chiefly “incorporeal”, but rather (in the *moral* sense) encompassing the *wholeness* of human self-fulfilment: a dimension uncovered to those who, under the guidance of prudence, experience authentic, not merely instrumental relationships to God, to other people, and also to God’s creation.

7. A tentative conclusion

At the beginning of this essay I have referred to Pope Francis’ urgent invitation to “acknowledge the appeal, immensity and urgency of the challenge we face”⁹⁶. Rethinking our philosophical and theological heritage in the light of the environmental crisis is a significant part of this challenge, seen the impact of ideas on behaviour, lifestyle, and practices. In this essay I have tried to investigate, although tentatively and fragmentarily, the potentialities of Thomas Aquinas’ virtue ethics, particularly in his

⁹⁶ *Laudato si’*, 15.

treatise of the cardinal virtue of prudence. *Direct* ecologization or “greening” of Thomas’ philosophy and theology seems to me a risky, incorrect, and ultimately impossible enterprise. But developing the hidden potentialities of Thomas’ rich ethical reflection in the context of our ecological crisis is a very important task for the time ahead, the task of “a master of a house, who brings out of his treasure what is new and what is old.”⁹⁷

SUMMARY

In his essay Giuseppe Ferrari, answering Pope Francis’ call for a renewed attention to the “ecological virtues”, investigates the potentialities of Thomas’ ethical thought for environmental ethics by analysing Thomas’ treatise on prudence in the *secunda secundae* (*STh* II-II, qq. 47-56). The author does not try to improperly “ecologize” Thomas’ ethics, but follows rather a methodological approach, trying to highlight the fruitfulness of Thomas’ insights when applied to contemporary environmental issues. Within this perspective, he analyses “economic and political prudence” and several implications of prudence (and of virtue in general): the acknowledgement of human limits, the so-called precautionary principle, and eventually the negative impact on environmental behaviour of some “vices opposed to prudence”.

⁹⁷ Matthew 13, 52.

OBEDIENCE AS A RELIGIOUS VIRTUE
An essay on the Binding of Isaac from the Perspective of
Thomas Aquinas¹

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Introduction

It is hard to imagine an authentic religious attitude without the virtue of obedience. After all, religion is concerned with the desire and the willingness to answer to a higher authority, which transcends us and on which we depend for the ultimate goodness of our lives. Religion has to do with surrendering oneself to a higher power, that by virtue of its essential goodness attracts me to itself. And obedience is a form of surrender. But is obedience rightfully called good and virtuous? Should one not feel distrust whenever obedience and compliance are preached? Does not obedience require submission to the authority of another, whose word is law? Obedience seems to imply that you relinquish the responsibility for your own actions. How then can this be held as a commendable attitude? But if obedience is essential to being religious, then it is of prime importance to get clear about its positive meaning, which may hide behind the deformed image of an obedience which belittles, imprisons and enslaves people.

In this essay I would like to focus specifically on obedience as a religious virtue. It is a complex and confusing subject, because religious obedience summons up both the image of Mary, and her unconditional openness to receive whatever God had intended for her, but also the image of Abraham, who seemed prepared to kill his innocent son in blind obedience to God's command. Within the Christian tradition, Abraham is known as the father of the faithful. In the trust that God would give him a future of abundant life, he

¹ This essay is a re-working of an older article, published in Dutch under the title 'Gehoorzaamheid als religieuze deugd', in the volume *Doen wat God wil: zegen of ramp. Over ethiek en religie in het licht van Abrahams offer* (edited by Rudi te Velde), Budel: Damon, 2003.

exemplified the obedience of faith. But at the same time, the story of the near sacrifice of Abraham's son is highly problematic, in particular (but not only) to a culture that values the moral autonomy of man and responsibility for one's own actions. The story of the binding of Isaac (the Aqadah) shows us how religious obedience – listening to an authoritative voice that comes from without – can lead to irresponsible behavior, that goes beyond the limits of ethics. Acting on God's command, Abraham embarks on a lonely adventure, in which he finds himself isolated from the moral community, and risks the very future of his family. We can read this story as a deterrent or maybe even as a fascinating example of how religion brings man into contact with a dimension beyond ethics, beyond human normality, in which he experiences an absolute claim that shatters the moral order of human existence.

In what follows I would like to examine in what way obedience may be called a religious virtue, without minimalizing the moral idea of autonomy. I will do this by discussing Thomas Aquinas' take on the virtue of obedience and its role in the relationship between ethics on the one hand, and religion, in particular the virtue of charity, on the other. The core of my discussion will be the thesis that religious obedience does not negate the autonomy of the moral subject, but that it opens it up to a promise of a meaningfulness, that the finite freedom of man can neither produce by itself nor realize. What I am trying to do is to conceive of the relationship between ethics and religion in which the latter points to a space beyond the law and beyond the will that justifies itself before that law. It is within this perspective that I will finally propose an interpretation of the story of Isaac's near sacrifice, inspired by Aquinas' view on the virtue of obedience as linking the moral domain to the domain of the theological virtues, in particular the virtue of *caritas*.

The Virtue of Obedience

It feels slightly uneasy to defend the positive value of obedience in a religious sense in a time when the traditional political culture of obedience belongs to the past and has been replaced by a modern democratic society, based on values such as individual freedom, autonomy, human rights and the equality of all human beings

before the law. Obedience seems to belong to traditional societies, in which every individual has to find a 'good' place for himself within the whole, by fitting himself into a preestablished and fixed order. Through the virtue of obedience, the individual seeks to conform himself to the general moral order of society, which is embodied by figures of authority (parents, church, government). As such, obedience functions as the glue that binds the members of the society together, and which directs it at its communal goal.

It is exactly in this sense, as the glue that binds society together, that the Christian tradition has always praised the virtue of obedience, along with humility and servitude. Saint Augustine for example, speaks of obedience as the "mother and keeper of all virtues".² In his view, obedience generates in man the moral disposition required for all the other virtues, a disposition which consists in the readiness of the will to submit itself to the rule of God's will. The goodness of God is both the end and the norm for the goodness of human action within the moral-religious order of society. Living well is not possible for man other than by conforming his will to the will of God.

In his *Moralia in Job*, very popular in the Middle Ages, Gregory the Great follows Saint Augustine in praising obedience as the only virtue in the human mind which engrains and protects the other virtues.³ The virtue of obedience grounds the basic moral attitude which is required to live in accordance with the demands of virtue. A virtuous life demands that the will is obedient to what the virtues command. Through obedience, man submits to the moral order of virtue.

For Thomas Aquinas too, obedience is the most important among the virtues.⁴ In the *Summa Theologiae* he argues that obedience is

² St. Augustine, *City of God* XIV, 12. The immediate context of this citation is the biblical story of Paradise and the Fall. According to Augustine, Adam and Eve have been given just one precept so that they, by following this precept, might learn the importance of obeying the will of God instead of doing their own will.

³ Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* 35, 14 (CCSL 143b): "Obedientia sola virtus est quae virtutes ceteras menti inserit, insertasque custodit."

⁴ *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 3.

the greatest among the moral virtues because and insofar as it directs the moral life of man toward the love for God. As such it is the link between the moral virtues and the theological virtues. Virtuous acts only have merit (*meritoria sunt*) before God when they are done in obedience to God's will.⁵ Through obedience stemming from love (*ex caritate*) the onus of the moral life is transferred from the will of the individual to the will of God: "not mine, but thy will be done". It is thus through the virtue of obedience that ethics is incorporated into religion. The ethical commitment is placed within the perspective of the love for God, for which the good of the virtue is done.

For Saint Thomas, obedience as moral attitude has its meaning within hierarchically ordered relationships between people who form a community. Among others, he points to a significant passage from the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves" (13, 17).⁶ Taken in this way, obedience first and foremost is a social/political virtue, which determines the relationship between subordinate and superior. There is no community without obedience, without the willingness to submit to the authority of its superiors, who are responsible for the wellbeing of the community.

Thomas grounds the moral duty of obedience in the natural law (*ius naturalis*), which in turn is an expression of the divine order of justice. Just as in nature the lower is moved by the higher, so too must within the human community, the subordinate be moved by the will of his superiors, because of their "divinely established authority" (*ex vi auctoritatis divinitus ordinatae*).⁷ Through the virtue of obedience, the particular will of individuals is incorporated into the moral order of the community under authority of those people who are responsible for the wellbeing of the whole. The reference to natural law means that the individuals are not

⁵ Ibid.: "[Q]uaecumque alia virtutum opera ex hoc meritoria sunt apud Deum quod sint ut obediatur voluntati divinae."

⁶ This passage from the Epistle to the Hebrews is cited in the *sed contra* of the first article of the *Summa's* treatment of obedience (*STh* II-II, q. 104).

⁷ *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 1.

thought of as independent entities which move each in their own direction and which therefore must be disciplined and coordinated from the outside, by some political force, into a communal entity (cf. Hobbes). In that case, obedience would entail a form of disciplining and social conditioning which necessarily includes a certain renunciation of one's own will and desire. For Thomas, obedience seems to consist precisely in the individual's willingness to let his striving after his own good be mediated by the order of the whole. Since, for him, the individual is part of the whole.

Thomas identifies obedience as part of the virtue of justice.⁸ One owes obedience to one's superior. By being obedient we offer the other what is owed to him by natural law. The authority which the superior receives from the natural law is ultimately founded in the divine law. The divine will is the "first rule" (*prima regula*) by which all creatures with a rational will are ruled. The more a human being expresses this rule within the moral quality of his will, the higher he stands in the moral order. He obtains the moral authority to direct and regulate another will as a "sort of secondary rule" (*quasi secunda regula*).⁹ Thomas sees the authority that one person has over another as theologically founded and legitimized. The ground shape of obedience is adherence to the *prima regula* of the moral community of all "rational wills", which is the will of the Creator.

A certain paternalism is part and parcel of his view on the hierarchical ordering of human relationships. Subordinates need to follow their leaders because, and to the extent that, those leaders are concerned with their wellbeing and, based on their moral status, have a better perspective on how the good can be realized for the community.¹⁰ This view is unmistakably shaped by the feudal-monarchist form of society of the Middle Ages. As such, it shows

⁸ *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 2.

⁹ *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 1, ad 2.

¹⁰ The order of justice, Thomas says, requires that subordinates obey their superiors. However, in case that the superiors are not just and have usurped power, they need not to be obeyed. Obedience is conditioned on the actual justice of the political order. See *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 3.

a strong contrast with the principle of autonomy of Kant, which expresses the civil revolution which defends the equality of all citizens before the law. In this new constellation the preaching of obedience smacks of the old regime. And precisely because of this, it is so important to formulate a meaningful religious sense of obedience which can be valued apart from the traditional culture of obedience.

Should one be obedient to God in every respect?

From what has been said it became clear that Thomas treats of the virtue of obedience from a mostly (moral) theological perspective. Although obedience in itself is broader than just the religious attitude of submitting to the will of God, it is true that obedience within the relationship of subordinate and superior has its final foundation in God's will, which is the *prima regula* of all rational wills. Seen from the perspective of the *prima regula*, there exists a direct continuity between ethics and religion, between doing good and being obedient to God's commandments. But does it follow from all of this that one should be obedient to God in every respect? If we substitute 'God' with 'the instance which decides what the good will be', then it seems that the answer must be affirmative. For as long as the good is what needs to be done, it is our moral duty to be obedient to a will which is the highest authority and norm of the good. Expressed like this, it also immediately brings to light the inevitable autonomy of ethics. The moral duty to obey God is founded in the intrinsic demand of practical moral reason to do the good. The ethical is already presupposed in the duty to do what God demands.

Thomas recognizes the (relative) autonomy of ethics. For him, acting morally cannot be simply identified with doing God's will. The rule of the human will, according to Thomas, is twofold. On the one hand, there is the immanent rule of human reason itself, the *ratio recta*; on the other hand, there is the first and transcendent rule, the 'eternal law', which is, as it were, the divine reason.¹¹ Man has no knowledge of the eternal law (*lex aeterna*) other than

¹¹ See *STh* I-II, q. 71, a. 6.

through the immanent expression of that law in the human (rational) nature (*lex naturalis*), or through the revelation of God's will (*lex divina*) on which faith is based. For Thomas, the moral law of human reason is the way in which God's will is known in the immanence of rational creatures. We could say that God 'imprints' upon the nature of every rational creature a "law", and that that creature 'obeys' that law by acting in accordance with its nature.¹² The relationship between the human will and the *prima regula*, which is God's will, is thus mediated by the natural law, which is the law of practical reason itself. Thomas thereby breaks with a purely religious ethics of divine command. Moral duty has its foundation in reason itself.

Given this (relative) autonomy of human moral reason, the question presents itself how to understand those instances when God's will appears to be contrary to the rule of reason. Are we bound to obey God, even when his command is contrary to what the moral law prescribes? It is precisely this problem that is raised by the story of Abraham's sacrifice.

The story of Abraham's sacrifice plays a small but intriguing role in the writings of Thomas. He points to it in objections as an example of how the moral order of virtue seems to be suspended by a direct command of God, just like the regular order of nature is suspended by a divine miracle. The Biblical story of Abraham is never treated or explained within a broader theological context. However, in those places where Thomas refers to the story, we are offered some clues about how he views the relationship between religion and ethics.

The story of the near sacrifice of Isaac is, among a few other places, mentioned in an objection regarding the question whether "God should be obeyed in everything".¹³ The Biblical story poses a

¹² See the foundational text about the *lex naturalis* in *STh* I-II, q. 94, a. 2.

¹³ *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 4, obj. 2; the story of the binding of Isaac is mostly mentioned in the context of the question on the mutability of the natural law: see *STh* I-II, q. 94, a. 5, obj. 2; *STh* II-II, q. 154, a. 2, obj. 2; *In I Sent* d. 47, q. 1, a. 4; *In IV Sent* d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1; *De pot* q. 1, a. 6, obj. 4. For the medieval discussion of the mutability of

problem to Thomas. After all, nobody can be required to do something which is contrary to moral duty. But in the story of Abraham it would appear that God commands him to do something that goes against moral duty and is therefore a moral sin. Of course, the theologian Thomas believes one should obey God in everything. But the question is how to make this understandable. How can one be bound to obey a God who commands Abraham to murder his innocent son? We know, Kant's answer here is negative: nobody can be held to obey a God who places himself outside the unconditional imperative of the moral law not to kill an innocent person.

But the case is not that simple. In his answer, Thomas points out that obeying God in principle cannot be against the moral order. He wants to relieve the tension between religion and ethics by showing that this tension is only apparent. The tension between ethics and religion only becomes unsolvable when ethics would have its own foundation, independent of God. But then an impossible situation presents itself: the human will would then be subject to two imperatives, that are both unconditional but at the same time exclude one another. God would then be forcing man to act against the unconditional moral demand, not to kill an innocent person. To avoid this conflict, Thomas traces human morality back to its ultimate foundation in God's will. "The virtue and moral justness of the human will in principle consists of her being in accordance with God's will".¹⁴ The divine will is the first and highest rule and as such she is the foundation of right reason (*ratio recta*). It might

the natural law, see Isabelle Mandrella, *Das Isaak-Opfer. Historisch-systematische Untersuchung zu Rationalität und Wandelbarkeit der Naturrechts in der mittelalterlichen Lehre von natürlichen Gesetz*, Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2002. Also Matthew Levering, 'God and Natural Law: Reflections on Genesis 22', in *Modern Theology* 24:2, April 2008, 151-177. My interpretation of Thomas' argument is primarily based on *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 4, where the focus is on the issue of obedience to God.

¹⁴ *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 4, ad 2: "...quia in hoc principaliter consistit virtus et rectitudo voluntatis humanae, quod Dei voluntati conformetur..."

happen that God asks something of people that goes against the current moral practise (*contra consuetum virtutis modum*), but it is impossible that God would ask something that goes against virtue, because ultimately God's will is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore, according to Thomas, God asking Abraham to kill his son cannot be against justice. After all, God is the creator (*auctor*) of life and death.¹⁵

This line of reasoning deserves some explanation. What does it mean to say that God has power over life and death and that He is therefore justified to reclaim Isaac's life? First, it needs to be emphasized that this is not about an unfathomable and capricious God who cares nothing about what we hold to be a fundamental moral principle: unconditional respect for human life. The point is not that God must be thought as a sovereign power which is exempt from the moral law. This is not what Thomas has in view. What he is saying is that, in principle, a command of God cannot go against virtue. For what are we talking about when we talk about "God"? God reigns over life and death. Or to put it negatively: we control neither life nor death. Every human must die. In relation to God, the creator, we have no right to death nor to life. Theologically speaking, this inevitable "must" falls under God's justice. Faith in God implies an obedient acceptance of this "must" in the confidence that behind this 'must' of death stands God, not Fate. In the judgement of man, death can come too early (or sometimes too late). Or death can overcome us as an injustice, when we are murdered. But whichever death we face, we can never say that we are done injustice by God. No human being can claim a right to life before God.

One misses the point of the story when one reacts to it, as such quite understandable, from the ethical impulse of the unconditional respect for the dignity of human life. Thomas' reading is theological in the strict sense of the word. It is about the relationship

¹⁵ *Ibid*: "...quia Deus est auctor mortis et vitae." See for the same type of reasoning *STh* I-II, q. 94, a. 5, ad 2: "...secundum illud I Reg. 2,6: 'Dominus mortificat et vivificat'. Et ideo absque aliqua iniustitia, secundum mandatum Dei, potest infligi mors cuicumque homini, vel nocenti vel innocenti."

between God and Abraham. Within that relationship, it does not constitute injustice on God's part when he reclaims the son which he himself gave to Abraham. Even the taking of the riches of the Egyptians constituted no robbery in the strict sense, according to Thomas, because there was no unjust appropriation of other people's possessions. After all, everything belongs to God, and he gives it to whomever he wants (and to those who need it).¹⁶ Nobody can claim a right to his own property before God, who is the Lord of all of Creation.

The answer that Thomas provides might feel unsatisfactory, or at least, it deserves further analysis. We might say that whatever God commands is *ipso facto* good and just, but the problem then remains that the discrepancy between God's will and human morality threatens to undermine the rational foundation of that morality. Within Thomas' theological universe, it is apparently possible at any given moment that human morality is swept aside by an extraordinary divine command. Does the moral order (the order of the *lex naturalis*) not represent a temporary and hypothetical arrangement, if God can 'break in' at any given moment?¹⁷ This is exactly Kant's fear and the fear of modernity in general. The violent potential of religion, with its absolute claims and the dangers of its particular form of heteronomy, must be kept within the 'safe' boundaries of autonomous universal ethics.

One could also say that Thomas' explanation has a certain formal character and abstracts from the specific religious meaning of the story of the near sacrifice. God, as Creator, may be fully justified in reclaiming the life of Isaac, just as he reclaims the life of every mortal human being at some point. But why would God want to do so in this specific case? Why is it important that Abraham learns to see his son as the son of God's promise, as a son (=future) that has

¹⁶ *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 4, ad 2; the story of the taking of the riches of the Egyptians by the Jews is one of the classical examples of a precept of God against natural law; cf. Exodus 12,36.

¹⁷ In *In IV Sent* d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 the term 'dispensatio' is used (*dispensatio in praeceptis legis naturae*); Abraham was given dispensation of the precept of natural law which forbids the killing of an innocent.

been given (back) to him by God? Why must Abraham's son first be 'expropriated' before being returned to Abraham, to be given to him as the promise of future life?¹⁸ These are the relevant questions which are raised by Abraham's story and which have everything to do with the religious virtue of obedience. Thomas passes these questions by, although he does offer some useful hints to interpret the story of Isaac's near sacrifice.

How to understand obedience as a religious virtue?

In the introduction, we said that for Thomas obedience is the most important virtue, or rather, the most important of the moral virtues. The reason for this is that obedience orders human moral life to the love for God. The significance of obedience lies in the fact that it liberates man from his attachment to his own will, for the sake of God and man's salvation. Thomas' elaboration of this is interesting with regard to our quest for the positive value of religious obedience.

First I will present a short summary of the ground plan of Thomas' theory of the virtues. This is important if we want to locate the virtue of obedience between ethics and religion. To Thomas, the moral life according to the virtues is intrinsically connected to the religious life, which is a life lived through faith in Christ, who puts man on the road to salvation in God. It is hard to isolate his ethics from the Christian religious framework. Ethics and religion, although they are not the same, are treated in one integral movement in the moral-theological part of his *Summa Theologiae*, within the context of the 'final goal' (*ultimum finis*) of all human actions: the beatitude of a life in unity with God. Thomas bases his treatment of the moral and religious life on the pattern of seven basic virtues, first and foremost among them the three theological virtues (hope, faith and love), followed by the four cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, courage and justice). Obedience resides under the cardinal virtue of justice. The theological virtues are the

¹⁸ These considerations concern what we can call the 'divine message' signified by the story of Isaac (cf. the phrase "mysterii divini significandi vel ostendendi", used in *In IV Sent* d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1).

most important to Thomas, because they direct man to the ultimate end. These virtues, which are a gift of grace, do not concern the moral quality of human actions, but their focus is God himself, as the ultimate end of our life. The cardinal virtues, on the other hand, function as the foundation of moral life in the here and now. They have more to do with the way in which we try to reach that goal, through the way in which we live, than with the actual goal itself. The theological virtues are valued higher than the cardinal virtues, just as the goal itself (*finis*) is valued higher than the way there (*ea quae sunt ad finem*).

The theological virtues are expressions of God's grace. These virtues make us convert to God and adhere to him. The movement of conversion has two sides, the negative side of distancing ourselves from the world, from the goods of this world, and the positive side of approaching God and his goodness. That is why the theological virtue which makes us adhere to God (*inhaeret Deo*) deserves more praise than the (moral) virtue which makes us turn ourselves from the world and which releases us from our attachment to our will. The moral virtues do not make us attach to God yet and are therefore, in themselves, without 'merit'. Their meaning lies precisely in the fact that they detach man from worldly affairs and opens him up to a goodness which is given to him by God. The appraisal of the moral virtues thus lies in their contribution to the fostering in man of a religious stance of openness and receptiveness.

It is exactly seen in the light of the conversion to God that obedience, of all moral virtues, is valued most. Because it is obedience which makes us give up on the good of the own will. Obedience is more important than sacrifices, Thomas quotes Gregory, because "through sacrifices we offer up extraneous flesh, through obedience we offer up our own flesh".¹⁹

¹⁹ *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 3: "Unde Gregorius dicit, quod *obedientia victimis iure praepositur: quia per victimas aliena caro, per obedientiam vero voluntas propria mactatur.*" Cf. *Moralia in Job* 35, 14. Gregory refers to a passage in 1 Sam. 15,22: "Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams."

All virtue and good works mean nothing, if they are not performed in obedience to God's will. Obedience is the highest of all moral virtues because, and as far as, man gives up the interest in his own will, and seeks to fulfil God's will in everything he does. Obedience is not the highest in itself; it finds her meaning in that it makes man turn away from concentration on his own will and opens him up to the promise of goodness which is included in God's will of grace. It is precisely because of this that one must say that it is not obedience itself which makes the works of virtue meritorious. But obedience is important because it fosters a stance of self-emptying and openness which is essential to the love (*caritas*) through which man attaches himself to God and performs all of his actions (all meritorious works) for the greater glory of God. Therefore, love is called the principle of merit. But there can be no love without obedience. Or rather: the love for God includes in itself an obedient willingness to act in accordance with God's will under all circumstances.

Thomas' account of religious obedience seems to me meaningful, even apart from the traditional politics of obedience, and important with regard to the possibility of a religious culture. However, it also holds true that religious obedience is vulnerable to all kinds of ideological distortion or perversion. For instance, a wrongly understood obedience can cause the individual will, or the collective will of a group (think of the crusades), to act as an instrument of God's will. When the individual will is morally legitimized by pointing at the will of God, which it carries out, then that will becomes beyond reproach or doubt. The individual will is thus 'filled up' by God's will instead of being emptied out. '*Deus vult*' thus affords the individual action with an ideological backing so that the fulfilment of God's will becomes dependent on the success of individual action, no matter how destructive these actions might be to others. However, the possible perversion of religiously motivated obedience should not conceal the positive phenomenon of obedience in the sense of responsiveness to a call, the fulfilment of which is a gift.

Conclusion: Imitating Abraham?

Recently, a small news item appeared in the newspaper: in Bangladesh, an imam had slit the throat of his infant son during the Muslim Sacrifice Feast, because he was convinced that God had commanded him to do so in a dream. This is one story among many. The man had probably projected himself into the story of Abraham's sacrifice, of which the Sacrifice Feast is a commemoration. Exactly like the prophet Ibrahim, who showed obedience to God, he apparently felt the deep-seated need to give up his most valued possession – his son – on behalf of his faith in God. Does this constitute an example of religious obedience? Is this what the story of Abraham seeks to promote? More to the point seems to me the question: what went wrong in this case? It is immensely tragic that the biblical story of Abraham has motivated the imam to kill his newborn baby. But what makes this terrible event different from the story of Abraham itself? Did Abraham not want to do the same? From the outside we might not see any significant difference. Abraham intended to do what the imam actually did. We could say that both men act in a temporary fit of madness. A father who murders, or is willing to murder his own son in obedience to a divine voice is not in possession of his full faculties. And is not a religion that enables this or even propagates this form of obedience morally rejectable?

If the imam had been inspired by Abraham's story, is it then true that he correctly understood its meaning? Or could we say that he did not understand it at all, that we are dealing with a radical misunderstanding of what the story is trying to convey? I think so. The misunderstanding concerns the true nature of religious obedience as requiring the 'emptying' of one's own will. The story of Abraham is exemplary. God tells Abraham that "the only sacrifice that you can give me, and which will satisfy me, is the sacrifice I have given you; you have shown your willingness to give it to me, and that is enough". That willingness is precisely the obedience of faith. When Abraham answered Isaac's question, as to the whereabouts of the sacrificial animal, namely that God would provide one Himself, he expressed, maybe without even realizing it himself, the truth of the whole story. It is, in my view, a

perversion of obedience to think that you can realize and execute that willingness in a real sacrifice of your own flesh and blood. There is a precise difference between obedience as an attitude of receptive willingness and obedience according to which one identifies oneself with the superior will (“I will do what God asks me to do”). It is in this light that we should understand the enormous misunderstanding of that man in Bangladesh. He sacrificed his son as if there was no God and everything depended upon his own doing. He equated his own will with the presumed will of God (“that which has to be done”) without first emptying his will in order to make himself receptive and really obedient.

SUMMARY

This essay explores Thomas’ thoughts about the virtue of obedience (based on *STh* II-II, q.104), which is particularly valued as a link between the moral virtues and the theological virtue of charity (love of God). Obedience generates in the human person the moral disposition required for all the other virtues, a disposition which consists in the readiness of the will to submit itself to the rule of God’s will. Reflecting on the question whether one should be obedient to God in every respect, Thomas is confronted with an objection pointing to the story of how God commands Abraham to kill his innocent son, which is prohibited by natural law. I use the scarce but intriguing remarks Thomas made in response to this objection to propose a meaningful interpretation of obedience as a religious virtue, essentially different from its distorted imitation which consists in an immediate identification of one’s own will with the presumed divine will.

ALS DE KOPPEN VAN DE LEVIATHAN¹

Het begrip kwaad in de Westerse cultuur

Marcel Sarot

1. Inleiding

In deze bijdrage zal ik een aantal kernmomenten uit het Westerse denken over het kwaad behandelen. Daarbij zal het gaan over het begrip kwaad, dus over de vraag wat het kwaad *is*, en niet over de vraag hoe een almachtige en algoede God het kwaad toe kan laten (de theodiceevraag) en evenmin over de vraag hoe wij het kwaad tegemoet kunnen of moeten treden (de vraag naar *how to cope with evil*). Door mij te richten op de vraag naar het begrip kwaad, hanteer ik primair een wijsgerige vraagstelling: het gaat om de wijsgerige analyse van een abstract begrip. Toch zal ik voortdurend raken aan religieuze vragen, theorieën en praktijken. Dat is niet te voorkomen, omdat het begrip kwaad zelf niet neutraal is, maar integendeel religieus geladen.

Deze bijdrage is een bijdrage aan wat wij noemen de ideeëngeschiedenis, maar dan één die overduidelijk geschreven is door een systematicus. Ik zal niet in chronologische volgorde de ontwikkeling van het begrip kwaad nagaan. Mijn invalshoek is een andere: de afgelopen dertig jaar heb ik, aanvankelijk als godsdienstfilosoof, later ook als fundamenteel theoloog, steeds opnieuw nagedacht over het kwaad. Ik deed dat aanvankelijk binnen de wijsgerige theologie, in het kader van de theodicee, vervolgens in het kader van de comparatieve godsdienstfilosofie, en ten slotte ook vanuit de fundamentele theologie. Voor die disciplines zijn bepaalde nuances en onderscheidingen in het begrip kwaad van meer belang, andere minder belangrijk. Hier richt ik mij op de nuances en onderscheidingen die voor systematici het meest van belang zijn, hetzij omdat zij tot op de dag van vandaag invloed hebben, hetzij omdat systematici ze nodig hebben als bouwstenen

¹ Psalm 74:14.

voor hun eigen denken. Het is niet te voorkomen dat aan een project zoals ik dat hier onderneem een zekere mate van subjectiviteit kleeft. Mensen zijn het niet altijd eens over wat het belangrijkste is. Ik kan slechts hopen dat de lezer zich op zijn minst deels herkent in de hier gemaakte keuzes, en dat zij in haar eigen denken iets kan beginnen met de hier aangereikte nuances en onderscheidingen. Graag begin ik met het punt dat ik boven al genoemd heb: de religieuze geladenheid van het begrip kwaad.

2. Het begrip kwaad en de religies

Dat het kwaad een probleem is, is voor ons in het Westen zó vanzelfsprekend dat wij ons nauwelijks kunnen voorstellen dat er culturen bestaan waarin het begrip kwaad – in de zin waarin wij dat kennen – niet bestaat. Toch is dat in de Indiase familie van religies die wij het hindoeïsme noemen, het geval. Natuurlijk ondergaan ook daar mensen pijn en lijden – vermoedelijk zelfs meer dan in West-Europa – maar of je daar ook van kwaad mag spreken... In het hindoeïsme zijn alle pijn en lijden verklaarbaar en verdiend: zij worden bepaald door onze daden in onze vorige levens (*karma*). Dat geldt zelfs voor het lijden van dieren; vanwege daden begaan in een vorig leven zijn sommige mensen als dier gereïncarneerd. Pijn en lijden zijn dus rationeel en rechtvaardig verdeeld; zij zijn in die zin geen *kwaad*. Voor het hindoeïsme geldt: *Evil is in the eye of the beholder*. Of wij kwaad zien, hangt af van ons perspectief. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan de dood. Als het leven ‘af’ is, is de dood niet onwelkom, terwijl als de dood te snel komt, wij hem als een kwaad ervaren. Of de dood goed of kwaad is, hangt af van ons perspectief. Voor het boeddhisme daarentegen is lijden wel een probleem. Dat blijkt wel uit de levensgeschiedenis van de Boeddha. Zijn vader houdt hem opgesloten in diens paleis, juist om hem verre van alle lijden te houden. Wanneer prins Gautama stiekem het paleis verlaat en achtereenvolgens een oudere, een zieke en een gestorvene ziet, raakt de vraag naar het lijden hem alsnog hard. Dat is het begin van zijn spirituele ontdekkingsreis, waarin vooral het lijden wordt opgevat als kwaad. In het jodendom liggen de zaken weer anders: daar is niet zozeer het lijden als zodanig een kwaad, maar het lijden van de rechtvaardige jood. God heeft een verbond gesloten met zijn

volk, en heeft daarom verplichtingen tegenover zijn volk. Wie zich niet aan de bepalingen van het verbond houdt, mag ook niet rekenen op de bijbehorende beloningen; het lijden van de goddeloze dwaas is geen probleem. Problematisch wordt het lijden, wanneer het een rechtvaardige uit het verbondsvolk treft (Job), of wanneer het heel het verbondsvolk treft (de *shoah*). Op dat moment wordt lijden kwaad. Het christendom daarentegen heeft een antwoord op de vraag waarom mensen worden getroffen door het kwaad: zij staan sinds de zondeval allen schuldig tegenover God. Je moet je meer zorgen maken als het je voor de wind gaat, dan wanneer je door allerhande onheil wordt getroffen. Als het je voor de wind gaat moet je je afvragen of dat niet betekent dat God je heeft opgegeven, en dat je na dit leven sowieso in de hel terecht komt. Daarom manifesteerde het probleem van het kwaad zich in het christendom lange tijd vooral als het probleem van de zonde: hoe kunnen wij, die na de zondeval allen schuldig tegenover God staan, toch nog worden gered? Pas nu door wetenschappelijke ontdekkingen de zondeval als historische verklaring voor het lijden steeds moeilijker houdbaar wordt, en bovendien het geloof in een leven na de dood (tenminste in het Westen) steeds minder een drijvende kracht wordt voor mensen, dient de vraag naar het onverdiende lijden zich met hernieuwde kracht aan en verdwijnt de vraag naar de rechtvaardiging van de zondaar enigszins naar de achtergrond.²

Uit dit summier overzicht van verschillende benaderingen kunnen wij twee conclusies trekken. Ten eerste: of iemand zal zeggen dat er kwaad is, of dat kwaad een probleem is voor deze persoon en op welke manier dit kwaad dan een probleem is, hangt af van de religie die men aanhangt. In de rest van deze bijdrage beperk ik mij strikt tot het begrip kwaad in de Westerse cultuur en zal ik derhalve veronderstellen dat er kwaad is en dat dit kwaad een probleem is. En ten tweede: er zijn verschillende vormen van kwaad. Het ene begrip kwaad wordt gebruikt om pijn en lijden mee aan te duiden, maar ook schuld en zonde. Toch zijn dat heel verschillende

² Zie voor een uitvoeriger overzicht van de benaderingen van verschillende religies van het kwaad mijn *Religie in de spiegel van het kwaad: Naar een comparatief-theologische benadering van het kwaad*, Almere: Parthenon, 2012.

verschijnselen. Op deze laatste conclusie, betreffende de verschillende vormen van kwaad, wil ik nu nader ingaan.

3. Leibniz en de verschillende vormen van kwaad³

Zojuist zagen wij dat er minstens twee vormen van kwaad zijn: pijn en lijden, en schuld en zonde. De bekendste indeling in soorten kwaad is echter een driedeling, afkomstig uit Leibniz' *Essays over theodicee* (1710). Leibniz (1646-1716) onderscheidt daar tussen metafysisch, fysisch en moreel kwaad.⁴ Zijn toelichting is kort: 'Het metafysische kwaad bestaat eenvoudigweg in onvolmaaktheid, het fysische kwaad in lijden en het morele kwaad in zonde.'⁵ Het metafysische kwaad zoals Leibniz dat ziet, is de onvolmaaktheid van alle dingen, die uit hun eindigheid voortvloeit. Je kunt een dubbeltje maar een keer uitgeven. Wie voor een tentamen studeert, kan niet tegelijkertijd bij haar zieke moeder op bezoek. En alle leven is eindig. Sommigen zeggen dat men hier niet van kwaad moet spreken: de dingen op deze aarde zouden niet kunnen zijn, als zij niet eindig en beperkt zouden zijn. *Omnis determinatio negatio est*: iedere bepaaldheid impliceert het weg-kiezen van bepaalde mogelijkheden. En als het om menselijke handelingen gaat: *You cannot have your cake and eat it*. Is dat nu zo'n ramp? Juist die beperktheid maakt dat wij moeten kiezen, en juist het feit dat wij moeten kiezen helpt ook, aan het leven zin te geven. Als ik alle boeken kon lezen, hoefde ik niet zorgvuldig te kiezen welk boek ik nu ga lezen, en juist het feit dat ik dat wel moet, helpt mij om boeken te lezen die echt de moeite waard zijn.

³ Zie mijn *Het goede leven: Idealen van een goed leven in confrontatie met de tragiek van het bestaan*, Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, ²2003, 41–53.

⁴ Leibniz, *Essais de Théodicée: Sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal*, §21 en 'Réflexion sur le livre de l'origine du mal,' §7.

⁵ De meest recente Nederlandse vertaling is al twee eeuwen oud; daarom maak ik gebruik van de Franse tekst en geef een eigen vertaling.

Toch ervaren wij onze eindigheid en beperktheid vaak wel als een kwaad. Dan gaat het natuurlijk allereerst om het feit dat wij sterfelijk zijn. Zelfs als wij principieel geen bezwaar tegen eindigheid hebben, komt de dood in de praktijk vaak te vroeg. Maar onze beperktheid wordt ook bij andere keuzes als een kwaad ervaren: bijvoorbeeld wanneer twee gebeurtenissen die men beide meent te moeten bijwonen samenvallen. Dat kunnen een tentamen en een begrafenis zijn, of een buluitreiking van een student en het afzwemmen van je kind. Het feit dat de alternatieven waaruit men moet kiezen in deze gevallen niet bestaan uit dingen die men graag zou willen doen, maar uit dingen waarvan men vindt dat men ze zou *moeten* doen, maakt dat men een dergelijk samenvallen als kwaad kan ervaren. Het behoort tot de functies van levensbeschouwingen, dat zij ons helpen zin te geven aan ons leven ondanks de dood, en ook dat zij ons helpen te onderscheiden tussen wat meer en wat minder de moeite waard is, en dat zij ons dus helpen om de keuzes te maken waar onze eindigheid ons toe dwingt. Juist wanneer wij in levensbeschouwelijk verband over kwaad spreken, is het daarom zinvol om het metafysisch kwaad ook in onze overwegingen te betrekken.

De tweede vorm van kwaad die Leibniz onderscheidt is fysisch kwaad of lijden. Omdat de term 'fysisch' veelal gebruikt wordt in een nauw verband met 'fysica,' kan de term 'fysisch kwaad' de indruk wekken dat het hierbij vooral om lichamelijke pijn en lijden gaat. Die hebben immers zichtbare en tastbare oorzaken. Psychische pijn is echter zeker zo belangrijk als lichamelijke pijn; het gaat hierbij bijvoorbeeld om gevoelens van verlies, mislukking en frustratie.

De derde en laatste vorm van kwaad die Leibniz onderscheidt is: moreel kwaad ofwel zonde. Moreel kwaad en zonde veronderstellen een vrije wil. Alleen handelingen of beslissingen die men ook had kunnen nalaten komen in aanmerking voor morele beoordeling. Gebeurtenissen of zaken die ons overkomen kunnen niet moreel verkeerd of zondig zijn. De categorieën 'moreel goed' en 'moreel verkeerd' zijn er niet op van toepassing. Een hartaanval is daarom een fysisch kwaad, geen moreel kwaad. Iemand treiteren daarentegen is moreel verwerpelijk. Voor Leibniz vallen moreel kwaad en zonde samen. In onze tijd zal lang niet iedereen het

daarmee eens zijn, omdat zonde een God veronderstelt die door het zondige handelen geraakt kan worden, en lang niet iedereen in zo'n God gelooft. Omgekeerd zullen sommigen die wel in God geloven zonden onderscheiden die niet moreel verkeerd zijn: het veronachtzamen van bepaalde religieuze verplichtingen bijvoorbeeld ('varkensvlees eten' voor joden en moslims).

Leibniz' indeling is niet compleet. Immers, bij elk fysisch kwaad kunnen wij naar de oorzaak vragen, en bij elke oorzaak kunnen wij vragen, of deze al dan niet moreel kwaad is. Wanneer de oorzaak niet de handeling van een vrije actor insluit, kan deze niet moreel verkeerd zijn. Wij moeten dan bijvoorbeeld denken aan natuurrampen, zoals de aardbeving die in 1755 Lissabon trof. Deze aardbeving heeft op tijdgenoten een enorme indruk gemaakt; de aardbeving vond plaats op Allerheiligen, en omdat juist kerken als eerste instortten, vonden zeer veel kerkgangers de dood. Omdat natuurrampen en ander door de natuur veroorzaakt lijden (bijv. ziekten, dood door blikseminslag) tot deze categorie behoren, spreekt men in dit verband wel over 'natuurlijk kwaad.' Dit is echter een minder gelukkige benaming, omdat 'natuurlijk' ook de positieve betekenis heeft van 'zoals de natuur het meebrengt, in overeenstemming met de natuur, met het wezen van iets' (Grote van Dale). Wat in overeenstemming is met het wezen van de natuur, moet men zo laten; als men spreekt van 'natuurlijk kwaad,' zou dat zo opgevat kunnen worden, dat dit een vorm van kwaad is waar wij niets aan kunnen of moeten doen. En dat is een suggestie die ik bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot ziekten niet zou willen wekken. Daarom prefereer ik de term 'non-moreel kwaad' boven 'natuurlijk kwaad.'

Overigens is de grens tussen moreel kwaad en non-moreel kwaad niet altijd even scherp. Non-moreel kwaad wordt soms wel door mensen veroorzaakt, maar dan onopzettelijk en onverwijtbaar. Verkeersongelukken worden soms veroorzaakt door moreel kwaad (roekeloos rijden), soms is er twijfel (er is wel sprake van fouten, maar of die verwijtbaar zijn?) en in weer andere gevallen speelt moreel kwaad geen rol: een kind rent de weg op, juist op het moment dat een vrachtwagen (die niet te hard rijdt) langs komt. Bij zulke twijfelgevallen is het moeilijk om te onderscheiden tussen non-moreel en moreel kwaad. In onze tijd komt daar nog iets bij.

Ooit was het duidelijk dat overstromingen, extreme droogtes en orkanen behoorden tot het non-morele kwaad: hun oorzaken lagen in de natuur, niet in het handelen van mensen. Nu echter steeds duidelijker wordt dat menselijk handelen invloed heeft op het klimaat, ligt dat niet zo duidelijk meer. Dit geldt ook voor andere vormen van non-moreel kwaad, zoals ziektes. Als onze levensstijl (of die van onze ouders of omgeving) al geen factor van belang is bij het ontstaan van een ziekte, dan is de vraag of en hoe de ziekte behandelbaar is vaak mede afhankelijk van sociaal-economische factoren. Hoe veel geld heeft de samenleving over voor onderzoek naar en de behandeling van een specifieke ziekte? Zo is er eigenlijk nauwelijks non-moreel kwaad dat zich aan menselijke invloed – en dus medepllichtigheid – onttrekt. In dit licht bezien is het ironisch dat juist in onze tijd, waarin de mens steeds meer invloed heeft op de hoeveelheid pijn en lijden in de wereld, dit lijden in toenemende mate een reden is om geloof in God af te wijzen.

Nog een laatste opmerking over de verhouding van moreel en non-moreel kwaad. Een belangrijk verschil tussen beide is, dat waar van non-moreel kwaad alleen sprake is bij door de natuur veroorzaakt lijden, moreel kwaad niet altijd lijden tot gevolg hoeft te hebben. De sluipmoordenaar wiens vuurwapen faalt slaagt er niet in lijden te veroorzaken, maar de intentie die hij had is voldoende om toch te spreken van moreel kwaad.

4. De ambiguïteit van het kwaad

In ons spreken over kwaad zijn wij vaak wel bereid om gradaties van kwaad te onderscheiden: kleiner en groter kwaad. Maar met kwaad is meer aan de hand. Niet alleen zijn er gradaties van kwaad, ook kan hetzelfde verschijnsel tegelijkertijd goed en kwaad zijn. Een mooi voorbeeld is chemotherapie: de chemicaliën die daarbij in het lichaam worden ingebracht zijn een vergift dat het lichaam schaadt, en dus een kwaad. Maar omdat dit vergift – als de therapie aanslaat – de ziekte waartegen het wordt ingezet nog meer schaadt, is chemotherapie een geneesmiddel. En als zodanig is het goed. Het lastige is, dat dezelfde eigenschappen die maken dat chemotherapie een gif is – namelijk het feit dat zij de celdeling afremt – ook maakt dat zij de groei van tumoren verhindert. Hierdoor is het ook zo lastig

om een chemotherapie zonder bijwerkingen te ontwikkelen. Voor de kankerpatiënt heeft de behandeling met chemotherapie daarom iets dubbelzinnigs: enerzijds moet de patiënt er alles aan doen om in zo goed mogelijke conditie te blijven om zo de strijd tegen de ziekte aan te kunnen gaan, anderzijds ondermijnt de medicatie die conditie. Iets soortgelijks geldt voor veel vormen van kwaad: dezelfde eigenschappen die water geschikt maken om te drinken en te bevaren, maken het ook mogelijk om in water te verdrinken en maken ook martelingen zoals *waterboarding* mogelijk.

De werkelijkheden die wij met de term 'kwaad' aanduiden zijn echter op nog een andere manier ambigu. Dit heeft te maken met het fenomeen dat ik in de vorige sectie besprak: dat wij de term 'kwaad' gebruiken voor ongelijksoortige fenomenen. Moreel kwaad is iets heel anders dan lijden, en non-moreel kwaad is weer iets heel anders dan metafysisch kwaad. In sommige gevallen kan een en hetzelfde verschijnsel in het ene opzicht kwaad zijn en in het andere goed. Dit verschijnsel speelt een rol in de discussie over de vraag of God kan lijden. In de vroege Kerk werd aangenomen dat God *impassibilis* is, niet onderhevig aan de wisselende gemoedsbewegingen waar wij mensen aan onderhevig zijn. God kan dus niet *lijden*. Een van de argumenten voor deze positie is, dat lijden een kwaad is en dat God, als Hij kon lijden, aan kwaad onderhevig en dus niet langer volmaakt zou zijn. In het licht van het voorgaande kunnen we zien hoe deze positie vanuit een andere invalshoek *fragwürdig* is. Lijden is weliswaar een *fysisch kwaad*, maar kan tegelijkertijd *moreel goed* zijn. Jezus zelf zegt hierover in het Johannesevangelie (15:13): 'De grootste liefde die iemand zijn vrienden kan betonen, bestaat hierin dat hij zijn leven voor hen geeft.' Je leven geven voor je vrienden is een vorm van fysisch kwaad dat moreel goed is; in het geval van Jezus' kruisdood is deze vorm van lijden tegelijkertijd óók nog moreel slecht. Zo schrijft Thomas van Aquino dat Jezus' lijden een misdaad was van degenen die hem ter dood brachten, maar een *offer* van Jezus (*STh* III, q. 48, a. 3 ad 3). Hier hebben wij dus te maken met één gebeurtenis die vanuit drie verschillende invalshoeken op drie verschillende manieren moet worden beoordeeld.

Invalshoek	Kwaad/ goed	Welke vorm?	Waarom?
Het gevoel van degene die de kruisdood ondergaat	kwaad	natuurlijk	De kruisdood is een vorm van lijden en lijden is fysisch kwaad.
De handelingen van degenen die Jezus aan het kruis brengen	kwaad	moreel	Het ter dood brengen van een onschuldige is moreel verkeerd.
De handelingen van Jezus zelf	goed	moreel	Het op je nemen van lijden omwille van een groter doel (bijvoorbeeld omwille van de verlossing van anderen) is moreel goed.

Voor de discussie over het lijden van God betekent deze ambiguïteit van de gebeurtenissen die wij als kwaad beschouwen dat de positie dat God niet kan lijden omdat lijden kwaad is en daarmee in strijd met Gods volmaaktheid, heroverweging, of op zijn minst precisering, verdient. Zouden wij, naar analogie van wat wij zojuist over het lijden van Jezus hebben gezien, ook in het lijden van God niet diverse aspecten moeten onderkennen?⁶ En blijft de conclusie dat Gods lijden een kwaad is, dan onverkort staan? Diezelfde ambiguïteit dient in alle andere theologische overwegingen eveneens mee te worden gewogen.

Overigens is ambiguïteit iets anders dan subjectiviteit. Dat de verschijnselen die wij als kwaad beschouwen in de bovengenoemde zin ambigu zijn betekent nog niet dat het oordeel dat iets een kwaad is, subjectief is. Wanneer wij van een handeling zeggen dat deze

⁶ Ik heb geprobeerd dit te doen in mijn 'A Moved Mover? The (Im)passibility of God,' in: Gijsbert van den Brink & Marcel Sarot (eds.), *Understanding the Attributes of God*, Frankfurt aM: Peter Lang, 1999, 119–137.

moreel verkeerd is, zeggen wij meer dan dat wij tegen die handeling zijn, of dat die handeling ons slecht uitkomt. Met uitspraken als ‘Laat hem met rust! Hij heeft je niets misdaan!’ ‘Kom op, je hebt het beloofd!’ doen wij een beroep op een *objectieve* standaard. Wij zouden heel verbaasd zijn als degene die wij aanspraken zou zeggen ‘Ik heb het goed recht iedereen het leven zuur te maken, of hij me nu iets misdaan heeft of niet’ of ‘Wat maakt het uit dat ik het beloofd heb? Beloftes hebben geen enkele waarde!’ Wij veronderstellen dat wij een objectieve morele standaard delen met de aangesprokene; die morele standaard wordt wel *natuurwet* genoemd.⁷ Ook al is in de meta-ethiek de gedachte van een natuurwet niet onomstreden, de objectiviteit van het begrip ‘moreel kwaad’ is nog steeds verondersteld in veel van wat wij doen en zeggen.

5 De oorsprong van het kwaad

Wij hebben al gezien dat verschillende religies op verschillende manieren omgaan met het kwaad. In sommige religies is het kwaad (en de bestrijding ervan) belangrijker dan andere, en het kan bovendien variëren welke vorm van kwaad als het meest problematisch wordt gezien. Onze visie op het kwaad is nog in een ander opzicht religieus bepaald, namelijk als het gaat om de vraag waar het kwaad vandaan komt. Een klassiek antwoord is dat er kwade en goede machten zijn. Vaak zegt men dan dat die kwade machten uiteindelijk teruggaan op één kwade hoofdmacht, terwijl de goede machten teruggaan op één goede hoofdmacht. Dan hebben wij te maken met kosmisch dualisme.⁸ De oudste vorm van kosmisch dualisme die wij kennen is het zoroastrianisme of mazdeïsme. In deze Perzische religie, wier wortels teruggaan tot ver voor onze jaartelling, zijn twee even sterke machten in een kosmisch duel verwickeld. Mensen moeten tussen die twee machten kiezen, en omdat ze even

⁷ Vgl. C.S. Lewis, *Mere Christianity*, London: Fontana Books, ⁵1958, 15–19; vgl. Thomas van Aquino, *STh* I-II, qq. 91–94, Ned. vert. in Thomas van Aquino, *Over de wet*, vert. M.A.J.M. Buijsen, Baarn: Ambo, 1996.

⁸ Kort en goed over dualisme: Peter Vardy & Julie Arliss, *The Thinker's Guide to Evil*, Australia: MediaCom, 2003, 20–29.

sterk zijn staat niet van tevoren vast welke de strijd zal winnen, ook al worden mensen natuurlijk geacht de kant van het goede te kiezen. Maar ook het platonisme, het manicheïsme en de gnostiek zijn dualistisch. In het platonisme schiept de demiurg de wereld, waarbij hij de eeuwige ideeën gebruikt om vorm te geven aan chaotische, in tijd en ruimte bestaande materie. Het is die materie die het kwade beginsel is. Het manicheïsme is een dualistische vorm van joods christendom, die echter de macht van de duisternis voor even sterk houdt als die van het licht. De manicheeërs kenden, net als sommige hedendaagse religieuze groeperingen, vrienden (*auditores*) en leden (*electi*). De laatsten mochten onder meer niet werken en niet vechten en leefden celibatair. Door deze ascetische levenswijze konden zij het rijk van het licht bereiken, waarvoor gewone schepselen meer levens nodig hadden. In de gnostiek werd Jezus beschouwd als een wijsheidsleraar die geheime kennis kwam brengen, die zijn volgelingen in staat stelde zich te ontworstelen aan de materiële wereld.

De gedachte dat goed en kwaad in een onbesliste strijd zijn verwickeld heeft tot op de dag van vandaag een zekere aantrekkingskracht, zoals bijvoorbeeld blijkt uit de invloed van deze gedachte op de literatuur (van *In de ban van de ring* tot *Harry Potter*).⁹ Ook in bepaalde evangelicale en pinkstergroeperingen krijgt het demonische zoveel aandacht, dat men in de praktijk in de richting van een dualisme gaat. Het christendom heeft het dualisme echter steeds willen vermijden. De duivel is geen gelijkwaardige tegenspeler van God, maar een gevallen engel die weliswaar veel schade aan kan richten, maar uiteindelijk geen schijn van kans maakt tegen God. Op dit punt – net als op vele andere – was de visie van Augustinus van Hippo (354–430) bepalend voor de christelijke traditie na hem. Augustinus was na een christelijke opvoeding een tijdlang manicheeër. Nadat hij zich tot het christendom had bekeerd, bestreed hij de manicheeërs en hun dualisme fel. Augustinus wees erop dat in de eerste verzen van Genesis God wel het licht schiep, maar niet de duisternis:

⁹ Vgl. C. Neil Robinson, 'Good and Evil in Popular Children's Fantasy Fiction: How Archetypes Become Stereotypes that Cultivate the Next Generation of Sun Readers,' *English in Education* 37/2, 2003, 29–36.

- 3) Toen zei God: ‘Er moet licht zijn!’ En er was licht.
- 4) En God zag dat het licht goed was. God scheidde het licht van de duisternis;
- 5) het licht noemde God dag, en de duisternis noemde Hij nacht.

Hij trekt hieruit de conclusie dat er maar één Schepper is, die alles vanuit het niets heeft geschapen. Het kwaad is niet geschapen, want het is niet iets, maar niets. Het is het bederf dat de goede schepping heeft aangetast.¹⁰ De technische term hiervoor is dat het kwaad een *privatio boni* is, een beroving van het goede waar men dat wel zou mogen verwachten. De genoemde voorwaarde (waar men dat wel zou mogen verwachten) is van belang omdat de afwezigheid van iets goeds lang niet altijd kwaad is. De afwezigheid van vleugels bij een mens is geen *privatio*, bij een vogel wel.¹¹ Deze theorie is niet alleen van toepassing op het non-morele kwaad, maar ook op de andere vormen van kwaad. Wat het morele kwaad betreft, ziet zij bijvoorbeeld in een ondeugd de afwezigheid van een deugd, in lafheid de afwezigheid van moed, en in gierigheid de afwezigheid van vrijgevigheid.¹²

In onze tijd zijn wij ons meer dan ooit bewust hoeveel kwaad er in de wereld plaatsvindt. Door de vele media waarover wij beschikken, zitten wij als het ware met onze neus bovenop oorlogen of natuurrampen elders op de wereld. Daarom is het goed om te beseffen, dat wanneer Augustinus zegt dat het kwaad een beroving van het goede is, hij niet bedoelt de werkelijkheid van het kwaad te

¹⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei* XI 9.22, XII 3, *Confessiones* VII 12–13, XII, *De natura boni contra Manichaeos*, *Enchiridion* 10–16; vgl. John Hick, *Evil and the God of Love* (herdruk van de derde druk uit 1985), London: Macmillan, 1990, 54–55, 179–181.

¹¹ Thomas van Aquino, *STh* I 48,3 c; 48,5 ad 1; vgl. Peter Vardy, *The Puzzle of Evil*, Londen: HarperCollins, 1992, 22.

¹² Augustinus, *Enchiridion* 11; vgl. Mary Midgley, *Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, 12–14.

ontkennen.¹³ Augustinus wil twee zaken veilig stellen. In de eerste plaats: het kwaad is geen zelfstandige macht tegenover God. En in de tweede plaats: het kwaad is ook geen schepping van God, en dus niet door God gewild. Het is geen schepping, maar bederf van de schepping. Kwaad heeft geen bestaan in zichzelf; het parasiteert op het goede. Je zou het kunnen vergelijken met roest: roest heeft geen zelfstandig bestaan; het parasiteert op ijzer. Niemand maakt roest; maar wel maken mensen stalen voorwerpen die tot op zekere hoogte voor corrosie gevoelig zijn, en op den duur meestal daadwerkelijk corroderen. Het roest tast dan het staal aan en vreet het op den duur zelfs weg; toch kan het slechts bestaan, voorzover het staal dat het aantast bestaat. Als dat volledig verdwenen is, heeft ook het roest zelf geen plaats meer. Zo is het ook met het kwaad: dat is niet geschapen, maar het is een aantasting van het geschapene, dat het aanvreet en ondermijnt; en toch kan kwaad slechts bestaan, voorzover het goede waarop het parasiteert bestaat.

Aan deze opvatting over de oorsprong van het kwaad correspondeert een heel specifieke opvatting over kwade handelingen. Als het kwaad niet iets is, maar niets, en als het geen zelfstandig bestaan heeft, kan men het kwade ook niet nastreven. Het is Thomas van Aquino geweest, die deze opvatting een- en andermaal naar voren heeft gebracht. Aan de hand van een paar voorbeelden wil ik duidelijk maken wat hij bedoelt. Een dief streeft iets goeds na, namelijk materiële welstand, maar hij doet dat op een verkeerde, ongeordende manier. Hetzelfde geldt voor iemand die overspel bedrijft. Ook die streeft iets goeds na, namelijk seksuele bevrediging, maar ook in dit geval gebeurt dit op een verkeerde, ongeordende manier, namelijk buiten het huwelijk. Voor Thomas is het derhalve zo, dat niemand het kwaad omwille van zichzelf nastreeft; als men iets kwaads doet, dan probeert men op een verkeerde manier iets goeds te bereiken.¹⁴

¹³ Contra Sjoerd Bonting, 'Argumenten uit natuurwetenschap en theologie voor een chaostheologie,' *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* 39, 1999, 265-284, sectie 6.

¹⁴ Thomas van Aquino, *ScG* III, 3-6, Ned. vert. in Rudi te Velde (red.), *Thomas over goed en kwaad*, Ambo: Baarn 1993, 23-24; vgl. Brian Davies, *Thomas Aquinas on God and Evil*, Oxford: OUP, 2011, 65-78

Graag constateer ik hier allereerst dat hier de opvattingen van Augustinus en Thomas radicaal tegenovergesteld zijn aan die van het dualisme. In het dualisme zijn goed en kwaad tegenovergestelde machten, die elk hun eigen redelijkheid hebben; men dient de een of men dient de ander. Wie echter meent dat het kwaad parasiteert op het goede, kan nooit zonder contradictie het kwaad als zodanig nastreven. Dat bestaat namelijk niet! Men kan hooguit – en dat is ernstig genoeg – al het goede ondermijnen. Maar het impliciete einddoel van het ondermijnen van al het goede is het niets, en niet het kwade. Men kan zich afvragen of deze opvatting voldoende recht doet aan de afgrondelijkheid van het kwaad, aan de diepte en kracht waarmee het kwaad insnijdt. In de praktijk heeft men in het christendom vaak geprobeerd recht te doen aan de ernst van het kwaad door over de duivel te spreken als ware het een zelfstandige macht, en over sommige boosdoeners als waren zij duivelaanbidders. Daarmee doen resten van dualisme hun intrede binnen het christendom.

Er zijn echter goede redenen om aan te nemen dat juist de opvatting van kwaad als *privatio boni* de zuigende werking van het kwaad goed kan verklaren. ‘Een halve waarheid is erger dan een hele leugen,’ zegt het spreekwoord. Een hele leugen heeft niets geloofwaardigs, maar een halve waarheid wel, namelijk het restant waarheid dat er in aanwezig is. Wie het Nazisme of de Islamitische Staat (IS) voorstelt als waren zij louter kwaad, kan niet begrijpen waarom zij aanhangers hadden en hebben. Het is juist het feit dat zij ook goede kanten hebben, dat het mogelijk maakt dat mensen door het Nazisme en IS misleid worden. Het onderkennen van dit goede is niet de eerste stap in de richting van een omarming, maar juist een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor de bestrijding. Het inzicht dat een en dezelfde werkelijkheid veelal vanuit verschillende invalshoeken verschillend moet worden beoordeeld (zie boven waar het om de kruisdood van Jezus gaat) kan hierbij van dienst zijn, doordat het kan helpen om niet te blijven hangen in de gedachte dat goed en kwaad in onze werkelijkheid in een onontwarbare kluwen met elkaar verstrikt zijn geraakt. Het komt er in veel gevallen juist op aan, de kluwen wel te

en Carlo Leget, ‘Aquinas on Evil,’ *Jaarboek Thomas Instituut te Utrecht* 13, 1993, 161–187.

ontwarren en daardoor in staat te zijn, te begrijpen op welke manier het kwaad verleidelijk is, en derhalve ook na te denken over de vraag, hoe wij het beoogde goed kunnen bereiken zonder kwade neveneffecten.

6. Als de koppen van de Leviathan...

Het oude nabije Oosten kende de Leviathan, een veelkoppig zeemonster. Ook in het Oude Testament vindt men aanwijzingen van een strijd tussen JHWH en de Leviathan, die daar ‘een chaosmacht die naast of tegenover God staat’¹⁵ is. Maar waar elders in het oude nabije Oosten deze chaosmacht niet onder deed voor de goden, is in het Oude Testament eerder sprake van een ‘beteugeld dualisme’: tegen JHWH is de Leviathan niet opgewassen.¹⁶ In zijn afscheidscollage aan de Universiteit Utrecht heeft Bob Becking laten zien dat, ook waar tegenwoordig nog slechts weinigen geloven in het bestaan van dit veelkoppige monster, het als symbool nog springlevend is. Becking ziet ‘Leviathan’ als label dat ‘gebruikt kan worden om het onbenoembare en bedreigende van een diepgevoelde angst aan te geven’ en betoogt dat ‘met het plakken van dat label de eerste stap gezet is op de weg uit de angst.’¹⁷

In het voorgaande heb ik geprobeerd te laten zien dat iets soortgelijks geldt voor het begrip kwaad. Net als de Leviathan is het een veelkoppig monster. Wij moeten onderscheiden tussen moreel kwaad, non-moreel kwaad, fysisch kwaad en metafysisch kwaad. Concrete verschijnselen kunnen steeds vanuit verschillende perspectieven worden gezien, en het hangt mede van het perspectief af, hoe men ze zal waarderen. Zo kan een en hetzelfde verschijnsel tegelijkertijd fysisch kwaad, moreel kwaad én moreel goed zijn. Absoluut kwaad bestaat niet; alle kwaad is vermengd met goed, en parasiteert op iets goeds. Deze slang met vele koppen heeft iets van

¹⁵ Bob Becking, *De Leviathan toen en nu: Herkomst, geschiedenis en functie van een monster*, Utrecht: UU, 2015, 9. Opsomming van alle Bijbelteksten waarin het monster voorkomt, en bespreking van de belangrijkste bij Becking, *Leviathan*, 5–9.

¹⁶ Becking, *Leviathan*, 8.

¹⁷ Becking, *Leviathan*, 19.

een kluwen die zich lastig laat ontwarren. Daarom is het enerzijds van belang om nooit op al te abstracte wijze louter van ‘het kwaad’ te spreken zonder aan de hand van concrete voorbeelden duidelijk te maken waar men het over heeft.¹⁸ En wanneer men over concrete voorbeelden van kwaad spreekt, zal men de in het voorgaande aangebrachte onderscheidingen nodig hebben in de analyse van dat kwaad.

Anderzijds kunnen wij niet volstaan met het bespreken van concrete voorbeelden van kwaad. Wij hebben ook meer omvattende begrippen nodig. ‘De Leviathan’ is aantrekkelijk vanwege zijn veelkoppigheid; die is bijzonder passend vanwege de veelvormigheid van het kwaad. Maar het hebben van een abstract begrip voor al het kwade – een abstract begrip waarvan wij hebben gezien dat het geen vanzelfsprekendheid is, en dat de specifieke inhoud religieus wordt bepaald – helpt niet alleen als eerste stap op weg uit de angst, maar ook om een aantal verschijnselen onder één noemer te vatten die dienen te worden bestreden.¹⁹ Zoals George Sand zou hebben gezegd: ‘Een kwaad aanwijzen is het bestrijden.’²⁰

¹⁸ Marcel Sarot, ‘Een feministische conceptualisering van het kwaad?’ in: W. van Dooren & T. Hoff (red.), *Aktueel filosoferen*, Delft: Eburon: 1993, 280–284.

¹⁹ Sarot, ‘Feministische conceptualisering,’ 282.

²⁰ <https://citaten.net/zoeken/citaten-bestrijden.html>. Het is mij niet gelukt, dit citaat terug te vinden in het werk van George Sand.

SUMMARY

In this article I discuss the concept of evil. I begin by showing that the concept of evil is not religiously neutral. Here, I will discuss the Western view of evil, influenced by Judaism and Christianity. Subsequently, I discuss Leibniz's classic distinction between three forms of evil - metaphysical, physical and moral - and introduce the categories of natural and non-moral evil. Next, I show that one and the same event may be good in one respect and evil in another. Thus, the passion of Christ is a physical evil when we look at the suffering undergone, a moral evil when we look at the act of those who inflict it on Him, and a moral good when we look at the act of Christ: He gives His life for His friends. This I call the ambiguity of evil. Finally, I discuss two views on the origin of evil: dualism and the view of evil as a privation of a good that should be there, and argue in favour of the second.

